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Our world is edging closer to the realisation of pervasive systems and their integration in 
our everyday life. While pervasive systems are capable of offering many benefits for 
everyone, the amount and quality of personal information that becomes available raise 
concerns about maintaining user privacy and create a real need to reform existing privacy 
practices and provide appropriate safeguards for the user of pervasive environments.  
This thesis presents the PERSOnalised Negotiation, Identity Selection and Management 
(PersoNISM) system; a comprehensive approach to privacy protection in pervasive 
environments using context aware dynamic personalisation and behaviour learning. The 
aim of the PersoNISM system is twofold: to provide the user with a comprehensive set of 
privacy protecting tools and to help them make the best use of these tools according to 
their privacy needs. The PersoNISM system allows users to: a) configure the terms and 
conditions of data disclosure through the process of privacy policy negotiation, which 
addresses the current “take it or leave it” approach; b) use multiple identities to interact 
with pervasive services to avoid the accumulation of vast amounts of personal 
information in a single user profile; and c) selectively disclose information based on the 
type of information, who requests it, under what context, for what purpose and how the 
information will be treated. The PersoNISM system learns user privacy preferences by 
monitoring the behaviour of the user and uses them to personalise and/or automate the 
decision making processes in order to unburden the user from manually controlling these 
complex mechanisms. 
The PersoNISM system has been designed, implemented, demonstrated and evaluated 
during three EU funded projects.  
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1 Introduction 
“The most profound technologies are those that disappear. They weave themselves into 
the fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable from it” [1]. The above quote 
could be the most often cited quote in the literature of Ubiquitous Environments but it 
marked the beginning of a new era in computing research; that of pervasive computing. 
For twenty five years, research on pervasive and ubiquitous environments has been 
ongoing but it is still far from entering our homes and our daily lives. One of the most 
important problems being faced is the ability of such systems to invade users' privacy. 
Pervasive and Ubiquitous systems perform effectively when they have access to 
information about the user such as preferences, interests, goals, intents, environmental 
(context information) as well as personal information. The one aspect of pervasive 
computing that concerns users most is the system's need to monitor this information about 
them at all times. Thus, it is imperative that any such system revolves around the user and 
is solely controlled by the user. Assuming that a pervasive system platform meets this 
requirement, it cannot exist in a vacuum. For it to be successful, it has to facilitate the 
interaction of users with other entities such as other users and pervasive services. This 
interaction often requires personal data to be disclosed.   
 The issue of Privacy in Pervasive Systems 
Pervasive and ubiquitous systems will be driven by information about the users they are 
empowering. This thesis is primarily focused on the personal information that is 
accumulated about a user in such systems and how it will be disclosed, communicated 
and processed by those systems. There are clearly potential threats to the privacy of users 
when so much personal information is collected and disseminated and it is the 
responsibility of these systems to provide appropriate mechanisms to protect the privacy 
of their users. The research presented in this thesis addresses the issue of controlling 
disclosures that might infringe the privacy of a user. It is assumed that adequate security 
mechanisms to prevent unauthorised access will be present in any pervasive system. 
The majority of services available in a pervasive and ubiquitous world will adapt to the 
preferences and contextual situation of their users. The preferences of the users could be 
accumulated directly from them by manually entering information into the system or by 
monitoring their behaviour and interactions with the system, identifying common patterns 
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of behaviour in specific contexts and inferring user preferences and intents based on them. 
Information about the contextual situation of users will be collected via sensors, networks 
and the devices which they use. This primary context information may also be processed 
to infer secondary, higher-order, contextual information. For many services, the more 
information they can access about the user, the more useful and appealing they will be to 
the user.  
Personal information is valuable and can be exploited for financial benefit [2]. As an 
example, consider a restaurant finding service that allows the user to enter a location such 
as a city and then lists the restaurants in that city. Such a service would be more useful if 
it is able to use the current location of the user to suggest restaurants near the current 
location of the user. It would also be more useful if the service had information about the 
type of restaurant the user preferred, the type of food they would like to eat as well as the 
preferences of the people accompanying them to the restaurant. As the user consumes 
such services and discloses information such as current location, personal interests, 
preferences, activities etc., reasoning and inference algorithms could be used to deduce 
more information about the user. The more information that exists about the user, the 
better inference can be made about other preferences and habits of the user. For instance, 
it would be possible that the service monitored the location of the user and the time spent 
in each location to infer what restaurants the user prefers without the user explicitly 
providing this information. The accumulation of increasing quantities of information 
about the user would effectively allow the services to build profiles of their users which 
can be a dangerous characteristic of such systems and give rise to concern [3]. Further, 
the accumulation of this information without the user being aware that this information 
exists about them is even more concerning. 
Information such as this can be used very effectively to make profit in targeted advertising 
[4]. Information is stored in the services’ servers and processed accordingly to find 
similarities, habits and traits of the users in order to offer products and services that are 
better tailored to the users. Using the restaurant finder service again as an example, 
consider the scenario of two people using this service meeting regularly at a restaurant. 
The service could infer that these two users know each other due to the fact that they were 
at the same location at the same time for roughly the same period of time on more than 
one occasion. This information is inferred by the service and can be used later for other 
purposes. What is important in this example scenario is the fact that the user may be 
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unaware this information is stored in the service's servers and can be used for any number 
of purposes.   
This processing of information without any restrictions, may also infer wrong information 
about the user or information that they would prefer not to be disclosed. Consider the 
scenario that a user is visiting a clinic specialising in certain diseases to request 
information on behalf of a friend. It could be wrongly inferred that the user is a patient in 
this clinic based only on the fact that the user is located at the clinic for a specified amount 
of time. This becomes part of the user’s record in the system and could be disclosed to 
other parties at a later time which could be embarrassing or even harmful to the user 
and/or their reputation depending on the situation.  
If appropriate safeguarding mechanisms do not exist in the system, the services will be 
allowed to access and process any kind of information about the user and use it to their 
benefit without considering the privacy of the user. Finally, it is also possible that 
information will be traded between services that have business relationships with each 
other. Information about transactions that have taken place with one service will be 
merged and processed with information about transactions with other services, thus 
resulting in the collection of vast amounts of information about users. In real life, users 
maintain a separation of their information depending on the context of their interactions. 
Depending on the role they undertake in each instance, they present themselves 
differently. For example, different interaction occurs between a user and their neighbour 
and a user and their colleagues or bosses. So, appropriate mechanisms must exist to allow 
users to implement the same interaction patterns in the digital world as they do in real 
life.  
 The status quo in digital privacy 
In their everyday encounters with services on the World Wide Web, users are often 
presented with the terms and conditions and the privacy statements of the services they 
are using. However, a very small fraction of users take the time to read them before 
agreeing to them. One of the problems behind this trend of the users is the manner in 
which the privacy policy statements are presented on the websites. Some of the users are 
unable to comprehend the content of the statements because of the legal jargon they 
contain [5]. Other users don’t bother to read them because they are not aware of the 
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dangers they potentially put themselves in. As for the small percentage of users that take 
the time to read them, the only options that are available to them are to use or not to use 
a service. There is no option to change the terms and conditions for using a service to fit 
the privacy demands of the user. If a user needs to use a service, they will therefore have 
to agree to the terms and conditions laid out by the service with no input from them [3]. 
In traditional systems, the information disclosed may not be as personal as in the world 
of pervasive and ubiquitous systems. In the latter, the amount of information that can be 
accumulated from sensors and monitoring systems and the quality and sensitivity of that 
pose much greater risk to privacy than in traditional systems.  
Almost every service provides a document with the service’s terms and conditions and a 
document with the privacy policies that describes the privacy practices of the service. 
These are actually terms of a contract between the user and the service. When the users 
“click” the “I Agree to the Terms & Conditions” button without reading them, they are 
clearly signing a contract without reading it. In the non-digital world, this action would 
almost never occur as people are quite reluctant to sign a contract they don’t understand. 
However, experience shows us that in the digital world, this reluctance disappears as these 
agreements are not perceived as real contracts. Hence, it is very important to provide 
mechanisms to protect the users and attract their attention to the privacy policies and 
practices of the services they use and allow them measures of flexibility on how to use 
the services with a level of risk to their privacy that is acceptable to them.  
 Aims and Objectives 
In a pervasive system, information about the user is constantly collected, processed, 
disclosed and shared to adapt the user’s environment to meet their needs and preferences. 
Research into existing solutions shows that traditional access control mechanisms and 
privacy practice notifications lack required capabilities to address the privacy 
requirements of pervasive systems [6]. There is a real need to allow users to dictate the 
terms for disclosing their own data, to provide appropriate tools to selectively disclose 
information based on the benefit they receive by doing so, and, to help them maintain the 
level of privacy they desire using personalised suggestions regarding the handling of 
personal data based on past decisions. This thesis addresses this need by proposing the 
PersoNISM system, an intelligent privacy protection framework for pervasive 
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environments that amalgamates privacy enhancing technologies and personalisation 
practices.  
The primary objective is to enable the user to remain in control of their data during and 
after their data is disclosed. Thus, the first step is to identify appropriate privacy 
enhancing technologies that can satisfy this requirement. Privacy policy negotiation 
allows users to change the terms and conditions for data disclosure and handling to fit 
their needs. It provides a solution to the “take it or leave it” approach currently in use.  
The use of multiple identities and context-dependent identity selection support the user 
in organising their information and using it depending on the current context and activity 
of the user. This approach prevents the accumulation of vast amounts of information 
linked to a single user profile as a) it segregates the user profile into smaller parts that are 
grouped together for a specific task and b) identities of a single user are not linked to each 
other so they appear to belong to different users. Finally, a dynamic access control 
mechanism enhanced by utilising data obfuscation algorithms allows the user to disclose 
different information in varying quality depending on the situation and the service they 
are interacting with.  
When users are provided with such tools, they can become overwhelmed by the 
information they need to keep track of and the configurations they need to perform to 
protect their privacy. This leads to user fatigue and eventually may discourage users from 
using the tools properly. Moreover, as more user information accumulates in the system, 
it is not reasonable to expect users to remember what information they disclosed to whom 
and under what conditions. Thus, the second objective is to help users maintain the 
desired level of privacy for their data by personalising or automating the processes 
involved according to their preferences. By monitoring the user’s decisions regarding the 
handling and disclosure of their data, the system can learn user privacy preference rules, 
using a behaviour learning algorithm, that reflect their privacy requirements. These 
privacy preference rules can be used later to either suggest to the user suitable privacy 
decisions or to enforce automatically if the user wishes so.  
The final objective of this thesis is to assess how well the proposed PersoNISM system 
satisfies these requirements. Initially, an online questionnaire was used to collect 
information regarding users’ online data disclosure habits aiming at gauging the level of 
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awareness of privacy of the average user.  Subsequently, a user trial was conducted, in 
which users evaluated the PersoNISM system by providing real personal information.  
To summarise, below is a list of objectives of this thesis: 
1. To enable users to remain in control of their data 
a. To design a privacy policy negotiation algorithm 
b. To develop a system for managing multiple identities 
c. To design a dynamic context-aware access control mechanism with data 
obfuscation capabilities 
2. To assist users in maintaining their privacy 
a. To design a mechanism for dynamic context-dependent privacy 
preferences 
b. To design an appropriate algorithm for learning privacy preferences 
c. To develop a system for automating privacy decision making 
3. To evaluate the proposed algorithms, mechanisms and systems 
a. To assess the extent to which users are currently aware of privacy issues 
and in need of the proposed solutions 
b. To evaluate the perceived value and usability of the solutions implemented 
in the PersoNISM system 
 Thesis Overview 
Chapter 2 provides a review of the current state of art in pervasive systems in general and 
in the areas of privacy, personalisation and personalised privacy specifically in the context 
of pervasive systems.  
Chapter 3 presents the architecture of three pervasive platforms of the EU projects 
DAIDALOS, PERSIST and SOCIETIES respectively in which the author has worked on 
the areas of personalisation and privacy protection frameworks. 
Chapter 4 gives an overview of personalisation practices in pervasive systems, focusing 
on the use of user preferences as a tool for personalising pervasive services.  
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Chapter 5 discusses the use of privacy policies and multiple identities as tools for privacy 
protection and presents the privacy policy negotiation concept as well as the importance 
of identity selection and data obfuscation. 
Chapter 6 presents the PersoNISM personalised privacy protection system that is based 
on a set of dynamic context aware user preference rules used to guide the system to 
perform intelligent privacy policy negotiation, identity selection and data management on 
behalf of the user.  
Chapter 7 presents the evaluation and testing performed on the PersoNISM system. 
Specifically, the results of a questionnaire on user behaviour regarding privacy, and a user 
trial of the PersoNISM system are presented which show how well the system managed 
to satisfy the participant users’ privacy requirements. 
Chapter 8 concludes with a summary of the PersoNISM system, a discussion on the 
achievements of the aims and objectives of the PersoNISM system and an outline of 
future work that can be performed to extend the capabilities of the PersoNISM system. 
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2  Related Work  
The work presented in this thesis relates to three different research areas: pervasive 
computing, personalisation and privacy protection. There has been a lot of discussion on 
the issue of privacy with regards to personalisation and context awareness in services of 
pervasive environments. The problem remains universally unsolved as the development 
of the technology always precedes legislation controlling its use. The fact that the services 
are offered on the Internet increases the difficulty of implementing current laws to 
safeguard the privacy of the users as countries will implement their own flavour of 
privacy laws. As pervasive systems are not yet mature enough to exist everywhere, it is 
safe to assume that laws will not be considered until these systems are in effect and their 
consequences on user privacy become more pronounced. This chapter provides the state 
of the art in pervasive and ubiquitous systems in which personalisation and context 
awareness are inherent, and describes the privacy protection mechanisms developed in 
these systems.  
 Pervasive and Ubiquitous Systems  
 “The most profound technologies are those that disappear. They weave themselves into 
the fabric of everyday life until they are indistinguishable from it.”  
Mark Weiser, 1991 [1] 
Mark Weiser envisioned a world saturated by computing devices, collaborating, sharing 
resources and data to aid users in their everyday tasks. Mark Weiser’s vision describes an 
environment of invisible computing devices anticipating their users’ needs, helping users 
accomplish tasks without distracting from the tasks themselves. To accomplish this, the 
system must be context-aware. In Satyanarayanan’s words, “it must be cognizant of its 
user’s state and surroundings, and must modify its behaviour based on this information” 
[7]. Hence, a pervasive and ubiquitous system is a computing infrastructure available 
anywhere anytime, able to monitor the activity and behaviour of its users and the 
environment they inhabit and configure it according to their current needs and wishes. 
Project Aura [8] from Carnegie Mellon University, targeted the integration of existing 
software and hardware technologies into a pervasive framework [9]. Two basic concepts 
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that drove the research in Aura are proactivity and self-tuning. Proactivity is a very 
important concept of a pervasive system and refers to the ability of the system to pre-
determine the goals and expectations of a user and try to meet them by performing actions 
on the user’s behalf. Self-tuning is the ability of a pervasive system to react to context 
changes and proactivity requirements to enable the system to be available always and 
everywhere with the best possible performance [9]. Proactivity and self-tuning are 
implemented through Aura’s Prism layer: a task layer sitting on top of all the other layers 
in the architecture including the Application Layer. The Prism layer represents User Intent 
and communicates this to services and applications required to accomplish an intended 
task. The basic functionality of the Prism architecture includes: i) representation of user 
tasks as sets of abstract services implemented by a Task Manager, ii) context management 
and context event management to reconfigure tasks appropriately implemented by a 
Context Observer and iii) event management to react to changes and reconfigure the 
environment implemented by an Environment Manager. Figure 1 shows the Prism 
Architecture.  
 
 Project Aura: The Prism Architecture. 
MIT’s project Oxygen [10] is a large effort to construct Intelligent Environments (IE) that 
control a wide range of available devices, sensors, resources and services embedded in 
these IEs, to provide both proactive and reactive services to its users [11]. Mobility plays 
a crucial role for all pervasive systems as location changes have to trigger re-configuration 
of devices which include service re-compositions, session transfers and network 
handovers. The Intelligent Room is a sub project of Oxygen inside MIT research which 
attempts to create a multi-agent based context aware home or office environment using 
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context management and Artificial Intelligence practices which include speech 
recognition as input to infer user behaviour and implement proactivity. The Intelligent 
Room facilitates Intelligent Environments (IEs); an IE controls all aspects of physical and 
digital devices and software that affects that environment (laptops, smart phones, 
databases, software agents, services, etc.). The research of the Intelligent Room focused 
on architecting a system that reacts to the user’s behaviour in a context aware fashion, 
automatically allocating shared resources needed for the currently performed tasks and 
finally enabling collaboration between multiple physical and digital spaces. The 
Intelligent Room architecture is based on software agents controlling specific resources 
arranged hierarchically depending on the task that is being performed. Each agent 
communicates and exchanges control and data messages regarding the resource it 
manages. A context management component collects data from agents, processes them, 
and instigates actions in the system according to the collected data. ReBA is a context 
reactive behavioural system facilitating the representation of context information by 
constructing a model of the environment based on the current activity being performed. 
The detected activity indicates what kind of resources are needed and how they should be 
used to perform the intended tasks.  
Another example of an agent-based system is Digital Me (D-Me) [12], a multi-agent 
system supporting personalised ubiquitous interaction. Two entities are envisioned, the 
D-Me Context-Aware Agent representing the user, and the environment that provides 
resources and services with which the user interacts. The aim of the D-Me Agent is to 
assist the user with as little user intervention as possible, in accomplishing a set of tasks 
in a smart environment using context information and a to-do list defined by the user or 
some behaviour learning agent. The D-Me distributed architecture places the user profile 
data in the handheld device of the user to allow for availability of the data at all times.  
The Gaia Operating System [13] [14] is a middleware infrastructure for Active Spaces. 
An Active Space is defined as a dynamically constructed space defined by a geographic 
space with physical boundaries, the set of resources and services currently available, its 
users and active sessions of users interacting with the resources and services. The Gaia 
OS provides context, event, resource and user session management to facilitate the 
processes in all current Active Spaces. User sessions are managed by the Gaia OS and 
associate user data and applications with users. The Gaia OS maintains user session 
information to enable seamless transition between Active Spaces as users leave one space 
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and enter another. To facilitate pervasive service provision in areas with no infrastructure, 
the Mobile Gaia OS was developed as a middleware for ad-hoc pervasive computing. The 
Mobile Gaia OS allows the creation of “Personal Active Spaces” connected through close 
proximity networks such as Bluetooth, IrDA or GPRS [15].  
Microsoft’s EasyLiving project [16] is a prototype to create middleware software to 
manage devices and services in a home and work environment. The goal of the 
EasyLiving software is to move away from the desktop environment and allow users to 
take advantage of the environment. Using a multitude of sensors and control devices, it 
tries to assist the user in interacting with intelligent environments by getting interfaces to 
move with the user. The EasyLiving project focused on creating easy to use world models 
that represent objects, devices, resources and services in smart environments using 
geometric models [17]. The geometric models are dynamic, constantly updating as the 
user roams the environment, providing information about the location of the user and the 
sessions they are involved in. While previous projects have focused on realising Weiser’s 
vision for invisible computing and seamless pervasive functionality, the EasyLiving 
project exposes the user to the pervasive technology.   
A lot of effort has been placed on the design and architecture of pervasive systems. While 
most of the underlying technologies already exist to implement such systems, integrating 
them all together proves to be a very difficult task. 
The term pervasive system will be used throughout this thesis to include ubiquitous 
computing systems, user adaptive systems and ambient intelligent environments which 
vary slightly in their emphasis but an issue common to them all is privacy.  
 Personalisation  
Most of the published research papers regarding personalisation refer to the 
personalisation or customisation of web services or mobile services, specifically 
addressing personalised service composition [18]. Several definitions of Personalisation 
exist among which, [19] defines it as: “Personalisation and customisation refers to the 
ability of an Internet Web site or service to be shaped or reshaped so as to better meet the 
individual needs or wants of a user”. Jørstad and Dustdar [18] agree with this while 
adapting this definition to concern mobile services instead of Internet Web sites or 
services, even though the architecture defined targets both stationary and mobile services.  
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Initially the focus of the research on personalisation concerned the personalisation of web 
services for marketing purposes. Much research was carried out looking for efficient ways 
to offer specific marketed products to users based on their previous transactions, searches 
and interests, all of which are parts of a profile. As a result, a number of recommender 
systems were developed that would benefit the user during her visits to e-commerce 
websites by recommending lists of products comparable with the user’s preferences and 
budget. However, while we are interested in personalisation that improves the user 
experience, the focus of this type of research does not necessarily address that; spam 
email, spam SMS and popup browser windows are clearly an annoying side effect of this 
type of activity [18].  
The term personalisation refers to the process of adapting a service, resource or entity in 
the environment to the needs of an individual user. Personalisation aims to enhance user 
experience.  This may be in contrast to the kind of personalisation practised on the World 
Wide Web that is often more associated with providing targeted advertisements which is 
outside the scope of our research.  
The term explicit personalisation refers to the process of customising a service manually 
either by the user or the service provider. This requires that the system provides 
appropriate interfaces for the user to tweak the parameters of the service or manually edit 
user preference rules to customise the system according to their wishes.  
In 2001, Accenture Technology Labs developed two systems (MusicFX and GroupCast) 
that adapt shared physical spaces according to the interests and preferences of their users 
[20]. MusicFX controls the music that is played through the speakers of a fitness centre. 
The music is selected based on the preferred genres of the current users of the fitness 
centre. GroupCast is installed in an office environment and collects the identities and 
interests of passers-by to display content of mutual interest on a large visual display 
located in a shared working space. In both cases, the user data was collected by providing 
to the users of these systems appropriate forms to manually fill in their music genre 
preferences and interests respectively. In both cases, a relatively smart space was 
personalised to the wishes of its occupiers; however, the means for collecting the data 
needed to perform the personalisation cannot scale in a fully pervasive environment 
where not one but a large number of services will need user preference information to 
perform in a personalised pervasive manner.  
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In contrast, implicit personalisation requires that a mechanism continuously adapts the 
service to the changing environmental conditions based on information on the user’s 
behaviour that has been collected and analysed by the system [18]. Only implicit 
personalisation can fully satisfy the requirements of a pervasive computing environment.  
Implicit personalisation implies that there must be a monitoring component that allows 
user preferences to be collected in the system without the manual intervention of the user. 
2.2.1 User Modelling 
In order to perform personalisation, systems must maintain information about the user, 
structured in some form to allow querying and processing. Most commonly, user 
modelling [21] is the approach used to represent user data for the purposes of 
personalisation. A user model is used to capture the user’s interests, capabilities, beliefs, 
likes and dislikes, behaviours and other such information that can be used to personalise 
the user experience. In the context of pervasive computing, a user model must also be 
able to represent conditional behaviours, that is, behaviours that differ depending on the 
user’s current context. In the EU IST DAIDALOS project, a message redirection system 
[22] made use of a set of IF-THEN-ELSE rules to control how messages and calls were 
redirected through the system depending on the user’s current activity, location and time.  
Another complexity in the context of a pervasive infrastructure is to design a user model 
that can be leveraged by a variety of applications and services. Only the application 
developer has the requisite knowledge of the inner workings of their application. Hence, 
the user model needs to be designed in an abstract manner regardless of the semantics of 
the applications that may use it. In the EU IST project Mobilife [23], a context dependent 
user modelling system was developed to provide contextualisation and personalisation 
functionality for third party services [24].  A user profile contains all the data of the user 
which consists of sub profiles associated with one or more applications. A sub profile also 
contains the context in which its behaviours should be performed. The sub profiles are 
created by a Recommender component that analyses records of user behaviour in the 
context in which they appeared to construct user models [25].  
Several guidelines have been produced by standardization bodies assisting developers in 
formalising the representation of user data such as the 3GPP Generic User Profile [26], 
ETSI’s User Profile Management [27] and W3C Composite Capability/Preference 
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Profiles (CC/PP) [28]. The 3GPP GUP specification defines the user profile as the 
collection of user data that resides in the user’s devices, telecom operator’s servers or 
service providers and provides a standardised specification for services to access user data 
stored by different entities in the network. The W3C CC/PP model is used to describe the 
capabilities of a device so that Web content can be delivered in the appropriate format for 
that device. However, the CC/PP model is not suited for pervasive computing 
environments as it does not allow the specification of a situational (conditional) profile. 
One of the risks of automated personalisation is that the system will make a wrong 
decision due to the inability of the system to model the environment of the user in a 
manner that will make it reason in the same way that a human would. It is imperative that 
the system provides appropriate mechanisms that allow users to correct the information 
that has been collected on their behalf. This requirement affects the modelling of the 
user’s preferences and the corresponding reasoning algorithms that are applied to the 
monitored data. In some cases, it may be impossible to manually amend the underlying 
model; for example, in the case of using a Bayesian network to model the user’s behaviour 
and predict the user’s intent, it is especially difficult to design a graphical user interface 
to allow users to make changes to the network. In these cases, mechanisms are required 
to collect feedback from the user using different means and input this into the network.  
2.2.2 Recommender Systems 
Recommender systems belong to a type of personalisation that is not related to the 
personalisation usually deployed in pervasive systems. As mentioned above, 
recommender systems attempt to personalise e-commerce websites in order to provide a 
better user experience to their customers. Recommender systems rely on sophisticated 
algorithms particularly those that use Automated Collaborative Filtering (ACF). ACF 
algorithms are based on the logic that users who expressed similar opinions in the past 
will likely express the same opinions in the future. Examples of ACF are memory-based 
algorithms such as the user-based k-Nearest-Neighbor [29] and item-based k-Nearest-
Neighbor [30] where the entire set of preference information is used to generate 
recommendations, and model-based algorithms such as that of Breese et al. [31] that is 
based on Bayesian networks where preferences are fed into a model that is used to 
generate recommendations [32]. One of the drawbacks of using Bayesian models is the 
inability to view the data inside the model and make adjustments. This problem imposes 
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great difficulties for systems that need to offer users graphical user interfaces to view, 
edit or delete their preference data. Recommender systems are a small part of the wider 
range of personalisation capabilities and therefore, we will not focus on these.  
 Privacy 
Privacy in user adaptive systems is considered the greatest barrier to its long-term success 
[33]. The quality of a ubiquitous system depends on the information it possesses about 
the user’s behaviour, their activities and their preferences, data that are used to configure 
services and resources in the environment to fit the user’s needs. The issue of privacy for 
the user who is monitored constantly is at stake. A trade off needs to be made that balances 
the need for information with the user’s right to privacy [34].  
Rao et al. [35], describe privacy as “Privacy in the computer age is the right of individuals 
to protect their ability to selectively reveal information about themselves so as to negotiate 
social relationships most advantageous to them.” Earlier, Irwin Altman developed the 
Privacy Regulation Theory in which he defined privacy as “a temporal dynamic process 
of interpersonal boundary” [36][37]. Altman theorises that the more privacy one has is 
not better off. The optimum level of privacy depends on the social interactions people 
wish to have at any time and that different people use different behaviours to achieve 
them. Influenced by Altman’s theories, Petronio [38] developed the Communication 
Privacy Management Theory in which she uses the boundary metaphor to illustrate 
ownership of information, separating private from public information. The majority of 
privacy aware systems currently try to mimic the real world and implement the trust 
values that people develop during their everyday life in the digital world. The problem is, 
however, that in the real world, transactions are happening between real persons who do 
not possess the abilities of computers. Human beings tend to apply the same rules of social 
interaction to information technology as they do to other humans [39], such as the belief 
that other humans will not disclose information that is very personal to them (non-
disclosure), or that humans forget information they do not use over time, or humans’ 
ability to distinguish right from wrong and act accordingly. However, computers do not 
possess such qualities. On the contrary, acquired information can be stored indefinitely 
and combined to produce a more extensive profile of online users [40] unless appropriate 
mechanisms are in place to limit and configure how information is disclosed, processed 
and disseminated.  
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While most of the previous work on privacy has been on trying to hide the user’s 
information, ubiquitous systems require that information be released where appropriate 
so that the user benefits from personalised services in a pervasive environment [41]. 
Smart objects are dependent on as much information as they can possibly collect in order 
to serve us. However, as the amount of collected data increases, our privacy diminishes 
and the threat to privacy increases as more intelligent devices are integrated into our 
everyday life [42].  
2.3.1 Privacy Concerns 
Internet consumers have raised privacy concerns and have expressed their distrust and 
lack of confidence in the online marketplace with regards to the manner in which personal 
and sensitive information is accessed, retrieved, processed and stored [43] [44].  
Wang et al. [45] define the types of privacy threats into the following four categories: 
i) Improper acquisition of information including improper access, collection and 
monitoring. Cookies and browsing history are two examples of the means of obtaining 
user information without the user’s consent and acknowledgement. Websites store a lot 
of information about the user in order to provide a personalised experience to the user. In 
a pervasive environment, the quality and quantity of information is magnified as it is 
enhanced by sensory input and information describing the context and behaviour of the 
user outside the typical scope of a Web Service. Pervasive services and applications 
provided by third parties can gain access to such information if proper mechanisms are 
not in place to protect it. 
ii) Improper use of information such as inference and sharing. Information can be 
disclosed to third parties for specific purposes. However, any processing of this 
information to infer further information such as determining a user’s shopping patterns 
without the user’s explicit consent is unlawful, as is the sharing or selling of this 
information to others.  
iii) Privacy invasion. Spamming in the form of e-mails, RSS feeds, and mass mailing 
lists is an annoying effect of improperly acquiring user information according to Wang et 
al. Furthermore, identity theft is another dangerous by-product of improper acquisition 
and selling of user information.  
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iv) Improper storage and control of personal information. If systems or services do not 
properly store information disclosed to them users have no means to protect their 
information when stored in mediums outside their control. Moreover, if these systems do 
not allow the user to have control of the disclosed information, users are unable to retract 
or alter the information that has already been disclosed. Security and privacy components 
should provide adequate mechanisms allowing users to enforce conditions regarding the 
management and storage of their information, demand access to the information after 
disclosure and the right to limit the period of time that information is retained in third 
party servers.  
Although these privacy threats were identified in the context of a user’s interaction with 
Web Services, the same privacy threats are also present in pervasive systems. These 
privacy threats pose greater risks in the context of pervasive systems because the available 
user information in such systems is more up-to-date and more critical in identifying a 
user. An example of such information is location information. Even if location 
information is the only piece of data disclosed, it can be used to identify the user (e.g. in 
the home environment).  
In an effort to identify privacy threats and vulnerabilities against the users of Ambient 
Intelligence environments and enable developers and policy makers to provide 
appropriate privacy policies, the SWAMI (Safeguards in a World of AMbient 
Intelligence) Project produced several “dark scenarios” demonstrating situations where 
the users of pervasive systems become victims of the technology surrounding them. While 
the actual scenarios are not presented here (they can be found in [46]), the results of this 
type of research are briefly discussed below.  
The SWAMI research project focused on the following key issues: privacy, identity, 
security, trust, digital divide, loss of control, dependency, exclusion and victimisation. 
The threats identified related to privacy (and not security) are surveillance and identity 
theft. Ubiquitous systems are vulnerable to the “little” brother phenomenon. The “little 
brother” refers to the commercial companies and service providers undertaking the role 
of the state in the “Big Brother” phenomenon and being able to conduct unauthorised 
surveillance on its citizens. A ubiquitous system is vulnerable to identity theft by 
malicious persons who will take advantage of the information made available to harm the 
users of ubiquitous systems. Data laundering is a new crime related to identity theft that 
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is discussed in the dark scenarios. Data laundering is the process of making illegally 
obtained personal information seem like they were obtained legally.   
The SWAMI “dark scenarios” were created not to discourage users from using pervasive 
systems but to identify the potential threats and eliminate them so as to protect the user 
and guarantee their privacy as well as to point out the benefits of such a system. In the 
process though, these scenarios also served to remind researchers of the fine balance 
between the need for such a system and the dangers to which it can expose the user.  
2.3.2 Trust, Control and Informed consent  
Trust, control and informed consent are the three pillars for constructing privacy aware 
pervasive systems. Van der Geest states that “Creating trust, giving users control, and 
requesting informed consent are essential conditions for solving the privacy issue” [47]. 
Trust  
Trust, as in everyday life, plays a crucial role and is the one criterion by which we allow 
other people or systems access to our personal information. General trust is noted by 
Geest et al. [47] as the basic type of trust that humans have towards other people and it is 
the existence of this basic type that allows other types of trust to develop. More 
importantly, Geest et al. suggest that without a general sense of trust, users would be 
unwilling to engage in any interaction of any kind. Research has demonstrated that lack 
of trust in online systems was the major reason for users not to engage in online shopping 
[48].  
Grandison et al. define trust as “the firm belief in the competence of an entity to act 
dependably, securely and reliably within a specified context” [49] and has been adopted 
by the Wireless World Initiative (WWI). WWI emphasises the relation of trust within a 
specified context to draw attention to the fact that although entities may trust each other 
this may not be true in all contexts because different contexts pose different restrictions 
and are vulnerable to different types of threats.  
Trust in the context of privacy in pervasive systems involves trust in the services that will 
access the personal information and how this information will be used. Viewing e-
commerce websites from the spectrum of deployed services, it is easy to see that trust in 
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pervasive systems is not that different from trust in the World Wide Web. Trust can play 
a very important role in deciding to disclose information.  
Control 
Control refers to two distinct and important facets of any privacy aware system: the first 
is control over the information disclosure and the second is control over the usage and 
maintenance of the information, including the location where the data is stored and the 
provision of appropriate interfaces to remove disclosed information from services. Good 
pervasive system architectures cater for the provision of appropriate mechanisms to 
control the disclosure of information to services by providing user-friendly graphical user 
interfaces that allow users to perform access control, edit privacy preferences, read 
privacy policies and designate trusted third party services allowed to consume personal 
data. The more control a user has over what, how and when their information is disclosed, 
the more trust the user has in the system and therefore, the more willing they are to 
immerse themselves in a pervasive environment.  
Moreover, in order to design efficient, privacy aware systems, the requirement to provide 
effective mechanisms, such as Graphical User Interfaces (GUIs), to enable the user to 
view, edit and delete any personal information held on them, must be catered for. In their 
survey study, Kobsa et al. [50] found that providing the means to edit user preferences 
and privacy policies does not absolutely satisfy the requirement for the provision of 
control. Specifically, emphasis must be placed on the appearance of the graphical user 
interfaces and the presentation of data in order to impart a sense of control to the user. 
Another matter that adds more complexity to this problem is that the user interfaces have 
to be designed to fit in the small size of the device screens. Presenting complex privacy 
policies on relatively small screens can be very challenging [51]. Manber et al. [52] and 
Cranor [53] also state that even if good personalisation practices are followed and user 
interfaces are provided and privacy statements are explicitly stated, users are unwilling to 
waste time and effort to read them or edit their preferences or they are unaware that any 
such interfaces or policies exist. This latter discovery only highlights the need for a) the 
automatic learning of privacy preferences, b) the personalisation of the privacy enhancing 
technologies by software working on behalf of the user and c) the provision of explicit 
mechanisms that draw the users’ attention to such tools while the user interacts with the 
system. 
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Informed Consent  
Under the EU Data Protection Directive of 1995 (95/46) [54] and the subsequent directive 
2002/58/EC [55] on privacy and electronic communications, it is a legal requirement on 
a service to supply a mechanism to get the user’s informed consent for the acquisition of 
personal information. Earlier on, the right to be given notice of data collection and usage 
practices can be found in the 1973 U.S. Department of Housing, Education and Welfare 
Fair Information Practices (FIPs) [56]. Consent refers to the user agreeing to the 
disclosure of their information. Informed consent refers to the user agreeing to the 
information being disclosed after being fully informed of any usage policies the service 
will practise over her disclosed personal information. Apart from the legal ramifications 
of such a requirement, acquiring the informed consent of the user will also grow the user’s 
trust in the service and result in the user engaging with the service.  
Traditionally, informed consent is obtained by having the users tick a checkbox to 
acknowledge they have read and understood the terms and conditions when installing 
software or signing up for a service. However, studies have shown that the terms and 
conditions are difficult to read, they are considered a waste of time and are hardly ever 
read by the average user [57], [58]. McDonald and Cranor also note that users implicitly 
(or subconsciously) perform a type of cost benefit analysis on reading privacy policies in 
terms of the time it takes to read a privacy policy and the benefit of knowledge of the 
content and the trust that it will be respected [5].  
2.3.3 Engineering Privacy 
Spiekermann and Cranor [59] mention three spheres of privacy control based on access 
to data; the user sphere includes data on devices that are entirely under the user’s control, 
the recipient sphere includes service servers entirely under the control of a service 
provider where the user has no access and the joint sphere where users store data on 
recipients’ servers where both users and data recipients have access to data (such as email, 
file hosting services, social networks). Users can control the information flow from the 
user sphere to the other spheres with appropriate and intelligent access control 
mechanisms. Information processing and sharing in the recipient and joint spheres must 
be performed according to privacy policies that the user has agreed to. Contextual 
Integrity [60] is a conceptual framework stemming from the social norms for expectations 
of privacy, namely the expectation of users that service providers will only use and share 
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user information for purposes that are relevant to the service. Barth et al. [61] attempt to 
formalise the concept of contextual integrity regarding the transmission of information 
from one entity to another (i.e. from one user to another, or a user to a service, or a service 
to another service) using first-order temporal logic. A privacy norm is defined by the 
current context, the role of the recipient of the information, the owner of the data and the 
type of data to be disclosed. A privacy norm can be positive or negative where “a positive 
norm permits communication if its temporal condition is satisfied, whereas a negative 
norm permits communication only if its temporal condition is satisfied”. Caprice [62] is 
a tool aimed at aiding designers of privacy critical applications to discover privacy threats 
and adapt their software to mitigate them in a three-step process: a) identify what context 
information must be monitored, b) identify the privacy threat before data is disclosed and 
c) provide courses of action depending on the severity of the threat and the benefit of 
disclosing the information [63]. The privacy threat analysis uses Barth’s contextual 
integrity framework to examine whether the privacy threat is severe enough to warrant 
appropriate action to preserve the user’s privacy.  
Contextual integrity is the founding principle of the “privacy-by-policy” architecture 
model (also termed “notice-choice” model) in which personal information is collected by 
services and protected according to a set of laws and guidelines. The privacy-by-policy 
architecture is the predominant architecture currently in the industry. In contrast, some 
systems have attempted to implement a “privacy-by-architecture” model which tries to 
protect user privacy by not collecting personally identifiable information. One early 
example of privacy-by-architecture design is the Place Lab geo-positioning system 
developed at Intel Research in Seattle [64] which uses radio beacons to announce their 
location. Based on the beacons’ signal strength, devices can calculate how close they are 
to these locations and determine their own location. The Global Positioning System 
(GPS) works in a similar way with satellite signals being received in a unidirectional 
manner from satellite to device, hence actual location information remains in the user 
sphere. The SQUARE methodology developed at Carnegie Mellon [65] was developed 
to help designers and developers ensure that security requirements are collected and 
analysed properly during the development phase of any project. The goal of privacy-by-
architecture design is to design systems where privacy and security requirements are 
satisfied in the design of the system rather than during runtime. The 9 steps of the 
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SQUARE methodology have been adapted for privacy requirements engineering and 
published in [66].  
2.3.4 Privacy Aware Ubiquitous Systems 
The Secure Persona Exchange (SPE) framework, described in [67] and [41], divides up 
the user information to create digital identities termed Personas. The SPE framework uses 
an Authorizing Entity acting as a third party entity that issues personas to be used with 
certain services based on user preferences, the type of information the service is 
requesting, the privacy policies of the requesting service and the reputation of the service 
to keep in line with its policies. The SPE framework is based on the Platform for Privacy 
Preference (P3P, see 2.3.6) notice-choice privacy model. Services request information 
and provide their privacy policies which are expressed in P3P vocabulary. P3P vocabulary 
requires that the privacy policy contain at least the following information: a) the purpose 
of data collection, b) identification of the entity collecting the data, c) identification of 
other entities that will have access to this data through this entity and d) the data retention 
policy. The P3P vocabulary includes other types of information that can be included in 
the request but they are not mandatory. The service’s privacy policy provided when a 
service is requesting user information covers the notice part of the notice-choice model. 
The choice part that follows is the action taken by the user, or the user agent acting on 
behalf of the user. The privacy policy is examined and compared to the users’ privacy 
preferences. At this point, the user may opt to use preconfigured privacy preferences, or 
configure them to block or release some or all of the information data requested. 
In [68], Lederer et al. propose a conceptual model of everyday privacy for ubiquitous 
computing systems based on Adam’s user perceptual model [69]. The model uses an 
abstraction layer in representing sets of privacy preferences using faces. Users assume a 
specific face depending on a situation i.e. “cocktail party”, “secure shopper”, 
“anonymous”, etc. This abstraction makes it easier for users to associate their privacy 
preferences with a specific situation. Lederer’s “faces” are comparable to the “secure 
personas” used in the SPE framework.  
In the Privacy Awareness System (PAwS) [70], services residing in a ubiquitous 
environment use short range wireless privacy beacons to announce their data collection 
practices to the mobile assistants of users through privacy policies. Services can provide 
Chapter 2 Related Work 
Page 23 
a list of privacy policies, each one offering a different quality of service and a 
corresponding data collection practice. Users can express their privacy requirements 
using privacy preferences which are compared against the privacy policies to select the 
quality of service the user wants. Users can decline the use of a service or disable a 
monitoring device if the data collection practices of the service are not acceptable to them.  
Context Fabric (ConFab) is a framework designed with a suite of privacy mechanisms to 
aid developers in creating ubiquitous computing applications which allow users to 
leverage the three pillars of privacy: trust, control and informed consent [33]. Ackerman 
claims that ConFab is the most advanced infrastructure for the protection of privacy at 
the time of publication but agrees that the supported preference model is very simple [71] 
[72]. Confab offers 3 basic interaction patterns: optimistic, pessimistic and mixed-
initiative which are used in specific contexts. The optimistic pattern is intended for 
applications that disclose user information and detect abuses. In this pattern, the user sets 
up preferences and access policies after a notification alerts the user of information 
disclosed and should be applied to information that is not sensitive. The optimistic pattern 
may seem to be not very privacy aware but it is useful for situations where preferences 
do not exist such as when the user uses a new service. The pessimistic pattern is used with 
applications where it is critical to prevent disclosure of personal user data. Access policies 
and privacy preferences are set beforehand and any disclosure of personal information 
must strictly adhere to the user’s expressed wishes. Finally the mixed-initiative pattern is 
used where user intervention is needed to decide upon disclosure of information. When 
such a situation arises, the system explicitly asks the user what action to take. ConFab 
adopts an approach similar to the one taken by many Digital Rights Management Systems 
such as PAwS [70] to tag personal information for purposes of auditing and tracking [33]. 
Tagging personal information as it is circulated among third parties can be monitored and 
returned as feedback to the system which can be used as input in deciding future practices 
with regards to information disclosure. 
2.3.5 End-User Requirements for Privacy Aware Ubiquitous systems 
A set of end-user requirements for designing privacy aware ubiquitous systems stemming 
from a set of privacy laws and governmental reports in Europe [54], [55], [73], [74] and 
the United States [75], [76] are outlined below. Further important research on this topic 
has also been published in [41], [70], [33] and [77] outlining how the architecture of the 
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Secure Persona Exchange (SPE) system, the Privacy Awareness System (PAwS), Context 
Fabric (ConFab) and PlaceLab [64] respectively meet these requirements.  
Value statement 
Users must be explicitly shown the benefits they would get by providing contextual 
information in exchange for a personalised service. Brar and Kay [41] use the term 
“Purpose Specification”. Similarly, Langheinrich [70] identifies the “notice” principle 
noting the need for a mechanism to declare the collection practices of the service and 
“access and recourse” principle noting the need to inform the user regarding the usage of 
their data. Hong et al. [33] make specific mention of handling special situations such as 
emergencies where exceptions can be made. While it is imperative that users should be 
explicitly made aware of the benefits of providing personal information, there are 
exceptions such as emergency situations where it should be required to disclose certain 
types of information to the authorities if they can present that this is necessary and done 
lawfully. Kobsa and Teltzrow conducted a survey using a bookstore website that provided 
book recommendations [78]. The quality of the recommendations depended on the 
amount of data the users disclosed. Users were told that the more data they disclose the 
better the recommendations they would get from the website. The survey showed that 
users would disclose more personal information if they were given clear explanations of 
the websites’ privacy practices and what they would gain by disclosing each item of data.  
Openness 
All data collected should be available to view by the user. Here, Brar and Kay [41] point 
to the notion of invisibility of the ubiquitous computing environment and state that while 
this is one contradiction, the benefit of the user being able to monitor what data is 
collected is greater than the invisibility concept. Langheinrich [70] uses the term “access 
and recourse” again to refer to the need to allow the user to edit their preferences and any 
sensitive information held about them. He also emphasizes the requirement of providing 
simple and efficient graphical user interfaces for the user to easily manipulate her personal 
information. Hong et al. extend this requirement to include simple and appropriate 
feedback to the user regarding services accessing personal information. It is important to 
the user to know when, to whom and which information was revealed at any point in time 
[33]. In the context of privacy on the Web, the “WhatTheyKnow” [79] tool is a JavaScript 
tool embedded in a page that shows the user what third party advertisers can see through 
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the user’s browser history. The purpose of the tool is to educate users about behavioural 
advertisement, raise privacy awareness and show, based on the information available, 
what other information can be inferred about them. Fu et al. [80] developed an application 
that monitored which Android applications were accessing user’s location information 
and how frequently they did so. Twelve out of thirteen users participating in a field study 
using this application reported that they did not understand why certain applications (such 
as “WhatsApp” [81], “ESPN” [82] and “CricInfo” [83]) were frequently requesting their 
location information even though they did not offer location based services.  
Simple and Appropriate Controls  
Brar and Kay [41] emphasize that the user should have the ability to control the release 
of information using simple mechanisms. They propose to implement this by creating 
separate personas, private and public ones, where services are given access to the 
information the user allows them access to. Langheinrich [70] notes two principles of 
“notice” and “choice and consent”. Notice is given through policy announcement 
mechanisms by the services (such as privacy beacons) and informed consent is taken 
using machine-readable privacy policies that are checked against the policies announced 
by the services. This process is common in many privacy aware systems. Providing 
simple and appropriate controls to enable users to leverage such practices not only 
protects their privacy and builds their trust regarding the system but also reveals the 
advantages of privacy enhanced pervasive systems [77], [33].  
Limited Data Retention 
For data stored by service providers, there is little that a user agent, working on behalf of 
a user, can do to limit data retention. However, it is possible to negotiate the release of 
information based on data retention policies advertised by the services. While Brar and 
Kay [41] explicitly state the data retention policy as a requirement, Langheinrich [70] 
satisfies this requirement by treating it as a standard part of the privacy policy announced 
by the service and does not state it as an explicit requirement or principle. Hong et al., 
also explicitly state this requirement and highlight potential intrusive data mining that 
might lead to incorrect assumptions about someone’s activities.  
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Decentralised Control 
Brar and Kay [41] mention the concern of users about systems that gather sensitive 
information in one centralised store that is out of their control. The SPE framework 
applies a distributed architecture where data is stored in the mobile device of the user and 
therefore, any sensitive data is under the user’s control. However, this solution has a 
setback and raises the problem of availability. If the mobile device is not available to 
retrieve data from, then services will not be able to offer personalised services. Hong et 
al. [33] emphasise the drawbacks of centralised storage systems. In their survey, they 
discovered that users felt they had no overall control of their centrally stored information 
and they feared that if higher level employees wanted to examine their personal 
information, there was little they could do to stop them. Kolias et al. [84] present a high 
level architecture to store user profiles on client devices rather than service servers. Users 
specify which information is sensitive and write their own privacy preferences which are 
stored on client devices and then shared across different web applications according to 
the privacy settings. The proposed architecture allows that monitoring and processing of 
user data can be performed on the service server but none of the data is stored there. While 
the architecture suggests this, it does not provide a mechanism to prevent the service from 
keeping the data stored on the server.   
Plausible Deniability 
This requirement is only mentioned in [33] and it highlights the need for a user to avoid 
embarrassing situations by hiding or “obfuscating” some information. In the real world, 
not answering a phone call may imply that a user is busy, is out of reach, or not wanting 
to talk to the caller but the actual reason should not be revealed to the caller by the system. 
Therefore, the system should allow this functionality without the user having to take 
special action for it to be in effect.  
Anonymity and Pseudonymity  
Personalised services can be offered by providing information that does not identify the 
user. In the Secure Persona Exchange system, some personas created can contain pieces 
of user information that by themselves cannot identify the user. These personas can then 
be used to interact with services where user identification is not necessary. Langheinrich 
[70] suggests that a balance needs to be made between the virtue of anonymous virtual 
identities (pseudonyms) in the digital world and the need to disclose personal information. 
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The implementation, proposed in [70], suggests that pseudonymous interaction is possible 
by not disclosing any identifying information about the user but it is not explicitly stated.  
The term “anonymity” refers to the concept of a user consuming a resource without 
having to reveal any identifying information or be authenticated in any way to use it. A 
good example of an anonymization tool is the Tor project [85] which provides anonymity 
to online users (while surfing the web, participating in forums such as for abuse victims, 
communicating such as for journalists with whistleblowers etc). Tor protects the user’s 
online privacy from Internet surveillance through traffic analysis which can reveal the 
location of a user at a specific time.  
Pseudonymity, on the other hand, refers to the concept of a user holding a set of 
pseudonyms that allow them to consume a resource or use a service without identifying 
themselves while, at the same time, enabling the user to be held accountable for it [86]. 
Rao et al. [35] refer to pseudonymity and anonymity as the core building blocks of 
Privacy solutions in the Web. Even though Rao et al. refer to privacy in the World Wide 
Web, pervasive systems share a lot of commonalities with it and it is essential that 
anonymity and pseudonymity are available tools for the pervasive user. Thinking about 
how millions of users surf the web everyday proves to be a good example in order to 
demonstrate anonymity or pseudonymity. Websites allow the user to browse their pages 
without having to identify themselves to them. This is one situation that should be 
available to accommodate the user in pervasive systems. Zarsky suggests researchers 
should consider anonymity based solutions where one-time identities can serve as contact 
points in transactions [87]. These one-time identities will not be valid after the transaction 
is complete and therefore, tracing multiple transactions back to an individual user will be 
made almost impossible. Moreover, Zarsky points out that anonymity based solutions 
will not prevent marketers from collecting personal information but it will limit the 
information to the specific data that the users gave their consent to be disclosed.  
On the other hand, anonymity breeds distrust. Zarsky points out that anonymity does not 
come without problems. If every user could stay anonymous during interactions with 
services, then users could provide false information and try to avoid being held 
accountable for their interactions [87]. Consequently, there is another balance needed here 
between allowing the user to remain anonymous but at the same time, including 
mechanisms that will allow accountability. The biggest disadvantage of anonymity is that 
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it renders personalisation obsolete. No user information will ever be held to be link to an 
actual individual and therefore, preferences will not be carried over from one session to 
another. As a result, another balance to be struck, is providing the means for anonymity 
but also providing the means to personalise services.  
Kobsa and Schreck state that anonymisation hides the relationship or linkage between an 
individual user and her stored personal data [88]. They suggest that a well-designed 
system should allow for many levels of anonymity. 
The CRUMPET project [89] targets location privacy using a Mediator Agent controlled 
by the user, installed either on a user’s device or a trusted third party’s device. The 
Mediator Agent hides the identity of the user from the service provider. Instead, it handles 
all communication using pseudonyms allowing user profiles to be constructed but not 
with real identities.  
Beresford and Stajano [90] present a privacy protecting framework for the Active Bat 
system based on frequently changing pseudonyms to avoid user identification from 
location tracking. The use of frequently changing pseudonyms prevents applications from 
tracking users’ activities so they are unable to infer further information or even identify 
them. For example, location tracking could expose the place of work of the user and then 
possibly identify them. Pseudonyms could, however, be linked if studied properly, hence 
to further enhance location privacy, the concept of mix zones is introduced. Mix zones 
group together users in the same geographical area. A mix zone is identified by the group 
of spatially connected users and is created between application areas. Location 
information is not disclosed within mix zones. A user changes into a new pseudonym 
before entering a mix zone. The more users in the mix zone the better the anonymity of 
the user.  
2.3.6 Privacy Preferences and Policies 
Privacy preferences refer to user preferences that specify the user’s wishes regarding the 
disclosure of their personal information. Lederer et al. [91] report an interesting finding 
while surveying users to determine the accuracy of privacy preferences. The focus of the 
questionnaire was the “inquirer”, i.e. the data collector, and the “situation”, i.e. the context 
in which the inquiry is made. The result of the questionnaire showed that users were most 
likely to adopt the same disclosure practice for the same inquirer rather than different 
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disclosure practices based on the context in which the inquiry was made [91]. Lederer et 
al. [91] report that their findings are partially similar to Adams’ in [92] which reports that 
the user-perceived privacy in an audio-video captured environment is a combination of 
the receiver’s identity (same as Lederer’s inquirer [91]), the usage of information data 
that is received as perceived by the user, the context in which the information is obtained 
(same as Lederer’s situation [91]) and the sensitivity of the information to be disclosed.  
Hong et al. [77] [33] note that different people have different levels of trust for service 
providers and other users. Moreover, based on their survey, it is evident that while users 
were willing to share information, such as their location, with friends and family 
members, they were concerned about offering this information to services which did not 
offer a tangible value in return and did not offer adequate privacy protection. Finally, they 
were adamant about controlling when and how this information would be disclosed and 
in which contexts, demonstrating for example, that they would allow their location 
information to be queried by their boss or their colleagues during working hours but not 
at any other time. It is therefore, a requirement for a privacy protection system to allow 
preferences to be dependent on the context of the user and allow for flexibility in different 
situations. 
A number of languages have been developed to model preferences for privacy. There are 
at least two privacy policy description and enforcement models that have been accepted 
as standards. These are the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) [93] and the eXtensible 
Access Control Markup Language (XACML) [94]. APPEL (A P3P Preference Exchange 
Language [95]) is a standard for specifying user privacy policies on the Web. APPEL is 
part of the Platform for Privacy Preferences [93]. APPEL allows users to enter their 
privacy preferences using a graphical user interface. These are then translated into a 
machine readable format which the P3P agents use to communicate with. P3P is a 
standardised set of multiple-choice questions covering all of the major aspects of a 
website’s privacy policies. The OASIS XACML open standard is another language for 
specifying privacy policies. XACML was designed for use by Web Services but its 
specification is flexible enough to allow it to be used to express user privacy preferences. 
Another language for privacy policy expression is the Enterprise Privacy Authorisation 
Language (EPAL) [97], a proprietary language provided by IBM which allows developers 
to specify enterprise privacy policies; EPAL can coexist with the P3P APPEL because 
EPAL specifically targets specification of enterprise-internal privacy policies compared 
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to APPEL which can express the privacy statements of any entity. Because of this, 
APPEL allows a broader range of applications and offers a standard vocabulary to fit any 
enterprise. 
In P3P APPEL, the preference evaluation algorithm produces the first rule that matches 
the situation “purpose, recipient, retention” regardless of whether subsequent rules match 
as well. Eldin and Wagenaar [100] propose a weighting system for APPEL preferences 
to solve the issue of preference order. The weights are assigned to individual preferences. 
A value that defines the level of privacy threat is determined at runtime and is compared 
against the weights of the privacy preferences to find the best match. Hence, APPEL 
privacy preferences are formulated using the set “purpose, recipient, retention” and the 
weight.  
Other initiatives include the Common Policy [101] framework, a proposed standard 
defining a simple framework for creating authorisation policies to access application-
specific data. The Common Policy framework has been specified in RFC 4745 since 
February 2007 but has not been adopted by commercial systems. The initial purpose of 
this framework was to combine the authorisation mechanisms developed separately to 
control location and presence information. The proposed framework, as specified in the 
RFC 4745, can handle authorisation of data in any application domain by providing 
mechanisms for extensibility.  
Research shows that the amount of information a service requests from the user, the 
language in which a service’s privacy policies are described and the consequences of 
releasing certain data are too great a burden for the user to control themselves.  Users 
should not be expected to maintain the knowledge of what information has been disclosed 
to whom and under what circumstances. Even if users managed that, it would be 
impossible for them to process it appropriately and act optimally [102]. The system 
should monitor the user’s actions, their context and the service’s practices and its 
compliance with its practices and provide appropriate guidance and advice on exchanging 
information with services. However, the user must remain in control of any transaction, 
and when the system is not confident about any automatic release of information, it should 
prompt the user to make sure that any system action has the user's consent. HCI plays a 
vital role in the way certain questions are presented to the user and helping the user fully 
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comprehend the extent of the implications if privacy is breached or not adequately 
protected. 
“The long-range vision is of systems that let people, agents, services and devices 
seamlessly interact as autonomously as possible while preserving appropriate security 
and privacy policies" [103]. The challenges presented by Kagal et al. focus on open and 
dynamic networks whose participants are not predetermined and identified and can 
change regularly. Kagal et al. stress the importance of interoperability when agents from 
different organisations and people have to communicate and agree on specific policies. 
Kagal et al. suggest that Semantic Web technologies such as the Resource Description 
Framework [104] and Web Ontology Language (OWL) [105] can be used to guarantee 
that parties communicate and negotiate terms based on the same understanding of the 
meaning of these terms. They also suggest that a declarative policy can tackle the problem 
of not having predetermined participants in these open and dynamic environments. 
Specifically they give the example of Rei, a declarative policy language that uses 
semantic technologies to describe policies and constraints over allowable and obligated 
actions on resources in a distributed environment. Kagal et al. claim that Rei can support 
sanctions and conditional permissions (such as the result of a policy negotiation process). 
Sanctions are a model of the consequences an entity will suffer if the policy agreement is 
violated. By conditional permissions, Rei allows a service to perform an action or get 
access to a resource as long as a set of conditions are met, such as retaining a record of 
the accessed data for a specified period of time (data retention).  
Garcia and Toledo [106] propose a privacy framework combining three standards P3P, 
WS-Policy and OWL. The P3P vocabulary is defined as a generic privacy ontology but 
domain specific services can extend this to cover specific intricacies of their domain, such 
as healthcare, e-government, etc. Policies are defined using the WS-Policy language and 
point to specific ontologies. In their implementation, the service discovery process takes 
into account the user’s privacy policies to filter out services that do not comply with these 
policies. 
2.3.7 Trustworthiness as a parameter for decision making 
“Trust expresses the level of access to resources that can be granted based on the available 
information and evidence” [107].  
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Researchers in the area of trust management tend to concur that context plays a very 
important role in trust management. A trusts B to do action x but not action y. Hence, the 
action is the context condition that affects the trustworthiness. Trustworthiness cannot be 
generic so that if A trusts B then A will trust B to do anything [107]. 
Kagal et al. [103], suggest that one solution to the problem of unknown participants is 
trust-based security. In such systems, self-evident properties that can easily be proven 
true (such as the originating IP address corresponding to a domain “.gov”), proof of key 
attributes and signed statements from trusted sources are used to determine whether an 
entity should be given access or not. Kagal et al. refer to Privacy Aware Web Project 
(PAW) as a good example of a framework that implements trust-based security. It is also 
mentioned that PAW is more than just a trust based access control system. It is developed 
as a general purpose policy framework for the Web, that lets users define trust based 
policies in their own policy language [108]. 
A user study on user interactions within a simulated intelligent environment found that 
the disclosure of personally identifiable information depends on how much the users trust 
the owner of the intelligent environment [109]. Another survey found that the trust and 
reputation of a data collector are a determining factor (among others) for disclosing more 
personal data [110]. Giang et al. [111] propose an access control mechanism where 
disclosure of data is decided based on the trust assessment of the data requestor. The trust 
estimation is used as input to a predefined access control policy that defines an 
“allow/deny” decision.  
The Mobilife project along with 3 other EU IST FP6 projects - Ambient Networks, 
WINNER (Wireless World Initiative New Radio) and E2R (End-to-End 
Reconfigurability) - joined to form the Wireless World Initiative (WWI) which went on 
to develop a Security and Trust Framework [112]. The security aspects of this framework 
will not be discussed here, but some aspects of the trust model, on which the framework 
was based, are relevant. Transitivity and Brokering of trust is one of the main concepts 
being researched by the WWI and relates to the trust brokered by 3rd parties. “If A trusts 
B and B trusts C, then does A trust C?” [112]. Trusted 3rd parties are needed to vouch for 
services that the user does not know about and thus does not trust. The transitivity of trust 
in such cases would mean that if a service’s policies are guaranteed by a 3rd party broker, 
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then the user trusts this service as much as she trusts the trust broker. Finally, the WWI 
highlight the challenges identified in building a trust model which include: 
 A large number of brokers will be needed to service agreements between users and 
services or between services and other services and enable on-the-fly agreements to be 
created. 
 A service delivered to a user may consist of a number of services composed 
together. For example, a VoIP service needs a network service as well which leads to 
complex dependencies which have to be catered for in the trust model.  
 Trusting a service does not automatically imply that a service is always trusted. The 
nature of ubiquitous systems dictates the dynamicity of service compositions with 
networks and applications and therefore, a trust relationship may change over time and 
with different contexts.  
Another trust management model used in pervasive environments is UbiSec’s Pervasive 
Trust Management model (PTM) [113] which features a very different architecture. Trust 
management is distributed, supporting transactions where a central server is not always 
available to broker trust agreements. The model is based on the notion that services are 
offered by users instead of users requesting services. Pervasive devices establish their 
own trust agreements with other users and act as their own Certification Authority. Fuzzy 
logic is used to represent trust relationships where a continuous function tending to 1 
would denote complete trust while one tending to 0 would imply complete distrust. The 
PTM also allows a risk management module to be built into the probabilistic model of 
trust management. Such a module would calculate a risk factor of interacting with a 
specific service and this could be used as input to the trust negotiation phase.  
2.3.8 Server side policy matching 
Carminati et al. [114] present a solution to managing the user’s privacy introducing a 
form of privacy preferences based on third party architectures. The basic idea is that a 
user “outsources” the management of his personal data to 3rd party publishers. These 
publishers have to ensure that the user’s privacy preferences are applied in every request 
for personal data from services. The publishers also need to ensure that any personal data 
they receive from the user is not accessible for viewing by the publisher and that is 
achieved by encrypting the data before outsourcing them. 
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It should be noted that depending on the type of preferences, this would be possible. 
However, in the context of pervasive computing, the evaluation of the preferences implies 
access to the context of the user which includes location among other important personal 
information. Therefore, it is impossible to a) ensure that the publisher only applies 
policies and does not have access to actual personal data and b) to persuade the end-users 
to “outsource” all their personal data to a third party entity. Carminati et al., imply that an 
advantage of outsourcing personal data is that this relieves the user from the burden of 
the management of their personal data while maintaining a high degree of control over 
them with the use of privacy preferences. This approach is quite static since the proposed 
Trusted Privacy Manager component introduced in their architecture matches requestor 
privacy practice policies (expressed in P3P) to predefined  user privacy preferences 
(rulesets expressed in XML notation, a simpler version of APPEL) [114].  
Nyre et al. [115] argue that users cannot handle privacy on their own, therefore they 
propose a solution in which privacy is offered by the service provider. Agents acting on 
behalf of the user send privacy preferences to the service provider who tries to satisfy 
them. The approach aims to relieve the user of managing a complex set of privacy 
preferences. A privacy preference provider offers a predefined set of privacy preference 
stereotypes (other uses of stereotype preferences have been published in [116]) that users 
choose from based on their data disclosure disposition during service session initiation. 
This approach has several problems such as a) the exclusive use of stereotype preferences 
cannot reflect the user’s exact privacy requirements, b) access control could not be 
dependent on the user’s context and trustworthiness of the service, c) the system cannot 
improve based on users’ disclosing behaviours as it makes exclusive use of stereotype 
preferences not associated with a particular user and d) while the approach tries to relieve 
the user from the burden of managing privacy preferences, it still requires that the user 
chooses from a complex set of privacy preferences to send to the service provider during 
every session initiation.  
2.3.9 Acquiring privacy preferences 
Any system should provide appropriate interfaces for the user to create privacy 
preferences. PrivacyBird.org [117] originally developed by AT&T Corp, was a complete 
P3P tool that allowed users to enter their privacy requirements. The tool allowed for 
custom setup of privacy preferences where a user could create privacy preferences in 
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detail or use one of three predefined settings “low”, “medium”, “high”. The tool was only 
available on the Web for P3P enabled Websites and due to the static configuration it 
provides, it is unsuitable for use in pervasive environments and has not been maintained 
for several years. A more recent (but not commercially available) P3P privacy preference 
generator is described in [118] which aimed at providing users with a user-friendly 
graphical user interface to enter privacy preferences. Like PrivacyBird.org, the tool 
provides beginner, advanced and expert modes for users with varying system knowledge. 
The tool defines twelve service types that correspond to user goals which were determined 
by identifying the primary purpose of collecting data by websites and several surveys e.g. 
[119] that offered examples of categorisation of internet sites: webmail, news portals, 
online shopping, banking, social media, forums, instant messaging, games, health portals, 
e-government services and e-learning services. Users can define privacy preferences for 
each service type and identify specific sets of data to transfer to a particular service type.  
While it is important to provide such tools that allow users to edit their privacy 
preferences manually, it is equally important to provide mechanisms that learn from the 
user’s behaviour and create rules on their behalf to unburden them from this task and help 
them protect their privacy in a more efficient and accurate manner.   
Schaub et al. [120] use an incremental approach using case based reasoning to acquire 
privacy preferences. A privacy preference is stored as a case and is matched to a context 
transition (the difference between two sequential context states). The decision making 
step is performed by evaluating the current context state against previous stored context 
states. A new case (or privacy preference) is then created by combining similar privacy 
preferences with the current context state. A similar approach is presented in [121] using 
case-based reasoning with a community portal providing additional information when 
needed. Learning of privacy preferences occurs when the system recommends courses of 
action when users encounter new services or services have altered their privacy policies.  
The information used to calibrate the current case is the user’s current location, current 
role, time of day, the service, the service provider (as a separate parameter) and the 
privacy policy of the service.   
Researchers at Carnegie Mellon University experimented with case based reasoning for 
acquiring privacy preferences for Grey [122], a distributed smart phone based access 
control system. In their evaluation study with real users, they found that learnt rules were 
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much more accurate than rules created manually by the users who notably spent more 
than 5 minutes to create the initial rules in the system and then additional time to revise 
them while interacting with the system.   
The DAIDALOS Personalisation and Learning system [123] makes use of Quinlan’s C45 
algorithm [124] to perform offline learning of user preferences in the form of decision 
trees using information coming from monitoring user actions as well as explicit feedback 
supplied by the user. The same approach is used for learning privacy preferences 
indicating when an identity should be selected by the user to interact with a service is also 
presented in [125]. 
Bootstrapping 
A new user will not have privacy preferences stored in the system and hence a mechanism 
must exist to bootstrap the decision making and preference learning process. There are 
several approaches to solving the bootstrapping issue. In [120], Schaub et al. suggest 
using “personality-based privacy profiles”. Several personality types are identified 
according to users’ data disclosing behaviours. A personality-based privacy profile 
containing a list of privacy preferences is created that matches the data disclosure patterns 
of the corresponding personality type. The user can choose the profile that best matches 
his disclosure patterns and that profile can be used as a starting point for the decision 
making and privacy preference learning process. 
2.3.10 Privacy Policy Negotiation 
It is inherent in the nature of service provisioning that, in order for it to be effective in its 
context awareness and personalization, data must be exchanged and even collected and 
processed. After such data has been shared, there is nothing a data owner (the data subject) 
can do to control further processing, forwarding and sharing of it when the data is stored 
on servers owned by the services where the user has no access. Hence, legislation plays 
a crucial role in motivating service providers to respect the privacy preferences of the data 
owners/subjects and adhere to their own privacy policies to which the users consent. Hong 
[33] agrees that eventually the issue of privacy will be handled by a combination of among 
other things, legislation, technology and social norms.  
Chapter 2 Related Work 
Page 37 
Privacy policies are used by service providers to describe what data are going to be 
collected, how long they will be kept for and how they will be processed (shared with 
third parties, used for marketing purposes etc.). At the moment, service providers are 
adopting the "take it or leave it" approach which means that a service privacy policy is 
static and the user can either accept it and be allowed to use the service or not accept it 
and be prohibited from using the service [126][127]. This approach is not flexible for the 
user who has no means to express their terms for disclosure of their data but has to commit 
to the demands of the service provider who sets the terms and conditions of the 
transaction. This notice-and-choice model has failed to provide appropriate privacy 
protection [128]. There is a need to provide the user with some form of control over the 
terms and conditions of data disclosure, such as privacy agents which are able to negotiate 
privacy policies on behalf of the user and the service provider. Further, Preibusch [129] 
identified two shortcomings of static privacy policies not only for users but for service 
providers as well: a) the “one size fits all” solution for privacy policies is not only 
problematic for users but for service providers as well because users may be willing to 
disclose more data for less privacy, and b) the “take it or leave it” approach is a double 
edged sword. It is the service providers’ loss when users turn away from a service whose 
privacy policy they don’t agree with and it is the users’ loss when they reluctantly accept 
the privacy policy even though they don’t agree but have no choice.  
During the design phase of the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P), the intention was 
to include a privacy policy negotiation mechanism. However, it was not included in the 
final specification because of its complexity and lack of interest from the industry and 
concerns that it would not benefit consumers, i.e. users trading privacy in return for better 
services instead of services competing for customers by providing better privacy features 
[6]. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that several surveys and experiments have shown that 
“users are willing to trade privacy for convenience or bargain the release of personal 
data in exchange for small rewards” [102] [110].   
Preibusch proposes a dynamic incremental approach to privacy policy negotiation. Users 
are presented with a first offer with minimum requirements, very limited personalisation 
and a small discount. If they accept, they are presented with a further offer that requires 
more data disclosure but offers better personalisation and further discount. This 
incremental approach continues until the user rejects the new offer. When the user rejects 
the offer, they have the option to use the previous offer or to walk away. Preibusch claims 
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that the sequential nature offers better understanding of the benefits of disclosing sensitive 
data.  
Tamaru et al.  [130] propose a Privacy Profile Negotiation Protocol (PPNP) to protect the 
user’s privacy while personalising services offered in public spaces using different 
profiles based on the trustworthiness of these services. ContactXML, an XML data 
representation language is used to describe the profiles of the users and PEGASUS is the 
framework that implements PPNP. Even though the protocol and the implementing 
framework PEGASUS are very loosely described, it is clear that it is a very lightweight 
approach that focuses on changing the granularity of (obfuscating) the personal 
information that is disclosed for different services. The issue with obfuscation is that it 
can be applied to few context data types so it cannot be the only solution to protecting the 
user’s privacy. The protocol fails to address automatic negotiation between the user and 
the services’ agents, context aware privacy preferences, preference evaluation and the 
methods that allow the protocol to access user-assessed trustworthiness levels of the 
services. It places an unnecessary burden on the user who is prompted very often to 
confirm disclosure of information, enter the trustworthiness level of services and control 
every aspect of the negotiation.  
Lee et al. [131][132] suggest a P3P Privacy Enhancing Agent (PEA) system based on the 
P3P (Platform for Privacy Preferences) specification and the JADE framework (Java 
Agent Development Framework) [133]. The Agent monitors the user's transactions on the 
Web, automatically retrieves the P3P policy from the server and analyses it against the 
user's privacy preferences and historic transactions. It alerts the user if the policy of the 
server conflicts with the user's privacy preference. This analysis is coined as the PEA's 
privacy policy negotiation process, even though the server is not participating in the 
process of negotiation. The system does not offer an option for the server to alter its policy 
based on the user's privacy preferences or to meet any constraints the user might want to 
impose. It is stated that the system makes use of user privacy preferences expressed in 
P3P and historic transaction information. 
Walker et al. [134] present the Privacy Policy Negotiation Protocol "Or Best Offer" 
(OBO) similar to sellers offering goods at a fixed price but allowing buyers to bargain for 
a better price. The Or Best Offer protocol claims to overcome shortcomings of previous 
research such as i) endless exchange of proposals and counter proposals by terminating 
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after three rounds of negotiation and ii) the inability to determine whether proposals and 
counter proposals increase the chances of successful negotiation by giving hints to the 
server on how to satisfy the user's needs. Walker et al. mention that the idea of negotiating 
privacy policies in each session was rejected by P3P designers due to lack of useful 
application scenarios.  
Another interesting approach is presented by Zhang and Todd [135] who introduce an 
architecture for context-aware privacy protection in pervasive systems which uses a 
Privacy Agent to manage policies of the user and to communicate with the data collectors 
concerning all data exchanges. The proposed system uses P3P to describe policies and 
suggests extensions to the existing P3P specification to accommodate the representation 
of non static data such as location, activity or status i.e. the context of the user. Data type 
ambiguity is handled with the use of a privacy vocabulary (ontology) based on the P3P 
terminology and policies. The ontology is used to represent privacy rules which are 
evaluated using ontology-based reasoning engines and eventually used to negotiate with 
the data collectors about data access. Privacy Agents reside on the network and not on the 
user's devices in order to save power on the mobile devices. However, this raises the issue 
of availability of rules over isolated spaces as well as the issue of trusting the network 
provider that stores the data. The solution proposed is protecting context in ubiquitous 
computing environments but does not leverage the power of context by embedding 
conditions of context in privacy rules and evaluation of privacy rules. As a result, it does 
not react to changes in the context of the user that affect the outcome of evaluating 
context-aware privacy preferences. 
The Houdini Framework developed at Bell Labs [136] provides a policy management 
infrastructure for personalising services offered on the Web and through mobile 
telecommunication networks. This framework incorporates a "Privacy Conscious 
Personalisation" (PCP) engine that can block or filter access to user data based on the 
user's static and dynamic data and the current context of both the requestor and user. Hull 
et al. [136] bring attention to the fact that a user's willingness to disclose information may 
depend on their context and attempt to address this with the use of context-aware controls. 
Hull et al. also raise the issue of fine-grained preferences being tedious for users to 
manage or create and suggest presenting the users with web interfaces adapted for small 
and large screens so they can easily create inference rules themselves. Requestors and 
context conditions can be grouped together under labels such as "colleagues" or "at work" 
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to improve performance and aid the user in creating privacy preferences. The Houdini 
Framework does not leverage any trust management system and therefore has no means 
for evaluating requestors and treating them accordingly. The Houdini Framework 
provides a personalised context-aware access control system for user data that works on 
behalf of the user without involving the requestor in any step of the process, hence there 
is no data negotiation involved to aid the access control process. Therefore, it does not 
provide the user with control regarding the further processing and further disclosure of 
their data.  
El-Khatib presents a Privacy Negotiation Protocol (PnP) for Web Services [137] for 
privacy policy generation and negotiation between two privacy agents. The protocol 
defines the states and semantics of the messages exchanged during the negotiation 
expressed using the P3P protocol specification. The presented protocol defines messages 
that allow a) the service provider's agent to offer a set of terms and conditions in a privacy 
policy, b) the user's privacy agent to accept or reject them and c) the service provider to 
suggest a counter offer after a rejection by the user's privacy agent. A limitation on this 
protocol is that the user's privacy agent is able to accept or reject a given offer but not to 
offer amendments that suggest the user's wishes. Like Zhang and Todd, El-Khatib 
introduces extensions to the existing P3P protocol specification to enable the expression 
of alternative terms and conditions within the privacy policy document.  
Although adequate research has been conducted on the field of privacy policy negotiation 
and a number of protocols have been designed, there is currently no standard accepted by 
the standardising organisations or adopted by the industry [138]. 
2.3.11 Identity Management  
Identity Management is a term used to describe the means by which individuals are 
authenticated and authorised to access services. Depending on the type, Identity 
Management systems involve issuing identities, managing the information associated 
with identities, providing identity interoperability across multiple domains and 
minimising data disclosure. Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) cannot exist without 
a proper Identity Management system. Transactions with services require users and 
service providers to use some form of digital identity to represent themselves in the digital 
world. Traditional Identity Management systems are centred on organisations that use 
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common identifiers to share information about individuals, an approach often termed 
"back-office" Identity Management. Such systems may operate without the consent of the 
individuals and as a result jeopardise privacy. There is consensus that some form of 
organisation-centric Identity Management is necessary in the community and more 
specifically by the government for the purposes of national security, crime prevention and 
detection. Many governments already employ systems such as national identity cards 
which can be used to identify citizens when using public services. Like governments, 
companies also employ organisation-centric Identity Management systems for their 
employees to identify themselves to the system. However, organisation-centric Identity 
Management systems are necessary to operate only for specific purposes. In order to 
address concerns over the organisation-centric Identity Management systems, user-
centric Identity models are currently being researched that focus on empowering the user 
with controlling their online identities and the disclosure of their personal information. 
OpenID [139], WebID [140], InfoCard [141], and Liberty Alliance [142] initiatives are 
examples of user-centric Identity Management and personal information management 
systems (UC-IPIM). The user-centric approach attempts to follow the type of 
identification individuals encounter in their non-digital everyday lives. Several types of 
Identity Management Systems are described below.   
Identity “Silos” 
Identity silos refer to the traditional identity schemes in which the relying party is also 
the Identity Provider and the identities used for these systems are only valid for 
authenticating to the relying parties they were created for. This category includes the 
millions of websites that exist in the Internet today that require the users to register with 
each one of them in order to use them.  
Generally, the advantage of this model regarding privacy is that any personal information 
is only disclosed to the relying party. The disadvantage of such a scheme is that a user 
has to maintain too many identities leading to “password fatigue”, a term used to describe 
the problem of having to remember a different password for every different account 
opened. This usually leads to users using the same username and password combinations 
for different services which results in a greater security threat [143],[141]. Someone 
acquiring the username and password from one service, can access the account of the user 
in other services. Identity silos are Identity Management schemes which do not allow 
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interoperability between different service providers, therefore data that is maintained on 
one service cannot be ported onto another. The identity silo model cannot exploit the 
functionality of pervasive computing which offers services the option to be composed 
with other services to offer a greater range of services.  
Common Identity  
A “common identity” management scheme means that users will have a unique common 
identity to use in more than one website, having a unique global identifier for 
authentication. In this scheme, a single Identity Provider issues the identity but does not 
take part in the authentication process. Services have to implement their own 
authentication mechanisms. In terms of personalisation, this approach is ideal as it gives 
access to all information held about the user and enables any personalisation practice. 
This applies to pervasive systems as well as traditional computing systems. However, one 
of the many disadvantages of this approach is that it does not provide any privacy. Since 
the same identifier is used to access all services, different services can match the unique 
common identifier provided to them and acquire personal information. An example of a 
common identity scheme is Microsoft's Passport .NET Identity scheme which can be used 
to login to Hotmail, Expedia, Live Messenger etc.   
Centralised Single Sign-On (SSO) Identity  
The Single Sign-On Identity is an Identity Model that features an Identity Provider that 
provides security token issuance, identity authentication and acts as a central authority. 
The user is issued the identity by an Identity Provider and can use the same identity with 
multiple services as long as the services implement the identity scheme. A famous 
example is Microsoft’s .NET Passport which was rejected by the Internet community 
[144] because it was too expensive, used proprietary software and had Microsoft at its 
centre acting as the identity provider, something that users felt was not appropriate. Kim 
Cameron, author of the Laws of Identity [145] criticised the .NET Passport identity 
management system for violating these laws. Later on, he became Microsoft's Chief 
Identity architect where he helped design the Windows Live ID system which addressed 
the violations of the Passport .NET identity scheme. One of the privacy concerns that 
were raised regarding the .NET Passport scheme, was the fact that there was 
omnidirectional flow of information data between the .NET accounts and the services that 
used .NET Passport authentication providing Microsoft and the participating service 
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providers with access to information about the users’ interactions with services. It should 
be noted though that when the .NET Passport was first introduced, it was intended to be 
used for unidirectional flow of information data but services were too interested in 
gathering personal information on users for targeted marketing purposes.  
Centralised Control of Multiple Identities 
Microsoft’s Identity Meta-System [146] incorporating the Windows CardSpace Identity 
module [141] (formerly InfoCard) is an example of this type of Identity Management. 
Windows CardSpace architecture is based on 4 requirements: 
Support for any digital system. As shown in Figure 2, Cardspace (named Infocard in the 
diagram) works with the application on the user’s terminal and passes information 
between the Identity provider and the relying party. Cardspace does not need to 
understand the technology of the security token communicated between the relying party 
and the identity provider. When the security token requirements are received from the 
relying party, Cardspace only needs to select an identity with a security token which 
matches the technology requested by the relying party. 
Consistent user control of digital identity. Figure 3 shows the user interface designed to 
allow the user to select an appropriate identity for a given transaction. This step, as shown 
in Figure 3, takes place just after the relying party conveys the security token requirements 
to Cardspace. Providing users with a consistent way to select their identities reduces the 
possibility of confusion and error and inevitably leads to good privacy protection practice. 
Replacement of password-based Web login. Username-Password logins are susceptible 
to “phishing” and for the user to maintain a combination of these for each website she 
uses is hard and usually leads to using the same username and password for all web 
accounts which is not good practice [147] [143]. To replace password based web logins, 
Cardspace offers a self-issued Identity Provider mechanism which allows the user to 
create their own identity cards acting both as the identity provider and guarantor, 
generating a private/public key pair to use for authenticating themselves to the relying 
party.   
Improved user confidence in the identity of remote applications. Windows Cardspace 
provides mechanisms to verify that a relying party or an identity provider is who they 
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claim to be. Microsoft has acquired Credentica's U-Prove Technology [148] which claims 
to provide features such as selective data disclosure, identity untraceability and 
unlinkability.  
The concept of this scheme is aligned with the principles of pervasive and ubiquitous 
computing. Its user-centric nature can be received well by the public who want to be in 
control of their online identities. However, since its inception in 2005, the scheme has not 
been adopted by users even though it is available on the Windows operating system. Lack 
of scalable business, liability and appropriate governance models are listed as potential 
reasons [3].  
 
 Interactions between the user, identity provider and relying party. 
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 User selects an appropriate card to interact with service.  
Decentralised Single Sign-On Identity 
Bhargav-Spantzel et al. [149] present the basics on federated identity management 
systems (IdMs) and their disadvantage of not providing selective release of identity 
contents. They claim that in order to achieve that, a user should hold more than one 
identity which contradicts the purpose of Federated SSO (Single Sign On) IdMs, which 
is minimizing the management of multiple profiles by the user. Instead, to cater for such 
a requirement, a trust negotiation framework is preferred and presented. Bhargav-
Spantzel et al. propose an approach to integrate federated IdMs with trust negotiation 
techniques resulting in the FAMTN (Federated Attribute Management Trust 
Negotiation). Key aspects of the FAMTN are a) a federated attribute need only be 
provided once, b) Identity verification need not be repeated by the user. (FAMTN 
participant components perform internal negotiations using a “circle of trust”) and c) 
support for temporary SSO. 
The FAMTN Framework has been developed by the Liberty Alliance project [142]. It 
aims to provide federated identity management between multiple service providers (SPs) 
that implement Single Sign-On, with automated trust negotiation mechanisms for 
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enforcing access policies when these SPs request user information from the Identity 
Providers (IdP) [149]. Liberty-Enabled Services that implement Single Sign-On belong 
to the circle of trust, a federation of service providers and identity providers in the Liberty 
architecture. Any Service Provider in the Liberty architecture can also be an Identity 
Provider so the FATMN does not distinguish between the two.  
FATMN allows users to login to a service provider using a Liberty account and navigate 
any Liberty-enabled service without having to repeat the login process. User’s credentials 
are transferred from service provider to service provider as the user moves from one to 
the other. When a service provider joins the circle of trust, trust agreements are created 
which are later used as input to the negotiation process that will determine what types of 
information the service provider is allowed to access. User privacy preferences are also 
used as input to this negotiation process.  
Service providers build a history of user transactions and user attributes that they have 
gathered during the user’s interaction with the service. User attribute access is negotiated 
between service providers in the circle of trust by an Automated Trust Negotiation 
mechanism. Automated Trust Negotiation enables service usage without the user having 
to enter the same details more than once.  
Shibboleth [150] is an initiative designed for resource sharing between research and 
academic institutions. It follows a very similar approach to the Liberty Alliance project, 
except that it uses a central identity provider that negotiates the federation of user 
attributes every time the user moves to another Shibboleth enabled domain.  
Liberty and Shibboleth could prove very complex but powerful identity management 
systems in pervasive systems mainly because they widely support federation, a key 
concept in pervasive systems whose business models are mainly focused on having 
telecom operators taking the role of Identity Providers.  
 Summary 
A pervasive and ubiquitous system is a context-aware, personalisable, dynamic, self-
adaptive environment of connected devices and resources such as sensors, mobile 
devices, back-end servers and services. The aim of pervasive computing is to provide an 
environment to the user that adapts to their current needs and preferences to help them 
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accomplish their goals in their daily life. Information about the user such as their interests, 
preferences, location, environmental conditions, activities social interactions, physical 
capabilities or disabilities and other similar information is collected from the users, the 
applications they interact with and sensors attached to their environment and drives the 
behaviour of a pervasive system. The user and their environment are constantly monitored 
which raises a lot of privacy issues. This has been a source of controversy over the use of 
pervasive systems. The protection of this information is vital to the adoption of pervasive 
technologies.  
There is a consensus that there is a balance to be struck between the user’s right to privacy 
and the need to provide information to take advantage of the functionalities of a pervasive 
system. This balance depends on a variety of factors such as contextual integrity, i.e. the 
user’s trust that service providers meet the users’ expectations with regard to privacy, the 
provision of appropriate mechanisms to control the flow of information to external 
parties, the provision of useful and user friendly interfaces to manage the user’s data, the 
act of data minimisation and proper data retention on the part of the service provider.  
The right to privacy needs to be embedded into the design of pervasive systems to ensure 
that appropriate mechanisms exist to protect its users. Privacy by architecture is one 
means to remove the need for disclosure of information. However, this approach is very 
limiting for pervasive systems. Disclosing information is vital for a pervasive system to 
function properly but users need to be able to control who gets access to what information, 
when and under what conditions. Bijwe and Mead [66] express their view that users’ 
privacy is threatened by authorised users of the system. Altman’s theory [36] [37] of 
optimum privacy is defined by the user’s preferred level of social interactions. If users 
can dictate when, who, under what circumstances what information is released, they could 
get closer to achieving the optimum level of privacy. Privacy policy negotiation and the 
use of multiple identities are two solutions that can be combined to equip the user to 
accomplish their optimum level of privacy.  
As the number of services, resources and the amount of data continuously grows, the user 
is faced with a heavy burden in controlling all this and in some cases, does not have full 
knowledge of how to accomplish this properly. Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) 
are required to help users overcome this burden. Privacy preferences can be used to 
express the user’s wishes regarding the disclosure of their personal information. These 
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are rules that control how the system releases personal information to external services. 
Such privacy preferences must comply with the requirements of pervasive systems that 
are constantly adapting based on the user’s context. Appropriate privacy preference 
models must be context-dependent to allow for different disclosures to be performed in 
different contexts.  
It is unwise to expect users to write privacy preferences that anticipate every possible data 
disclosure scenario. The user’s data disclosing behaviours and the context in which they 
were performed can be monitored and analysed using behaviour learning algorithms to 
automate the acquisition of privacy preferences and alleviate the user from this burden.  
This chapter provided an introduction to pervasive systems and personalisation and an 
overview of privacy issues and approaches to these issues particularly in the context of 
pervasive computing. Chapter 3 gives an overview of three EU research projects 
DAIDALOS, PERSIST and SOCIETIES that researched pervasive and ubiquitous 
systems and produced working prototypes. The author was involved in researching, 
designing and implementing their respective personalisation and privacy frameworks.  
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3 EU Research 
The research presented in this thesis is part of a complete framework for providing 
personalisation of services and protection of privacy for users of pervasive ubiquitous 
systems. This chapter provides background and insight into the way in which the 
PersoNISM system has evolved into its current form.  
The research reported in this thesis began with the author’s participation in the EU FP6 
DAIDALOS project [151]. Two of the basic assumptions of this project were that a 
telecommunications infrastructure would be available at all times and that services would 
be provided by network operators or Internet vendors and could safely be assumed to be 
available from any fixed location. Based on this assumption, an architecture was 
developed in which privacy and security features were based on a centralised Identity 
Management system whose architecture impacted the design of the platform components 
including those providing personalisation features.  
After the end of the DAIDALOS project, the focus of the research shifted to the EU FP7 
PERSIST project [152] which was based on the Personal Smart Space paradigm (PSS) 
that used a peer to peer approach and hence could not rely on a centralised Identity 
Management system. Furthermore, any user could assume the role of a service provider 
even when they were mobile allowing interaction in an ad hoc manner as well as through 
existing infrastructure. As a result, the PERSIST prototype is a much more open system 
as it allows any user to participate as a user or as a micro-operator or both.  
To achieve this, the PERSIST privacy protection framework was developed based on 
higher level privacy protection and using a lightweight proprietary Identity Management 
system, privacy policy negotiation and identity selection. To ease the user with the use of 
such features, privacy preferences were used in the system to guide the user as well as 
automate some processes on their behalf according to their wishes. 
Research conducted on privacy preferences, privacy policy negotiation and identity 
selection in the context of the PERSIST project provided initial feedback on the feasibility 
and problems with this approach. The final prototype for the privacy preference data 
model, privacy policy data model and management and privacy policy negotiation 
protocol was designed and built by the author who also assisted in the design and 
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implementation of the lightweight Identity Management System used. This was 
successfully demonstrated at the final audit of the project.  
After the end of the PERSIST project, the research continued under the auspices of the 
EU ICT FP7 SOCIETIES project. The SOCIETIES project aims to deliver a prototype of 
a Cooperating Smart Space (CSS) extending traditional pervasive paradigms that are 
focusing on the individual by leveraging the power of dynamic communities as well as 
social networking integration. The platform exploits the combination of the digital and 
the physical environment of its users to foster Pervasive Communities that feature, among 
others, community enhanced proactive personalisation and strong privacy protection 
using privacy policy negotiation, context-aware dynamic access control, trust 
management, dynamic data obfuscation and identity management. Like the PSS, the CSS 
also encourages users to become micro-operators by sharing services within communities 
but unlike the PSS, it does not provide a traditional peer to peer approach but instead uses 
the backend cloud servers to host platform services that require device resources that are 
not suited for mobile devices.  
The DAIDALOS and PERSIST projects followed a scenario-driven approach to 
designing their respective architectures and demonstrating and evaluating the project 
outcomes. Videos of the implemented scenarios for DAIDALOS can be found in [153], 
and for PERSIST in [154], also more information on the PERSIST demonstration can be 
found in [155]. Finally, information on the results of the SOCIETIES user trial can be 
found in [156]. 
 EU IST-DAIDALOS  
DAIDALOS (Designing Advanced network Interfaces for the Delivery and 
Administration of Location independent, Optimised personal Services) was a 
multidisciplinary EU FP6 IST project that ran from January 2004 until December 2008 
in two phases with participation of over forty partners from industry and academia. This 
section concentrates on the architecture developed during the second phase of 
DAIDALOS. The vision of DAIDALOS was to integrate multiple existing and new 
heterogeneous network technologies in a Beyond 3G pervasive infrastructure that 
provides access to services and content supported by context and personalisation. 
DAIDALOS developed this infrastructure centred on 5 key concepts: 
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 MARQS: Mobility Management, AAA[Authentication, Authorisation and 
Accounting], Resource Management, Quality of Service and Security 
 VID: Virtual Identity 
 USP: Ubiquitous and Seamless Pervasiveness 
 SIB: Seamless Integration and Broadcast 
 Federation: enabling provision of services across multiple domains and 
networks 
The VID and USP concepts had a larger impact on the design of the DAIDALOS 
architecture than the rest. The Virtual Identity concept is at the core of the DAIDALOS 
architecture, affecting all layers and nodes of the system and it is the cornerstone of the 
privacy protection technologies designed for DAIDALOS. DAIDALOS users use Virtual 
Identities to represent themselves to the platform and to the services they interact with. 
The DAIDALOS Virtual Identity framework was designed to provide users with multiple 
identities for use in different situations and with different service providers. This concept 
requires that the identities owned by a single user cannot be linked together.  
The Ubiquitous and Seamless Pervasiveness concept refers to two requirements. a) 
ubiquitous access to services: the ability of the system to provide its services and 
networking capabilities irrespective of the location, network technology, device 
architecture or service type and b) seamless pervasiveness: the ability of the system to 
monitor the user in their environment, anticipate their needs and act appropriately to aid 
them in their tasks in a seamless manner. The USP concept is realised in the DAIDALOS 
Pervasive Service Platform (PSP) layer while the Virtual Identity Model is realised in all 
of the layers of the DAIDALOS architecture as it is used to create Virtual TCP/IP stacks 
per Virtual Identity [157].  
As mentioned previously, a scenario driven approach was followed for performing 
requirements collection, analysis, prototype design and demonstrating the outcome of the 
DAIDALOS project. The Nidaros scenario [153] focuses heavily on demonstrating the 
use of preferences in a mobile networked environment. Intelligent interface selection (IIS) 
depends on user preferences to perform network handovers. User preferences define the 
parameters that should be taken into account such as Quality of Service (QoS), cost, 
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current identity, etc. Network handovers can be performed between UMTS, DVB and 
WLAN networks according to the user’s preferences and current context conditions.  
  
 DAIDALOS “Nidaros” scenario screenshot 
Further, the Nidaros scenario demonstrates context aware personalisation when a 
student’s mobile phone automatically mutes itself when the student enters a classroom 
while a lecture is taking place. The phone will automatically unmute itself as soon as the 
student leaves the classroom.  
3.1.1 DAIDALOS Pervasive Services Platform 
The DAIDALOS Pervasive Services Platform (PSP) has two layers. The Service and 
Identity Management layer is the lower layer responsible for service management 
including service selection, ranking, composition and re-composition and identity 
management such as creating, deleting, amending and selecting appropriate identities for 
use with services. The Service and Identity Management layer hides its functionality from 
the upper User Experience management layer and makes sure that the platform operates 
with multiple identities for each user without being able to link together the identities 
owned by the same user. The User Experience Management layer includes the platform 
services that enable the system to operate in a pervasive, personalised and context-aware 
fashion. The main building blocks of the User Experience Management layer are the 
Personalisation and Learning system and the Context Management system. The Service 
Chapter 3 EU Research 
Page 53 
and Identity Management layer provides the basic functionality for pervasive services to 
be deployed and instantiated in the DAIDALOS platform and therefore realises the 
ubiquitous access to services requirement while the User Experience Management layer 
provides the necessary enhancements for pervasive services to adapt to an individual user 
based on their context and user preferences and realises the requirement for seamless 
pervasiveness.  
 
 DAIDALOS PSP two layer architecture approach.  
DAIDALOS assumes the existence of infrastructure and backend servers that handle the 
processing and storage of information. These backend servers are owned by network 
operators and service providers which can also act as Identity providers (IdPs). This raises 
a privacy issue as the user is not fully in control of the storage of their information and 
there is no provision for storing personal information on the users’ devices. Instead, all 
information is stored and processed in centralised servers owned by Identity or content 
providers.  
Personalisation in DAIDALOS  
The User Experience layer of the DAIDALOS PSP platform provides personalisation and 
context-awareness for DAIDALOS enabling services (platform services) and third party 
services. The aim of personalisation is to adapt the functionality and behaviour of the 
system so that it performs differently according to the user’s context, preferences and the 
available services and resources at the time. DAIDALOS personalisation utilises user 
preferences to personalise the following functionalities.  
User Experience Management
API
Service and Identity Management
API
Network and access technology
Web Services technology and standards
3rd Party Services
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Service Ranking and Filtering. Context-dependent user preferences are used to filter and 
rank the results of a service discovery query to provide users with a list of services that 
are relevant to their context (i.e. based on location and proximity) and preferred by them 
(i.e. based on cost and quality of service). Personalised Service filtering discards services 
that are not preferable or relevant to the user and personalised service ranking sorts the 
list of discovered services based on personalised parameters such as distance, cost, 
quality, provider preference etc.  
Service Selection. User preferences can be created to dictate specific services to be used 
in specific situations and for particular tasks. 
Service management. User preferences are used to trigger the system to initiate, terminate 
or recompose a session in different context conditions. A simple example of personalised 
service management is to turn on the air conditioning service when a user enters their 
office building.  
Service adaptation. The most common use of user preferences is to personalise the 
parameters of a service. This can range from setting the wallpaper of a user's desktop to 
adapting the heating temperature of a room based on room occupancy.  
Communication Redirection. User preferences are used to redirect calls and messages to 
different devices depending on the context of the user.  
Network Selection. Context-aware user preferences are used to select the network and 
network interface that should be used at any instant depending on network availability, 
network quality of service (QoS) and cost. 
Identity Selection. The user is able to create user preferences that define which identity 
should be used with specific service types, services and in specific situations.  
The DAIDALOS Personalisation subsystem exposes appropriate interfaces to allow 
services (DAIDALOS enabling services and third party services) to request preferences 
in order to personalise themselves at any time. However, it also acts as a proactive system 
by constantly monitoring the context of the user, evaluating the user preferences that are 
Chapter 3 EU Research 
Page 55 
affected by the changes and re-personalising the services according to the result of the 
evaluation.  
 
 Personalisation Subsystem interactions with services. 
Privacy Protection in DAIDALOS 
The Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) researched, designed and implemented for 
the DAIDALOS architecture stem from the design of the DAIDALOS Virtual Identity 
Framework [158]. At the core of the VID Framework lies the concept that the user profile 
(consisting of all the data that exist about the user in the system) can be fragmented both 
physically and conceptually. The user’s data reside on different servers owned by 
infrastructure vendors such as identity providers or content providers. A Virtual Identity 
is linked to selected data from various sources and used to represent the user to services 
including platform services.  
Users interact with services in the system by first exchanging their identities through a 
process called VID exchange. The VID exchange includes negotiating anonymously a set 
of terms and conditions before either party selects what VID to use. During the 
negotiation, the service provider reveals some information about themselves to provide 
assurances to the user of the service that they can provide. The service provider may also 
request information from the user such as user age or location if the service can only be 
provided to adults or to a specific geographic area. After such requests have been satisfied 
and based on the information that has been exchanged, each party selects a VID to 
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Any user can have multiple VIDs to represent themselves to different services and in 
different situations. Deciding when and with which service to use a specific VID is 
provided by the DAIDALOS personalisation system which allows users to create user 
preferences to indicate under which circumstances (under specific context) a VID should 
be used.  
The DAIDALOS Virtual Identity Framework 
The basic concept of an Identity Management system is the user profile. The DAIDALOS 
Virtual Identity model defines the Entity Profile as the set of all data that exists about the 
user in all the federated domains that he is registered with. The term "entity" refers to a 
user, a group or organisation. The Entity Profile (EP) is a logical concept that refers to 
the set of all the data of a user as stored anywhere. The Entity Profile consists of Entity 
Profile Parts (EPP) where each Entity Profile Part is the set of data stored in a single 
domain. Network operators, service and content providers create EPPs for their users. 
EPPs contain personal information, context information and preference information. An 
Entity Profile View (EPV) is a partial view of the Entity Profile and as such it is linked 
to one or more Entity Profile Parts as seen in Figure 7. The EPV is also termed the Virtual 
Identity (VID). During the VID creation phase, the user can select the Entity Profile Parts 
they want to associate with their VID. This linking does not automatically mean that by 
giving a VID to a service, it can access any of the data held in the EPPs linked to this 
VID. Access control rules are configured to control data disclosure on a per request basis. 
An EPV with configured access control rules is a filtered EPV (fEPV).  This enables the 
user to use the same identity with more than one service but assign different access 
permissions for each service.  
There are two basic components that constitute the Virtual identity Framework: the 
Identity Management component and the Identity Broker component. The Identity 
Management component is part of the DAIDALOS PSP. Its functionality is VID creation, 
deletion and management that it delegates to the appropriate IDBroker components, and 
VID selection for use with services. It is the only component that holds the necessary 
information to link together the VIDs of the user. The Identity Broker component is 
deployed on the operator domain and handles requests for managing (creating, deleting, 
amending) Entity Profile Parts that are created on that domain. Every domain has an 
identity broker component to handle the management of the EPPs on that domain. Its 
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main responsibility is the mapping of Entity Profile Parts to VIDs, routing and proxying 
the requests for data held in EPPs. Moreover, the IDBroker is not able to view the actual 
data stored in the EPPs but can only link VIDs with the URIs of the Entity Profile Parts 
with which they are associated.  
 
 DAIDALOS Virtual Identity Model 
3.1.2 Lessons Learnt 
Fragmented user profile 
Any system that attempts to protect the user’s privacy has to be flexible enough not to 
restrict the performance of other components of the system. The DAIDALOS Virtual 
Identity model had an innovative design for an identity model. However, the fact that the 
identities of a single user could not be linked together inside the system that supported 
them was very restrictive for personalisation and learning purposes. Behaviour history 
was accumulated separately for each identity the user created and therefore, the learning 
capabilities of the system were severely impeded. Preferences could not be imported for 
use with new identities as the system was handling the different identities of the same 
user as multiple users.  The same problem affected the use of context inside the system. 
As different context information was accessible using different identities of the user, the 
personalisation components were unable to use this information to create rich context 
dependent preferences or react appropriately to changes in the context of the user. 
Infrastructure requirement 
DAIDALOS could only operate with a fixed infrastructure and placed a lot of emphasis 
on the role of telecom operators and network providers. These entities were entrusted to 
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provide both secure storage capabilities for information as well as behaving as the hosts 
of the system and therefore enabling the functionality of the system. The fact that the 
system was not focused on the user but was driven by requirements set by the 
telecommunications industry impacted on the users’ ability to have ultimate control over 
their data. The DAIDALOS system did not provide any means by which a user could host 
and manage their data on devices they own themselves. Instead, the DAIDALOS system 
required that all data would be stored and managed centrally. 
 Anonymous negotiation 
User anonymity is a critical requirement in a negotiation process as any data the user 
discloses during the negotiation should not be linked to the real user until the negotiation 
succeeds. Even then, anonymity might also be maintained if needed.  While it is important 
that the user remains anonymous during a negotiation process, there is no reason for a 
service provider to remain anonymous. On the contrary, the user needs as much 
information about the service provider and their privacy practices as possible to be able 
to provide informed consent about disclosing their data.  
 EU ICT-PERSIST 
PERSIST (Personal Self Improving Smart Spaces) was an EU FP7 ICT project that ran 
from April 2008 until October 2010 with participation from industry and academia. The 
project was given an excellent review and was considered a flagship project of the EU 
when the project completed. The vision of PERSIST is of a Personal Smart Space 
encompassing the devices, portable and stationary, a user makes use of in their daily 
routine. The Personal Smart Space moves around with the user, providing context-aware 
pervasiveness in a ubiquitous and seamless manner. The Personal Smart Space surrounds 
the user at all times catering for their needs, adapting the devices and the environment 
they inhabit at any time and learning from the user as it constantly tries to improve the 
user experience.  
The objective of PERSIST was to develop Personal Smart Spaces (PSSs) that expose a 
minimum extendable set of functionalities that can be enhanced by interactions between 
users of PSSs during their everyday activities. Learning and reasoning, personalisation 
using preference and user intent models, context-awareness and proactive behaviour are 
at the core of the PSS architecture. PSSs encourage users to interact with other PSSs to 
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enhance their pervasive experience. Services, resources and information can be 
exchanged and shared with others with the aim of helping users to accomplish tasks in 
their daily routines.  
3.2.1 The Personal Smart Space 
A Personal Smart Space (PSS) is a collection of devices that belong to a single user. A 
Personal Smart Space is a logical entity rather than a physical one. It is based on a network 
of devices that communicate with each other and are aware that they are part of a group 
of devices aiming to aid their owner in their daily tasks. A PSS can interact with other 
PSSs and promotes the provision and consumption of services and exchange of 
information. Services installed in any of the devices of a PSS can be advertised on the 
network so that other PSSs can consume them when needed. This section provides a view 
of the architecture of the Personal Smart Space and describes the components that are 
necessary for the operation of the personalisation and privacy subsystems.  
The architecture of a PSS-enabled device consists of five layers each of which 
incorporates various components and component blocks essential to the operations of the 
PSS in a pervasive environment. The PSS Framework is situated on the four higher layers 
while the lowest layer represents the underlying system software and hardware. Figure 8 
provides a simple view of the PSS framework architecture. The Personalisation and 
Privacy subsystems depend on some of the other PSS Framework subsystems to function 
properly. The Context Management is the most significant subsystem with regard to the 
personalisation and privacy subsystems because it adds dynamic context awareness to the 
preferences as well as being used as a permanent storage medium for preference data.  
As in the case of the DAIDALOS architecture, the PERSIST Identity Model affects the 
entire PSS Framework as all operations are performed based on the identity used by the 
user at any time. Preferences are identity dependent allowing personalisation to be 
performed differently for each identity of the user but can be shared between multiple 
identities to allow the same functionality to be applied with different identities if needed. 
The Identity Model is at the heart of the Privacy Protection Framework because any 
disclosure of data is performed according to the identity of the PSS requesting the data 
and the identity of the PSS owning the data.  
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  PERSIST High level architecture diagram. 
PERSIST also used a scenario-driven approach to collect user and system requirements 
while designing the architecture of the Personal Smart Space platform. The focus of the 
scenarios were on demonstrating the personalisation and learning functionality embedded 
in the Personal Smart Space platform. Contrary to the DAIDALOS approach, the effect 
of the personalisation and learning were demonstrated using a visualisation tool that 
showed a room in which actuators applied the personalisation in an evident manner. The 
room showed furniture that could be moved or hidden to configure the room according to 
its current use. An office room could be configured into a play room or a bedroom 
depending on the current user’s context and their role in the room.  
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 PERSIST visualisation – Reconfigurable room in “office” mode.  
 
 PERSIST visualisation – Reconfigurable room in “entertainment” mode.  
3.2.2 Some aspects of the PSS Architecture 
User Context  
The Context Management System provides modelling, management and eventing for user 
context information. The data managed and stored in the context database are used for 
modelling the user's environment. Information acquired from sensors attached to the user, 
their devices and the environment is collected and stored in the context management 
system. The Context Management system enables internal and external components 
controlled access to context and profile data.  
User Context is modelled using three principal model types; Entity, Attribute and 
Association. Entities model an object of the physical or the conceptual world. For 
example, a person, a device or a service can be defined as an Entity. Entities have 
properties and these are defined using the Attribute construct. For example, as 
demonstrated in Figure 11, if an Entity is modelling a person, some of this Entity's 
Attributes can be modelling the person's age, name, telephone, location, heart rate etc. 
Associations are used to link Entities with each other. For example, an Entity "Person" 
can be linked to another Entity "Person" using an Association of type "IsFriendsWith". 
Each instance of an Entity, Attribute and Association has a unique context identifier. This 
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identifier includes, among other information, the identity of the user. For example, the 
context identifier of an attribute referring to the user’s location can be represented as:  
pss://user%5B5e0ed9b9-e5d1-4af3-b26e-
b33be80de73b%5D@ac3fc8a2a4490bd6a8/ENTITY/person/1/ATTRIBUTE/location/3. As can be 
seen, the identity (in bold) is embedded in the context identifier. When context 
information is disclosed to another PSS, the context identifier given to other PSSs has to 
be altered to contain the identity that was selected to communicate with that PSS. Thus, 
unlinkability between identities is maintained and partitioning the profile data of the user 
is performed so that none other than the user of the PSS can gain access to more 
information than the user wishes to disclose.  
 
 PERSIST Context Model 
The context management system is a group of components that handle the management 
of the context data such as storing, retrieving, collecting sensed data and logging the 
history of each context attribute. The Context Broker component offers interfaces to 
enable other components to store and retrieve information from the Context Management 
Database. The Personalisation and Privacy Protection Systems make use of these 
interfaces in order to store and retrieve user preferences, privacy preferences, and privacy 
policies for the services provided by the PSS and their respective preference registries as 
well as requesting context data for the purpose of conducting preference evaluation. They 
also provide event management functionality for informing listeners of a change in the 
context of the user or their environment. Any component can register as a listener with 
the Context Event Management subsystem for a specific context attribute and be informed 
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User Interaction 
The User Interaction subsystem comprises the User Interaction Monitor and the Feedback 
Management components. These components are necessary for retrieving information 
from the user and the services currently being used.  
The User Interaction Monitor is responsible for monitoring and logging the interactions 
of the user with services. This component has very similar functionality to the Action 
Handler component of the DAIDALOS architecture. As users interact with services, their 
actions and a data representation of the context in which the action occurred are stored. 
The collection of all actions and their context forms the user’s behaviour history. This is 
the manner in which the user behaviour history is collected in a PSS, identical to the 
DAIDALOS monitoring technique. The history of the user's behaviour is used by the 
Learning subsystem to learn user preferences. Another responsibility of the User 
Interaction Monitor is to post an event to the Event Management system to inform other 
components that the user has performed an action. The Personalisation subsystem relies 
on this event to trigger a behaviour learning cycle.  
The Feedback Management component provides a list of graphical user interface 
templates that allow components to prompt the user to provide feedback on an action that 
is about to be performed. The Proactivity subsystem and the Privacy Subsystem are 
examples of subsystems that make use of this component when it is not possible to decide 
what action to take based on the existing user preferences and privacy preferences 
respectively. The user's response is communicated back to the appropriate component 
which uses this information to update its data model. This way, the PSS is able to improve 
itself, by adapting its behaviour based on what the user wants in different situations.   
Learning Management 
The Learning Management subsystem includes implementations of several learning 
algorithms suited for learning different behaviours. As in DAIDALOS, the Mining 
Algorithms component includes an implementation of the C45 learning algorithm [124] 
that is used to learn user preferences. However, the PSS Framework architecture has a 
fundamental difference in the way learning is performed. In DAIDALOS, learning was 
performed on the user’s entire user behaviour history. This history can grow immensely 
after some time has passed and the system will accumulate a lot of information about the 
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user’s behaviour. The C45 Learning component exposes an interface that allows other 
components to trigger a learning cycle. A learning cycle can be limited to a specific period 
of time and to a specific type of user action. This allows the component that requests a 
learning cycle to ask for a specific preference to be learnt based on actions that occurred 
in a specific timeframe. This is efficient for two main reasons; a) the amount of historical 
data to be processed is considerably less than the entire behaviour history and therefore 
the learning process requires less time to produce a result and b) the user behaviour may 
change over time, causing older behaviour to become obsolete and hence the preference 
models must adapt quickly to give priority to recent actions over older ones. The 
Preference Merging component is an example of a component that makes use of the C45 
Learning component to trigger a learning cycle. The C45 Learning component retrieves 
the user behaviour history from the Context History database and attempts to find 
common patterns of behaviour. The objective is to discover the same action occurring in 
the same conditions many times. The output of the C45 Learning algorithm is a preference 
or a list of preferences that are communicated back to the component that triggered the 
learning cycle.  
Service Run-Time Environment & Overlay Network Management 
The Event Management component mentioned in the previous section is part of the 
Service Run-Time Environment subsystem. It provides an interface for components to 
publish events to the system and for listener components to subscribe for events. There 
are a number of events that the Personalisation and Privacy subsystems need to be notified 
about such as when the status of a service changes, for example starting, stopping, 
installing, uninstalling a service, or when a user action is received by a service.  
The Service Messaging component is part of the Overlay Network Management 
subsystem (ONM). It provides the underlying service messaging infrastructure for intra 
and inter PSS communication. This component is used by the Personalisation subsystem 
to relay messages between components in the same PSS such as personalising services 
located on remote devices and by the Privacy subsystem to relay messages between the 
components in different PSSs in order to perform the Privacy Policy Negotiation process. 
In general, it is the component used to send messages to components residing on a 
different device.  
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Service Management 
The Service Management Subsystem includes components that are responsible for 
advertising services to other PSSs, discovering other PSSs in the vicinity and services 
from other PSSs in the vicinity and managing the active service sessions for atomic and 
composite services. The Session Management component publishes service related events 
such as when services start, stop, and recompose. The Service Discovery component 
publishes events when a new PSS is discovered and new services are discovered from 
PSSs in the vicinity. The Personalisation and Privacy Subsystems need to be notified of 
these events when they occur. 
PERSIST Digital Personal Identifiers 
The design of the Identity Management System and the Identity model has an impact on 
all aspects of the PERSIST framework. The Identity Model used in PERSIST is a simpler 
version of the DAIDALOS Virtual Identity Model. Unlike DAIDALOS, The PERSIST 
Identity Model does not have as a requirement that an identity has to be issued by a 
telecommunications operator. The Identity Management System of the PSS framework is 
solely responsible for issuing and managing the user's identities. These are called Digital 
Personal Identifiers (DPIs) and are used in order to represent the PSS to other PSSs. Other 
types of identities such as the ones issued by a government, an institution or a workplace 
are not in the same level as the PSS Digital Personal Identifiers. These other identities are 
easily handled inside the PSS privacy protection framework by treating them as personal 
information stored as context attributes in the user's profile.  
As in the case of the DAIDALOS VID Framework, the PSS Privacy Protection 
Framework allows for multiple identities to be active simultaneously. This means that the 
PSS can use several services at the same time using different identities to represent itself 
to the PSSs providing these services. Some of the identities of the PSS are created by 
default and have specific functions. These are the private DPI, the public DPI and the 
local DPI. Consumer DPIs are created on the fly with the purpose of consuming services 
from other PSSs.  
Private Digital Personal Identifier: The private DPI is used internally in the PSS to enable 
profile data (such as context data) to have a default identifier and is never exposed outside 
the PSS platform. This means that every item of data inside the context management 
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system (as all data are stored in the Context Management database) is accessible using 
the private DPI. The private DPI is never used to consume or provide any services locally 
or to another PSS. There is only one private DPI for each user PSS. 
Public Digital Personal Identifier: The public DPI is used to advertise the PSS on the 
network. The public DPI has very little amount of data attached to it. The user can decide 
what they wish to make public with their public DPI. The PERSIST Overlay Network 
Management System that manages PSS network connectivity, uses the public DPI to 
advertise PSSs services to other PSSs. The Identity Management component supports 
changing the public DPI of the PSS according to the user's context and preferences, 
therefore a PSS can have as many public DPIs as the user wishes to have but only one 
can be active at a particular point in time. The initial design of the Identity Management 
component included allowing multiple public DPIs to be active simultaneously but the 
requirement was not met at the Overlay Network Management layer due to limitations to 
the underlying JXTA platform [159]. However, according to the specification of JXTA, 
it is possible to alter the current JXTA implementation for the purposes of allowing 
multiple PSS advertisements to be sent to the network each one with a different public 
DPI embedded in them. This would require multiple instances of the JXTA platform to 
be running at the same time each one serving exactly one public DPI. The benefit of 
having multiple public DPIs active simultaneously is to be able to offer different services 
with each public DPI and the client PSSs interacting with them as different PSSs.  
Local Digital Personal Identifier: The Local DPI of a PSS is used internally to use 
services that are installed and running on the user's PSS on behalf of same PSS. The risk 
for data disclosure in this case is minimal to non-existent as services provided by the 
user's PSS are not exchanging information with other PSSs and any data operation stays 
local to the PSS.  
Consumer Digital Personal Identifier: Consumer DPIs are used to consume services 
provided by other PSSs. Consumer DPIs as a concept, partition the user's profile data into 
smaller separate profiles in order to limit the amount of information that can be disclosed 
to other PSSs. As described in section 3.2.2, every context attribute, entity and association 
has a context identifier that embeds the private DPI in them. Before disclosing a piece of 
context data such as a context attribute, the DPI in their context identifier is replaced by 
the consumer DPI selected to use with that service. The original context identifier stays 
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intact inside the context database but the context identifier given to the provider offering 
the service is "disguised".  
The Identity Management (IdM) System manages all the identities and the mapping of 
context data to these identities. The IdM also takes part in the Identity Selection phase 
which succeeds the negotiation phase and is responsible for finding identities that match 
a service's requirements. 
3.2.3 Lessons Learnt 
Privacy Preference Format 
The use of Privacy Policy Negotiation preferences for performing access control as well 
as driving the negotiation process proved very inefficient. Privacy Policy Negotiation 
preferences do not need to be context dependent as data disclosure does not occur during 
negotiation. Therefore, an evaluation of a PPN preference during the negotiation could 
yield a different outcome than during a request for data during the usage of the service. 
Therefore, it would be more efficient to provide the user with two different types of 
preferences; one type to help with privacy policy negotiation that is not context dependent 
but does depend on the trustworthiness of the service provider and the conditions included 
in the privacy policy of the service they are offering and one type to control the access 
permissions for service providers which should be context dependent, trust dependent and 
also take into account the negotiated conditions.  
Learning privacy preferences 
During the monitoring and learning phase, a privacy action was accompanied by the 
context information describing the user’s situation during the privacy policy negotiation 
process. The privacy action embedded information such as the privacy statements 
(obligations) that were contained in the service’s privacy policy. This meant that almost 
all actions were distinct from each other. Thus, the window for learning privacy 
preferences for privacy policy negotiation is very narrow with service providers having 
very different privacy policies according to their requirements and the context of the user 
changing very frequently. The C45 learning algorithm tries to find common actions 
occurring under the same circumstances; it proved very inefficient in learning privacy 
preferences that could be used both for future privacy policy negotiations as well as 
performing access control. Therefore, a different learning method needs to be explored 
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that is a lot more flexible and allows privacy preferences to be learnt faster and in a more 
generic fashion so they can be reused in new negotiations. 
Negotiation from the viewpoint of the service provider 
In the DAIDALOS architecture, the service provider is an entity such as an organisation 
or company. During the privacy policy negotiation, both parties exchange statements that 
have to be verified by the user. In the case, that preferences exist in the system for both 
client and provider, the negotiation can be performed automatically. In the case that the 
service provider is presented with a statement that the system cannot process due to lack 
of rules for this particular statement, manual intervention is required to respond to this 
statement. Given that the service provider is non-human, the system must be able to cope 
with this situation. In PERSIST, this issue was less problematic as PSSs were run by 
individuals acting as service providers but nonetheless, even a user acting as a service 
provider cannot always be available to respond to user requests. Therefore, an automated 
solution is still needed.  
Informed Consent  
A number of questions were raised during the design of both DAIDALOS and PERSIST 
privacy protection systems. By law, the user has to agree explicitly with the terms and 
conditions of a service and give informed consent. The first question is whether there is 
a clear benefit for using a fully automated system with such complicated policy generation 
algorithms to do privacy policy negotiation. The second question is what are the tasks 
that should be automated and what are the tasks that the user should always be involved 
in.  Further, giving the user the option to decide which parts to automate and which parts 
they always want to be prompted for must also be explored.  
 ICT-SOCIETIES 
SOCIETIES (Self Orchestrating CommunIty ambiEnT IntelligEnce Spaces) is an EU FP7 
ICT Integrated Project with participation from both industry and academia that started in 
October 2010 and ended in April 2014. The vision of SOCIETIES is to develop a 
complete, integrated Cooperating Smart Space (CSS), which extends pervasive systems 
beyond the individual to dynamic communities of users [160].  The functionality of 
SOCIETIES is based on the three concepts; Discover, Connect, Organise.  
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Discover: The SOCIETIES platform provides functionality to discover resources, 
services, users and communities that might be relevant to the user based on information 
from user profile, past behaviour, current context, future behaviour predictions and social 
network information such as interests, social interactions and relationships.  
Connect: The SOCIETIES platform provides functionality to connect users who share 
similar interests, have common goals, or are collocated by suggesting communities that 
they can join, create or manage.  
Organise: The SOCIETIES platform provides functionality to adapt the user’s digital and 
physical environment using user and community information captured in the system. 
Resources and services provided to communities of users are adapted accordingly, to the 
communities’ content and context.  
The objective of SOCIETIES is to bridge the gap between pervasive and social computing 
using Pervasive Communities where users can communicate using both the physical and 
digital environment. SOCIETIES builds upon earlier research into Personal Smart Spaces 
(PSS) conducted during the PERSIST project to deliver to each individual user a 
Cooperating Smart Space (CSSs). Using their own CSS, users take advantage of the 
SOCIETIES functionality such as dynamic community orchestration, proactive 
personalisation and strong privacy protection technologies to aid them in achieving their 
daily tasks efficiently. Community Interaction Spaces (CISs) are pervasive communities 
in which users can connect with other users through their respective CSSs, communicate, 
interact, share services, devices, resources and information to support them as individual 
users as well as a community. 
One fundamental difference between the PERSIST PSS and SOCIETIES CSS is that a 
PSS can function in an ad hoc manner, without access to infrastructure, while a CSS needs 
connectivity to cloud services for some of its functionality.  
3.3.1 SOCIETIES concepts 
Cooperating Smart Spaces (CSSs)  
A CSS represents a single participant (user or organisation), and includes their 
information, and services within a distributed collection of CSS Nodes where a node is a 
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device that runs a version of the SOCIETIES platform. It provides both a pervasive 
capability and a social networking capability in an integrated form. A CSS can interact, 
communicate, or share services, resources and information directly with other CSSs, both 
in a peer to peer fashion as well as within a Community Interaction Space (CIS).  
Community Interaction Spaces (CISs)  
A CIS is a representation of a pervasive community administered by a single CSS. CISs 
can be defined by a logical as well as a physical space in which CSSs can share resources, 
services and information and organise community tasks in a dynamic and context-aware 
fashion. CIS components such as community context, community personalisation and 
community orchestration enhance pervasive communities by assimilating context 
information that is derived by the collective behaviours and information that stems from 
CSS to CSS interactions within the CIS. Figure 12 shows the architecture of the 
SOCIETIES platform. 
3.3.2  SOCIETIES Architecture 
The SOCIETIES core services are distributed within four vertical layers depending on 
the type of user they are serving. The lower two layers – Node and Participant 
Components -  are operating on behalf of individual users, providing communication 
functionality between the devices managed by the same CSS, service management, 
device management, user personalisation, proactivity, behaviour learning, intelligent 
privacy protection, intelligent community orchestration and social networking 
connectivity to the CSS. The Community Components operate on behalf of a CIS 
providing functionality such as community context management, community 
personalisation and community behaviour learning. Finally, the top layer Umbrella 
Components operate independently of CSSs and CISs, employing a bird’s eye view on 
the CSSs and CISs available inside the SOCIETIES system and provide community 
recommendations, CSS and CIS directory services, Identity Administration functionality 
and finally a Marketplace similar to Google Play Store [161] and Apple’s App Store [162] 
that hosts SOCIETIES enabled applications and services. 
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 SOCIETIES Architecture 
Personalisation in SOCIETIES 
Both on the individual and the community level, the SOCIETIES Personalisation system 
supports complete dynamic management of preferences and behaviour models, proactive 
personalisation of services and the environment of the user. The Personalisation system 
plays a significant role both in the pervasive and the community aspect of the SOCIETIES 
platform. By monitoring user and community behaviour and applying appropriate 
learning algorithms, preferences and behaviour models are built automatically offering a 
seamless personalisation experience to the user as such mechanisms can relieve the user 
from the burden of manual service configuration. Essentially, the SOCIETIES 
Personalisation system provides mechanisms that can drive a system in a proactive 
manner based on the user's wishes. The SOCIETIES Personalisation System employs two 
different user preference models; one based on IF-THEN-ELSE rules and one based on 
preference based dynamic incremental neural network (DIANNE [163]) and two different 
user intent models; one context aware user intent model based on the Hidden Markov 
Model [164] and one user intent model based on Conditional Random Fields (CRIST) 
[165]. SOCIETIES utilised multiple different approaches to personalisation aiming to 
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study their strengths and weaknesses of each approach in the same situation and examine 
which algorithm is best suited for a specific situation.  
 
 SOCIETIES Personalisation Interactions 
The Personalisation Manager component acts as a coordinator between the different 
sources of personalisation predictions produced by the four personalisation algorithms. 
The four personalisation algorithms indicate to the Personalisation Manager which 
context attributes would be affecting their predictions so it can monitor any changes to 
these context attributes. When either a context event or a behaviour action is received, the 
Personalisation Manager requests an evaluation of the behaviour models from each of the 
four personalisation algorithms based on the event received. The Personalisation Manager 
then inspects the preference predictions and intent predictions separately. Conflict 
resolution – if needed – is performed between the preference based predictions and then 
the intent based predictions and delivers to the User Agent one list of preference based 
predictions and one list of intent based predictions in the form of Action objects. 
Responsibility for performing conflict resolution – if needed – between these lists of 
actions lies with the User Agent component.  
Depending on the confidence level for the actions received, the User Agent will notify 
the user of an impending personalisation action in three different forms; explicit, implicit 
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 Implicit feedback: This notification dialog box appears for ten seconds to notify the 
user that a personalisation action will be performed and allows the user to abort it 
within 10 seconds. This form of feedback is used when the confidence level of the 
action to be implemented is very high. If the user does not respond within 10 
seconds, the User Agent automatically implements the action.  
 Explicit feedback: This notification dialog box requires the user’s explicit feedback 
so the action will not be performed until the user explicitly indicates if they wish 
the action to be implemented or not. This form of feedback is used when the 
confidence level is high enough to notify the user but not as high as to implement 
it automatically. 
 Multiple choice feedback: This notification dialog box asks the user to select from 
more than one conflicting actions to be performed. The user has the option to select 
none of the actions if they wish to do so. This form of feedback is used when the 
conflict resolution algorithm is unable to make a clear decision as to what action to 
perform and requires the user’s input.  
Depending on the user’s feedback, the User Agent performs the action or aborts the 
personalisation. But most importantly, it informs the Personalisation Manager of the 
user’s input in the form of a Feedback Event which specifies which action was 
implemented or aborted, and whether the action was or was not successfully implemented 
including the reason.  
The Personalisation Manager holds a confidence level for each of the personalisation 
algorithms it employs which is updated according to the success or failure of the actions 
they predict. Upon receiving the feedback from the User Agent, the Personalisation 
Manager will update the confidence levels accordingly and will also notify each of the 
personalisation algorithms of the user’s feedback so that each of them can update their 
behaviour models accordingly. 
Privacy Protection in SOCIETIES 
The Privacy and Trust system for the SOCIETIES platform was designed to provide 
privacy protection both for the Cooperating Smart Space (CSS) as well as the Community 
Interaction Space (CIS). The aim of the SOCIETIES Privacy and Trust System is to 
protect the privacy of the user, aid the users in making informed decisions about 
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disclosing data to other CSSs, services and CISs as well as sharing resources and services 
within communities and finally protect the resources, information and shared services of 
a community.  
The SOCIETIES Privacy and Trust system is a policy based privacy protection 
framework utilising four distinct technologies; privacy policy negotiation, access control, 
data obfuscation and trust management.  
Privacy Policy Negotiation. The system provides a non-automated privacy policy 
negotiation mechanism that allows users to modify the terms and conditions of data 
disclosure using an online form when they install a service or join a CIS.  
Access Control. Permissions for allowing or denying access to specific data are managed 
by an Access Control component. Permissions are set during a service installation or 
during the process of joining a CIS. A permission defines whether a specific subject (or 
requestor) can access a specific data item and what kind of operation it can perform on 
the data (read, write, create, delete). 
Data Obfuscation. Data obfuscation is the process of modifying data to make them less 
specific. The most common example of data obfuscation is location obfuscation. Not all 
of the data can be obfuscated and depending on the type of data, different obfuscation 
algorithms can be applied. Data types such as name, age, date of birth, temperature, 
employment, location, ethnicity etc. can all be obfuscated as long as the appropriate 
obfuscation technique is available for that data type and appropriate obfuscation rules 
exist to perform it.  
Trust Management. The SOCIETIES Trust Management system is designed to evaluate 
the trust of a requestor as a CSS and a CIS. The system supports the evaluation of direct 
and indirect trust. Direct trust is the evaluation of the trustworthiness of an entity based 
on interactions of the user with that entity whereas indirect trust is based on trust 
evaluations of an entity performed by other trusted CSSs. 
Personalising privacy in SOCIETIES 
Privacy Policy Negotiation, Access Control and Data Obfuscation take advantage of 
personalisation, specifically custom privacy preferences tailored to each individual 
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technology’s requirements. The aim of adapting the user’s privacy using personalisation 
techniques is to help the user to make better decisions about disclosing data to third parties 
as well as unburden them from having to respond to frequent prompts from the system 
about what action to take in each case. 
In the case of privacy policy negotiation, the system employs customised privacy 
preferences to suggest to the user how to handle the negotiation. These preferences are 
created from decisions the user has made during previous negotiations with the same 
requestor. Personalisation is applied to aid the user in negotiating with the services or CIS 
administrators but not to complete the negotiation on behalf of the user.  
In the case of access control, the system uses customised access control preferences to 
perform access control on behalf of the user. As in the previous case, access control 
preferences are created based on the user’s responses when asked to disclose data or after 
the negotiation process completes. For all the static data (such as name, age, ethnicity etc. 
which, unlike context data, do not change depending on the environment) requested in 
the privacy policy, access control preferences are created that indicate that these data can 
be disclosed if the negotiated conditions are met. If the type of data is contextual that 
describes the user’s environment, access control preferences are created by asking the 
user if they want to disclose the data under the current circumstances.  
3.3.3 Lessons Learnt 
Fine granularity in Privacy Policy Negotiation Preferences 
In both PERSIST and SOCIETIES, the user’s input to the privacy policy negotiation 
process was translated into privacy policy negotiation preferences. Each preference 
indicated a decision regarding the terms and conditions for allowing a specific service 
provided by a specific service provider to access a specific data item. Defining these 
preferences with such fine granularity resulted in their inability to be reused in future 
negotiations with services and service providers with whom the user has not interacted 
with. Therefore, extra privacy policy negotiation preferences can be created that define 
courses of action without defining specifically the service and service provider but 
instead, use their trust level as a parameter to implementing such decisions. In this 
manner, in future negotiations, the system can recommend decisions depending on the 
trustworthiness of the service providers.  
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Lack of Multiple Identities 
Initially, the SOCIETIES architecture was designed to allow users the flexibility of using 
multiple identities to represent their Cooperating Smart Space. However, the choice of 
using XMPP as the communication protocol and subsequently further choices in the 
integration of XMPP and the SOCIETIES platform proved too time consuming to 
implement this feature in an appropriate manner. Hence, the final architecture of 
SOCIETIES was based on a single identity with which the Cooperating Smart Space was 
using to represent itself. As a result, this demeaned the quality of the protection of privacy 
that the SOCIETIES platform offered due to the fact that the user profile could not be 
segregated since all data disclosed by the CSS were linked to that single identity.  
 EU Projects Research in Relation to Thesis Research 
Objectives 
Each of the three EU projects has influenced the research objectives of this thesis and had 
a profound impact on the design of the PersoNISM system. More specifically:   
Enabling users to remain in control of their data.  
The design of the DAIDALOS platform was carried out in a top-down approach, 
influenced mainly by the telecommunications industry. The research was heavily 
business-oriented which impacted the design of several components. The centralised 
architecture was never questioned or debated. The entire Pervasive Services Platform was 
designed to be provided by telecom operators which meant that all the privacy critical 
components that related to the storage, processing and disclosing of user data were not 
under the control of the user. Despite the fact that the Virtual Identity model merits special 
attention in the research on privacy, its design impeded the personalisation and learning 
processes. In contrast, the PERSIST and SOCIETIES projects used a combination of a 
top-down approach to steer the research directions of the projects and a bottom up 
approach for collecting requirements for each individual functionality of the Personal 
Smart Space and Cooperative Smart Space concepts. Privacy management, context 
management, personalisation and learning components were designed from the start as 
components that should be tightly coupled to provide to the user a pervasive experience 
as well as protect their privacy.  
Chapter 3 EU Research 
Page 77 
Assisting users in maintaining their privacy. 
The difficulty in maintaining one’s multiple identities became apparent during the 
DAIDALOS project. It was difficult to imagine how a user could manage the associations 
of several data to identities and the use of each identity for a specific purpose without 
proper assistance from the system. Due to restrictions posed by the Virtual Identity 
architecture, the personalisation components had no access to the right information in 
order to be able to perform personalised identity selection. Hence, a personalisation 
component had to be created to be embedded inside the Identity Management system in 
order to have access to all the information it required. By contrast, from the start of the 
design phase of the Personal Smart Space platform, the personalisation and learning 
components were designed to help users maintain their privacy. The author was very 
heavily involved in designing and implementing all aspects of the privacy protecting 
framework that availed itself from personalisation and learning mechanisms [166]. 
 Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of three pervasive platforms developed under the EU 
projects DAIDALOS, PERSIST and SOCIETIES respectively. All three pervasive 
platforms placed a lot of emphasis on utilising dynamic personalisation and strong 
privacy protection techniques.  
The DAIDALOS Pervasive Services Platform provides context awareness and dynamic 
personalisation of services in a heterogeneous networking environment. Using context 
dependent user preferences, the DAIDALOS PSP platform focused on the personalisation 
of DAIDALOS enabled third party services and several system functionalities such as 
service discovery and composition, network interface selection, communication 
redirection and identity selection. Privacy protection technologies were heavily 
dependent on the underlying Virtual Identity model which defined much of the 
implementation of the DAIDALOS PSP platform components.  
The PERSIST Personal Smart Space platform takes a different approach based on a peer 
to peer platform with the goal of bridging isolated islands of pervasiveness separated by 
a lack of connectivity and pervasive infrastructure. Context and personalisation played an 
important role in PERSIST by offering personalisation and proactive automation of 
functionality; internally in the Personal Smart Space,  in the areas of service management 
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and resource sharing as well as in PSS to PSS interactions in the areas of resource and 
service discovery, selection and adaptation, privacy negotiation, identity selection and 
access control. The peer to peer nature of the identity model utilised in PERSIST gave 
greater flexibility in designing the PSS privacy protection features and allowed the user 
ultimate control over their personal data in terms of storage and disclosure to third parties. 
The SOCIETIES platform combined the concept of a personal smart space with the 
presence of infrastructure. It implemented concrete functionality for interactions of smart 
spaces within community smart spaces to promote native social networking inside the 
SOCIETIES platform and integrations with existing social networking sites. SOCIETIES 
provides a comprehensive approach to personalisation by leveraging four diverse types 
of personalisation; if-then-else preferences, dynamic incremental associative neural 
network, context aware user intent and conditional random fields based user intent. Each 
method has strengths and weaknesses and the purpose for using these in a combined 
approach was to use the strength of one approach to offset the weakness of another. The 
SOCIETIES privacy framework was designed to offer users appropriate safeguards 
against unnecessary and unwanted data disclosure as well as helping them in configuring 
their privacy as they see fit.  
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4 Personalisation in a Pervasive System 
The purpose of personalisation in a pervasive system is to adapt the environment of the 
user according to its user’s wishes. The user’s environment includes the pervasive 
platform itself, the services running on that platform, the interactions with other entities, 
the available resources and data. To accomplish this task, a personalisation system needs 
a way to represent the wishes of the user that is both machine and human readable to 
enable the user to make changes if they wish. As the user performs their daily routine, 
their environment (or more specifically their context) changes frequently. As their context 
changes, services and resources need to be reconfigured to adapt to the new environment 
as per the user’s wishes. This chapter presents an approach to personalisation in pervasive 
systems based on the author’s work during the participation of the three EU projects 
DAIDALOS, PERSIST and SOCIETIES.   
A pervasive system is characterised by the presence of devices, services, sensors, 
resources and data in the environment of the user which can be monitored, configured 
and used to aid the user in their everyday tasks. The design for a personalisation system 
within a pervasive system should satisfy a number of basic requirements that stem from 
the nature of pervasive computing as well as the prime requirement that a pervasive 
system serves its users.  
Environment monitoring. The personalisation system needs information about the current 
context of the user and their surroundings to be able to make good decisions about 
adapting the services and resources available to the user at any time.  
Proactive adaptation. Appropriate mechanisms should be employed to automatically 
reconfigure services, resources and the system itself when changes in the context of the 
user are detected.  
User behaviour monitoring and learning. Learning user preferences by monitoring the 
users’ behaviour and mining behavioural history is required to alleviate the user from the 
burden of manually creating user preferences.  
Dynamic self-improvement. The behaviour models employed must be flexible because 
they need to be constantly updated to reflect changes in the users’ behavioural patterns. 
Chapter 4 Personalisation in a Pervasive System 
Page 80 
Self-improvement mechanisms must combine behavioural history information as well as 
direct feedback from the user.  
Manual configuration. The benefit of allowing the user to manually edit their user 
preferences is twofold. First, it gives the user the ultimate control over how the system 
should behave on their behalf. The user can see how the system will behave under 
different circumstances and make changes accordingly. Second, as 100% accuracy in any 
prediction algorithm cannot be guaranteed, manual configuration is the only failsafe way 
to correct a false or inaccurate prediction. 
 User Preferences 
User Preferences define the wishes of the user in machine readable format. DAIDALOS, 
PERSIST and SOCIETIES use a user preference model based on nested if-then-else 
statements. The User Preference model is a generic model that allows any type of 
preference to be represented in the same way. Therefore using the same data structures 
and algorithms, the system is able to apply all the different types of personalisation needed 
in each platform.  The most important factor that led to adopting nested IF-THEN-ELSE 
rules for user preferences was their simplicity and ability to be represented textually so 
they can be manipulated using a Graphical User Interface (GUI). This is in contrast to 
other solutions to personalisation such as Neural or Bayesian network models that are 
nearly impossible to represent textually or allow the user to edit. 
4.1.1 Context-Dependent Nested IF-THEN-ELSE Rules 
A Preference contains a set of conditions and outcomes. A Preference outcome defines 
an action to be implemented in the system. This can be either setting a parameter for 
example setting "volume = 0" or calling a method in a service for example “method = 
‘turn_on_lights’ ”.  It is in the discretion of the service developer how to represent a 
personalisable parameter or action in the system since only the service is able to interpret 
the semantics of the action. The set of conditions define the context in which the outcome 
must be implemented in the system. A Preference Condition is a statement that can be 
evaluated. Conditions can be context conditions such as the user's current location (e.g. 
‘location == home’) or activity (e.g. ‘activity== jogging’), or service conditions such as 
the state of a service (running, not running, paused or any state allowed by the service 
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model employed). Here is an example of a user preference in the form of a nested IF-
THEN-ELSE rule: 
IF location == home AND activity == reading    set of conditions 
 THEN temperature=23       outcome 
ELSE IF location == home AND activity == sleeping  set of conditions 
 THEN temperature = 20      outcome 
FI 
ELSE temperature=19       outcome 
FI 
The Backus-Naur form of the user preference model is shown below.  
<preference> ::= IF <condition> THEN <preference> FI 
  |IF <condition> THEN <preference> ELSE <preference> FI 
  | <outcome> 
<condition> ::= <simple condition> <logOp> <condition> 
  | (<condition>) 
  | NOT (<condition>) 
  | <simple condition>   
<logOp> ::= AND | OR 
<simple condition> ::= <attribute> <relOp> <value> 
  | <predicate method call>                             
<relOp> ::= <|<=|>|>=|==|<> 
<outcome> ::=<outcome_name> = <outcome method_call> 
  |<parameter name> = <value> 
<attribute> ::= <string> 
<value> ::= <string>|<integer>|<real> 
<outcome method_call> ::=<name>(<parameters>) 
<predicate method_call> ::=<name>(<parameters>) 
<parameters> ::=<parameters>,<parameter> 
  |<parameter> 
<outcome name> ::= <string> 
<parameter> ::= <value> 
<parameter name> ::= <string> 
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<integer> ::= <digit> { <digit> } 
<string> ::=  <char> { <char> } “ “ 
<char> ::= <letter>  |  <digit> 
<letter> ::= A | B | C | E | G | H | J | K | L | M | N | P | R | S | T 
| V | W | X | Y | Z | a | b | c | d | e | f | g | h | i | j | k | l | 
m | n | o | p | q | r | s | t | u | v | w | x | y | z 
<digit> ::= 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 
 BNF notation of the context-aware user preference model. 
A User Preference defines the wishes of the user for a specific personalisable parameter. 
For example, the preference for “volume” is defined in a separate preference to that for 
“genre”.  User Preferences are indexed by the type of service and/or an identifier for a 
specific service to which they refer. Service type preferences are generic and used to 
personalise new services based on their service type. For example, assuming that there 
are stored preferences for service type “multimedia” and the user installs a new VoIP 
application of this type on their device, the application can be personalised using the 
generic preferences relevant to service type “multimedia”. By monitoring the use of the 
VoIP application, the learning algorithms can subsequently learn specific preferences for 
that particular application and store them. The next time the VoIP application is launched, 
the VoIP application will be personalised using the newly learnt VoIP service specific 
preferences. User preferences can also be service agnostic in which case, they are not 
related to a specific service or service type. These are used very rarely, such as when 
personalising a newly installed service whose service type has not been encountered 
before and for which no generic service type preferences exist in the system. The 
hierarchy of these different preference types is illustrated in Figure 15. The generic 
preferences are stored at the top in level 1. The preferences specific to a service type are 
stored in level 2 and can be retrieved by providing the service type as a string. The service 
specific preferences are stored in level 3 and are retrieved using the specific service 
identifier and its service type.  
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 Preference Hierarchy 
4.1.2 User Preference model implementations in DAIDALOS, PERSIST 
and SOCIETIES 
A preference model employed in a pervasive and ubiquitous system for the purposes of 
personalisation is required to represent any type of condition along with an outcome that 
is to be effectively implemented by the system. As mentioned in the previous sections, 
DAIDALOS, PERSIST and SOCIETIES used nested IF-THEN-ELSE rules to represent 
user preferences. A preference has two parts, a conditional expression (a Preference 
Condition) and an outcome (a Preference Outcome) that expresses an action to be 
implemented by the system. The condition part of a preference can include testing of 
attributes of the user’s context such as ‘location’ or ‘activity’.  
The DAIDALOS preference model differed from the PERSIST preference model in its 
implementation. The former is implemented using nested Java objects expressing three 
different constructs. The first construct allowed context-independent personalisation, 
represented by a preference outcome only; the second construct provided a simple IF-















Chapter 4 Personalisation in a Pervasive System 
Page 84 
implemented a full IF-THEN-ELSE form where further preferences could be nested under 
the THEN or ELSE parts of the preference adhering to the BNF shown in section 4.1.1. 
While this approach made it easy to visually present these rules to the user, it was a 
complicated and inefficient format to use for merging existing preferences with new 
preferences acquired using user behaviour learning techniques. This was not an issue in 
DAIDALOS as the Learning algorithm processed the entire history of the user behaviour 
and there was no need to perform preference merging. However, in PERSIST and 
SOCIETIES, this is a very crucial requirement for the user preference model as the 
learning is performed on the user’s recent history only and therefore it is necessary to be 
able to merge two models in an easy and efficient manner. Another reason for not 
replacing the old model with the newly learnt model and instead merging them, is to 
preserve any modifications the user has manually made to the existing preference. The 
approach adopted in PERSIST, and subsequently in SOCIETIES, to satisfy this 
requirement, uses a tree data structure to represent a preference object whose branches 
correspond to conditional expressions and the leaves of the tree are used to store the 
outcomes. Both processes of preference merging and preference evaluation proved to be 
more efficient and easier to implement with the latter user preference model 
implementation than the complex structure of the DAIDALOS preference model.  
An example Preference Tree is shown in Figure 16. The branches of the tree represent 
context conditions and the leaves of the tree express an action (Preference Outcome) that 
has to be applied in a service or in the system. An outcome will be applicable if all the 
conditions on the path between the root node and the leaf node (that holds the outcome) 
evaluate to true. The root node of the tree can be empty, or can represent a condition 
(which requires that the root node has at least one child node that represents a nested 
condition or an outcome). If the root node is empty, then it should be treated as multiple 
trees joined as children of an empty root node. This means that there are two or more 
actions that depend on a set of conditions that are disjoint. More specifically, if Ax is the 
set of conditions that action x depends on to be implemented and By is the set of conditions 
that action y depends on to be implemented, then the intersection of sets Ax and By is 
empty (A ∩ B = ∅). This implies that, at a certain point in time, two or more conflicting 
actions may become applicable. In order to resolve such conflicts during preference 
evaluation (at runtime), preference outcomes carry a confidence level that is calculated 
based on information from previous applications of that outcome. This confidence level 
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can be used to determine which outcome is the most appropriate using a conflict 
resolution algorithm (see section 4.3.2). In cases where the conflict resolution algorithm 
is unable to decide, the user can be prompted to select the outcome. This selection can 
also contribute to the determination of subsequent confidence levels. The information 
used to calculate the confidence level of an outcome includes the following attributes: 
 
 Preference represented in a tree format 
Confidence level: The confidence level of a preference outcome expresses how strong a 
preference is. When the learning algorithms produce new preferences, they are merged 
with the existing preferences (if they exist) and their confidence level is adjusted based 
on what has been learnt.  
Successful Application: This field states how many times this action has been applied 
successfully, i.e. not overridden by the user. 
Failed Application: This field indicates how many times the system attempted to apply 
this action but was aborted by the user.  
Last Successful Application: This field holds a timestamp to declare the last time the 











Chapter 4 Personalisation in a Pervasive System 
Page 86 
The information is updated when a preference is applied and user feedback is received 
and the confidence level is recalculated according to the newest values. The confidence 
level is needed during the evaluation of preferences.  
 Dynamic Personalisation 
Personalisation can be performed in a static or a dynamic manner. The term static 
personalisation refers to situations where services explicitly request user preferences to 
personalise themselves. This form of personalisation does not react to changes in the 
context of the user and thus is not adequate for a pervasive system. A pervasive system is 
expected to adapt the environment of the user according to the user’s wishes and the 
availability of services and resources around them in an automated seamless manner. The 
term dynamic personalisation refers to personalising the environment of the user in a 
proactive manner, by reacting to changes in the context of the user (location, activity, 
time of day). As shown in Figure 17, the personalisation system can receive environment 
information in the form of events that indicate changes in the context of the user or the 
state of the services in the system. User preferences are evaluated against the current 
context of the user to infer what outcomes must be implemented to adapt the environment 
to serve the user’s needs.  
 






Service session event context event
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4.2.1 Preference Evaluation 
Preferences are evaluated when services explicitly request the outcomes of certain 
preferences to personalise themselves or when a change in the context of the user is 
detected. As described at the end of section 4.1.2 the user preference model is a nested 
IF-THEN-ELSE model in the form of a tree. The branches represent the conditions of the 
preference and the leaves represent the outcomes. A preference is evaluated by traversing 
the tree using depth-first pre-order traversal and evaluating the condition in each branch 
against the current values in the Context Management System.  
Figure 18 shows the preference evaluation algorithm used in PERSIST and SOCIETIES. 
The preference evaluation algorithm evaluates a preference tree beginning at the root of 
the tree and descending, visiting each of the child nodes recursively. First, it checks to 
see if the current node is a branch or a leaf. If it is a leaf, then it contains an outcome and 
so the algorithm returns that outcome. If it is a branch, it checks to see if the branch 
contains a condition. If a condition is present (representing an IF statement), it is 
evaluated against the current context of the user and if it evaluates to true, it continues to 
evaluate the child nodes of the current node (representing the THEN statement). If the 
condition evaluates to false, any child nodes are ignored and the algorithm visits this 
node’s siblings. If all nodes of the same level evaluate to false, the algorithm returns a 
null value. If a condition is absent, that means that the tree under this node is split; 
meaning it contains disjoint sets of conditions that may lead to multiple, and possibly 
conflicting, outcomes. At this point, the algorithm initialises a list of outcomes to hold 
the potentially conflicting outcomes that will be produced by evaluating the children of 
this node. For each direct child node of this node, the algorithm checks if it is a leaf node 
and if so, it stores this as a default outcome for this level in the tree. If the node is a branch, 
it recursively calls the algorithm again passing each child node of this branch as a 
parameter. If the algorithm returns a non-null node (an outcome node), it is added to the 
outcomes list. When all the nodes have been exhausted, the algorithm exits the loop and 
inspects the outcome list. If the outcome list is empty, the default outcome of this level is 
returned. If the outcome list contains only one item, that outcome is returned. If the 
outcome list contains two or more items, the algorithm performs conflict resolution to 
detect the most applicable outcome. As explained in section 4.1.2, each outcome has a 
confidence level that indicates how confident the system is that this outcome should be 
implemented under a set of conditions. Hence, the conflict resolution algorithm compares 
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the confidence level of each potential outcome and returns the one with the highest 
confidence level. The confidence level calculation algorithm is explained in section 4.3.2.  
Outcome evaluateNode(Node node){ 
 if (node.isLeaf()){ 




 return null; 
} 
 
List outcomesList = new List(); 
for (childNode : node.children()){ 
 outcome = evaluateNode(childNode); 





switch (outcomesList.size()) { 
 case 0: 
return null; 
  break; 
 case 1:  
  return outcomes[0]; 
break; 
  default:  
   return resolveConflicts(outcomesList); 
} 
} 
 Preference Evaluation Pseudocode 
The size of the preference tree depends on the number of context attributes and their 
corresponding values. Since each preference refers to a single parameter (i.e. volume), 
the type of action does not affect the size of the tree. Tree traversal is inexpensive since 
the algorithm will never traverse the entire tree. The tree under the branches that evaluate 
to false is ignored. If the tree is not split, only one branch will evaluate to true in each 
level of the tree and the children nodes of that branch will be visited. If the tree is split, 
the tree traversal will be as expensive as the number of nodes that split the tree.  
4.2.2 Preference Condition Monitoring 
Preference condition monitoring refers to the process of listening for changes in a) the 
context of the user that affect the outcome of the evaluation of the user’s preferences, b) 
the state of the services available to the user and c) the preferences due to user intervention 
or preference learning. Monitoring the state of the services is needed for three reasons; 
first, service status information can be represented as a preference condition so it can be 
considered as another form of context; second, knowing which services are running 
reduces the number of preference evaluations needed as only the preferences of currently 
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running services should be evaluated; and third, knowing which services are currently 
running and which context affects the preferences of the currently running services 
reduces the number of context event registrations. Hence, a preference condition 
monitoring mechanism must exist to make sure that only the relevant preferences are 
evaluated when an event is received and only affecting context is monitored so that the 
system performs personalisation as efficiently as possible.  
Receiving service status events 
By correlating the currently running services and the context that affects their preferences, 
the preference condition monitoring component can request the evaluation of the 
preferences that are affected and can be currently applied. A “service started event” 
triggers loading the preferences relevant to the service that was started. The context 
conditions are extracted from the preferences and for each context type, the preference 
condition monitoring component registers for events of this context type with the Context 
Broker.  The preferences are also evaluated against the current context and if the 
evaluation yields a result, the outcomes of these preferences are implemented.  
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If a “service stopped event” is received, the information about the preferences of the 
stopped service is removed and for each of the context types that affected only the 
preferences of this service, the preference condition monitor unregisters as a listener for 
events of this type. Figure 19 shows the workflow of receiving service status events. 
Receiving context events 
A context event indicates that something in the environment of the user has changed. 
After receiving a context event, the preferences affected by this type of context are 
retrieved and evaluated. Each outcome produced by the preference evaluation process 
must be implemented and an appropriate feedback event must be posted through the event 
management system to notify listeners if that outcome was implemented correctly or not. 
Figure 20 shows the workflow of receiving a context event. 
 
 Context event received. 
Receiving “preference updated” events 
When a user manually edits a preference or when the learning algorithm learns a 
preference, an event is posted to notify listeners that a preference has been updated. The 
preference condition monitoring component receives these events and must ensure that 
the current correlated information between affecting context data and affected preferences 
and services is in accordance with the current preference set. The updated preference is 
retrieved and the conditions affecting the preference are extracted. The correlated data are 
updated accordingly with the extracted conditions. If a new context type affects the 
preference, it registers for events of the new context type or if a context type no longer 
affects this preference and that context type does not affect any other currently loaded 
preferences, it unregisters from events of this context type. The corresponding workflow 
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 Preference updated event received. 
 Implicit Personalisation 
Maintaining the user preference set manually can become an arduous task as the number 
of services used by a single user grows. While it is beneficial to provide users with a 
graphical user interface to create and edit their user preferences, a pervasive approach to 
personalisation should also support the learning of user preferences through behaviour 
and situation monitoring. DAIDALOS, PERSIST and SOCIETIES make use of the C45 
algorithm to mine behavioural information. Figure 22 shows the workflow of implicit 
personalisation in PERSIST and SOCIETIES.  
Services volunteer user actions to the Personalisation & Learning System that indicate 
that a user has interacted with the service in some way. As soon as such an action is 
received, the Personalisation & Learning System retrieves a selection of context attributes 
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context snapshot. The action and the escorting context snapshot are then stored in the 
User Behaviour database. The system waits until a sufficient number of actions have been 
received before triggering a learning cycle.  
 
 Implicit Personalisation 
4.3.1 Preference Learning & Merging  
The learning algorithm produces user preferences that are based on the user’s recent 
behaviour history. These new preferences must be embedded within the existing 
preferences using an appropriate merging algorithm. There are four different situations 
that can occur when merging preference trees depending on how the preference 
conditions and outcomes of the new preference match those of the existing preferences.  
 Situation 1: Identical preference conditions with identical preference outcomes. 
 Situation 2: Identical preference conditions with different preference outcomes. 
 Situation 3: Different preference conditions with identical preference outcomes. 
 Situation 4: Different preference conditions with different preference outcomes. 
Situation 1: Identical preference conditions - identical preference outcomes.  
This is the case where the new preference matches the old preference entirely. Both 
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IF A==a THEN X=x FI.  
The algorithm has to simply increase the confidence level of the preference. The 
confidence level is re-calculated using the confidence level calculation algorithm 
(described in section 4.3.2). 
Situation 2: Identical preference conditions - different preference outcomes.  
This happens when the user performs two different actions in the same context. In this 
case, the existing preference states that: 
IF A==a THEN X=x FI but the new preference learnt states that: 
IF A==a THEN X=y FI 
These preferences cannot be merged because the two outcomes contradict each other and 
the preference evaluation algorithm will not be able to distinguish which of the two it 
should implement. To avoid having the preference evaluation algorithm solve this 
problem, the preference merging algorithm has to solve this problem in the preference 
merging phase. There are three solutions to this problem: 
a) Between the old and new preference, discard the preference with the lowest confidence 
level and decrease the confidence level of the preference with the highest confidence level 
using an appropriate algorithm.  
b) Instruct the learning component to run another learning cycle with a longer history of 
actions than the current history used for learning this new preference.  
c) Prompt the user to select which preference should remain and which one should be 
discarded or allow the user to edit the preference explicitly. This would set the confidence 
level of the preference to the highest value.  
d) Keep both conflicting actions in the tree and ensure that their respective confidence 
levels are up-to-date. This will be very helpful information to maintain when users change 
their behaviour.  
The solution adopted in PERSIST and SOCIETIES uses a combination of solutions b and 
c in which the learning manager is instructed to re-mine the history of actions to yield a 
non-conflicting preference but it might again reach the same preference as previously. In 
this case, the user is prompted to edit the preference and the confidence levels is set to the 
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highest value because the user explicitly stated their wish. Using only solution a, could 
potentially discard a preference whose confidence level is not as low as to ignore it. The 
use of solution b is preferable as the new preference will be based on a larger history, 
hence it will take into account more information. Between solutions a and c, solution c is 
preferable as an appropriate graphical user interface can give the user the option to edit 
the preference and expand it to include other conditions that explain why the conflict 
emerged, a prospect  that would not be possible with solution a.  
Situation 3: Different preference conditions - identical preference outcomes.  
Situation 3 has four subcategories in which the condition types and/or their values can be 
the same or different or a mixture of these differences. These are: 
Situation 3.1: Different condition types. This situation arises if none of the conditions of 
the new preference is present in the existing preference tree. For example: 
Assuming the existing preference states that:  
IF A==a THEN X=x FI 
And the new preference states that:  
IF B==b THEN X=x FI 
To merge this preference, the two conditional parts are merged with an OR operation: 
IF A==a OR B==b THEN X=x FI.  
The tree constructed from the merged preference looks like the tree in the following 
diagram. 
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 Situation 3.1 
Situation 3.2: Identical condition types but different values. In this case, there is a 
complete match in the types of conditions present in the new preference with the condition 
types found in the existing preference but the values differ. The algorithm performs the 
same operation to merge the preference trees as in Situation 3.1: 
Assuming the existing preference states that: 
IF A==a THEN X=x FI 
And the new preference states that: 
IF A==aa THEN X=x FI 
then the merged preference is: 
IF A==a OR A==aa THEN X=x FI where the two conditional parts are merged with an 
OR operation. However, the tree shown in the Figure 24, shows a different picture than 
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 Situation 3.2 
Situation 3.3: Combination of different and same types - different values. In this situation, 
some conditions exist in both the existing and the new preference with different values 
and some conditions exist only in one of them. For example: 
Assuming the existing preference states that: 
IF A==a OR B ==b THEN X=x FI 
And the new preference states that: 
IF A==aa AND C==c THEN X=x FI 
The conditions are joined with an OR operation: 
IF A==a OR B==b OR (A==aa AND C==c) THEN X=x FI 
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 Situation 3.3 
Situation 3.4: Combination of different and same types - identical values in the same 
condition types. In this situation, some conditions exist in both existing and new 
preferences and their values are the same and some conditions exist only in one of them. 
For example: 
Assuming the existing preference states that:  
IF A==a OR B==b THEN X=x FI 
And the new preference states that: 
IF A==a AND C==c THEN X=x FI 
The new preference constructed by merging the two trees results in: 
IF A==a OR B==b OR (A==a AND C==c) THEN X=x FI 
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 Situation 3.4. 
The above expression can be simplified by removing the unnecessary Condition c using 
algebraic laws and the resulting expression is: 
IF A==a OR B==b THEN X=x FI 
However, it is preferable to keep as much information in the preference as possible 
because the tree could be updated frequently if the user performs the particular action (x) 
in different circumstances and retaining the Condition c can prove useful in future 
merging operations.  
Situation 4: Different preference conditions - different preference outcomes. 
This situation occurs when the outcomes are different and the combination of conditions 
varies. This situation is also broken down in four categories.  
Situation 4.1: Different condition types. This situation arises if none of the conditions of 
the new preference is present in the existing preference tree. For example: 
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IF A==a THEN X=x FI 
And the new preference states that: 
IF B==b THEN X=y FI 
The merged preference is constructed as: 
IF A==a THEN X=x  
ELSE  
IF B==b THEN X=y FI 
FI 
One problem that is immediately apparent is that it is possible that both A==a and B==b 
conditional expressions evaluate to true at the same time. There are two solutions to this 
problem: 
a) The algorithm leaves the tree as is and the preference evaluation algorithm takes into 
account the confidence level of the preference during the evaluation in order to decide 
what action to implement. 
b) The algorithm triggers a new learning cycle to mine a longer history of actions. As 
described earlier, by default, the learning cycle only learns from the last n actions and n 
is defined by a threshold to wait until a learning cycle can be triggered. By default, n = 3 
so after receiving 3 actions, a new learning cycle is triggered. However, this can be 
changed if needed.  
The implemented algorithm in PERSIST and SOCIETIES uses solution a) and allows the 
preference evaluation algorithm to solve the conflict if it exists. The reasons for which 
solution a) was adopted are because it is preferable to maintain as much information as 
possible in the preference tree for future merging operations along with the fact that the 
conflict will not necessarily occur all the time and it is unlikely that both conditions will 
evaluate to true during every evaluation cycle. Also, by continuously mining the history, 
learning more information about the preference and updating the confidence level, it is 
possible that one of the branches will become obsolete depending on the interaction of 
the user with the service. Figure 27 depicts the constructed preference tree.  
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 Situation 4.1 
Situation 4.2: Identical condition types - different condition values. In this case, there is 
a complete match in the types of conditions present in the new preference with the 
condition types found in the existing preference but the values differ. For example: 
Assuming the existing preference states that: 
IF A==a THEN X=x FI 
And the new preference states that: 
IF A==aa THEN X=y FI 
Then the result of merging the two preferences is: 
IF A==a THEN X=x  
ELSE 
IF A==aa THEN X=y FI 
FI 
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 Situation 4.2 
Situation 4.3: Identical condition types - different condition values. In this situation, some 
conditions exist in both the existing and the new preference with different values and 
some conditions exist only in one of them. For example: 
Assuming the existing preference states that: 
IF A==a OR B ==b THEN X=x FI 
And the new preference states that: 
IF A==aa AND C==c THEN X=y FI 
The result of merging these two preferences would yield: 
IF A==a OR B==b THEN X=x 
ELSE 
IF A==aa AND C==c THEN X=y FI 
FI 
The same problem arises here as in situation 4.1. Expressions A==a OR B==b can 
evaluate to true at the same time as A==aa AND C==c because B==b can be true and 
A==aa be true. The solutions are the same as presented under situation 4.1 and again, the 
implemented solution in the algorithm updates the confidence levels of each preference 
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The merged tree is depicted in the figure below: 
 
 Situation 4.3 
Situation 4.4: Combination of different and same types - identical values in the same 
condition types. In this situation, some conditions exist in both existing and new 
preferences and their values are the same and some conditions exist only in one of them. 
For example: 
Assuming the existing preference states that:  
IF A==a OR B==b THEN X=x FI 
And the new preference states that: 
IF A==a AND C==c THEN X=y FI 
The merged preference that results from merging these preferences is: 
IF A==a AND C==c THEN X=y 
ELSE  
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The tree that depicts the merged preference is shown below 
 
 Situation 4.4 
4.3.2 Preference Confidence Level  
Users’ preferences may change over time, particularly as newer and more sophisticated 
services become available to them. However, existing preferences stay in the system 
indefinitely unless the user removes them manually. This might have the undesired effect 
that the system will implement outdated or unwanted outcomes. To avoid this, it is useful 
to maintain a level of confidence in each action to indicate how confident the system is 
that the user prefers that this outcome is implemented under the stated circumstances. A 
confidence level can be attached to the outcome that is calculated based on how many 
times an outcome was successfully or unsuccessfully implemented by the system. During 
preference evaluation, the system can check the confidence level of an outcome to make 
sure that it should be implemented. The confidence level can be adjusted when the user 
aborts an implementation of an outcome or when they select it for implementation or 
when they implement that action themselves. A simple algorithm such as the one shown 
in the flowchart of Figure 31 can be used to adjust the confidence level of an outcome 
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private static final int MIN = 0; 
private static final int MAX = 10; 
public void updateConfidenceLevel(boolean positive){ 
  if (positive){ 
   switch (currentStage){ 
   case POSITIVE_1: 
    confidenceLevel+=2;  
    currentStage = Stage.POSITIVE_2; 
    break; 
   case POSITIVE_2: 
    confidenceLevel+=3; 
    currentStage = Stage.POSITIVE_3; 
    break; 
   default:  
    confidenceLevel+=1; 
    currentStage = Stage.POSITIVE_1; 
    break; 
   } 
   if (confidenceLevel>MAX){ 
    confidenceLevel = 10; 
   } 
  }else{ 
   switch (currentStage){ 
   case NEGATIVE_1: 
    confidenceLevel-=2; 
    currentStage = Stage.NEGATIVE_2; 
    break; 
   case NEGATIVE_2: 
    confidenceLevel-=3; 
    currentStage = Stage.NEGATIVE_3; 
    break; 
   default: 
    confidenceLevel-=1; 
    currentStage = Stage.NEGATIVE_1; 
    break; 
   } 
   if (confidenceLevel<MIN){ 
    confidenceLevel = 0; 
   } 
  } 
   
 } 
 Confidence level calculation pseudocode 
The confidence level range is between 0 and 10. Each preference outcome includes a 
Stage field which suggests if the last two applications of this outcome were successful. 
When the outcome is applied, the confidence level algorithm is called with the appropriate 
Boolean value. A true value is passed as a parameter if the application of the outcome 
was successful and a false value if the user aborted the implementation of the outcome.  
When the confidence level of a preference falls below 5, the outcome is not considered 
for implementation. When the confidence level goes above 7, the system is confident 
enough to implement this outcome automatically by notifying the user before 
implementing it and allowing them ten seconds to abort. If the confidence level is between 
5 and 7 (inclusive), the system prompts the user to confirm the implementation of the 
outcome.  
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4.3.3 Learning service actions 
The preference model as described in 4.1.1 can contain context conditions that define 
when a specific outcome should be applied. However, it is also possible to include the 
state of the services as conditions so that a preference can define that an Action y should 
be implemented when Action x is implemented. To realise this requirement, the 
personalisation system maintains the state of the services in the context database. A 
service is modelled as an Entity (as described in 3.2.2) and each of its personalisable 
parameters are modelled as attributes of that entity. These attributes are updated when the 
user performs actions that are monitored, which change the state of the service or when 
the personalisation system applies an outcome that changes the state of the service. By 
modelling the state of the services in the context database, the system avails itself from 
functionality provided by the context management system such as context event 
management. Hence, when the state of a service changes, the Preference Condition 
Monitor component can be informed in order to re-evaluate the preference that contains 
such preference conditions.    
 Summary 
This chapter provided a detailed overview of personalisation for pervasive systems using 
a rule based approach. The concept of personalisation lies in the core of any pervasive 
system as the need to automate decisions and adapt the environment of the user according 
to their wishes is imperative.  
A personalisation solution must satisfy several basic requirements to be acceptable in a 
pervasive system.  
 It must take account of the user’s environment as input to making decisions 
about adapting the services and resources available at any point in time by 
constantly monitoring the context of the user. 
 It must allow the user a way to intervene if the personalisation it is applying is 
not aligned with the user’s wishes.  
 It must be able to adapt the services and resources in a proactive manner if it is 
confident enough that its decisions are what the user wishes by reacting to 
changes in the context and behaviour of the user. 
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 It must be able to learn from the user’s behaviour and maintain appropriate up-
to-date preference information by constantly monitoring the user’s behaviour.  
The personalisation approach presented in this chapter was employed in all three EU 
projects (DAIDALOS, PERSIST, SOCIETIES) with slight modifications to satisfy 
specific requirements of each platform. This rule based approach is an attempt to provide 
generic personalisation to services in a pervasive environment without the knowledge of 
particular workings of each service. The purpose of this decision was to maintain 
simplicity across all aspects of the personalisation system and using the same models and 
algorithms to personalise any kind of service suitable for a pervasive system without the 
need to understand how each individual service works.  
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5 Privacy in Pervasive systems 
A pervasive system depends on the collection and processing of information, specifically 
of the personal data of its users. The quality of a pervasive computing environment is 
directly associated with the quality of the functionality it offers. This has been a source 
of controversy over the use of pervasive systems. It is an indisputable fact that there is a 
need for appropriate privacy protection mechanisms in any pervasive computing 
environment.  
 Privacy policies  
A privacy policy describes how a service collects, stores, uses and disseminates the 
personal data of its users. More specifically, it states a) what data are requested, b) the 
purpose for which this data is requested, c) what type of processing will be applied to this 
data, d) with whom this data will be shared with and e) how long this data will be stored 
for. It may also include other statements about the rights of the user as well as the service 
provider with regard to the data. With the use of privacy policies, companies, and more 
specifically services, inform their users about what happens to the users’ personal data 
after disclosure. 
5.1.1 The Request Policy 
A Request Policy document is a privacy policy expressed in machine readable format. A 
Request Policy comprises a Subject element and a list of Request Item elements. The 
Subject specifies the party to which the policy refers to, i.e. the service and service 
provider information. Each Request Item element refers to a specific piece of data that 
the service will request access to during the use of the service by the user (e.g. name, 
email, address, current location, etc). Each Request Item states the following (see Figure 
32):  
 The type of data (defined in the <Attribute> inside the <Resource> attribute). 
 The purpose for which this data is requested in a user friendly manner (defined 
with the <Purpose> attribute). 
 The type of operation it will need to perform on the data (e.g. READ, WRITE, 
CREATE, DELETE defined with the <Action> attribute). 
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 The list of conditions (each condition is defined with the <Condition> attribute) 
that defines restrictions on both the service provider and the user such as how 
these data will be shared with other parties and how long the data will be kept 
by the service provider (data retention period). Other conditions can also be 
included such as the right of the user to opt out of the service at any time and 
other rights or obligations of the user the service might request (a full list of 
conditions is provided in Appendix X). 
 Whether this data type is optional for running the service (defined with the 
<Optional> attribute). If it is marked as not optional, then this means that the 
service cannot operate without this information.  
<Request> 
 <Resource> 
  <Attribute AttributeId="context" 
 DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> 
   <AttributeValue>locationSymbolic</AttributeValue> 
  </Attribute> 
 </Resource> 




  <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" 
 DataType="org.societies.api.schema.privacytrust.privacy.model.privacypoli
cy.ActionConstants"> 
   <AttributeValue>READ</AttributeValue> 
  </Attribute> 
 </Action> 
 <Action> ... 
 <Condition> 
  <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:condition-id" 
DataType="org.societies.api.schema.privacytrust.privacy.model.privacypolicy.Co
nditionConstants"> 
<AttributeValue DataType="DATA_RETENTION">12 hours</AttributeValue> 
  </Attribute> 
 </Condition> 
<Condition> ...  
</Request> 
 
 Snippet of a Request Policy document in XACML format. 
XACML as a Privacy Policy specification language 
XACML was chosen as privacy policy specification language due to its simplicity and 
the fact that it was easily extensible. However, any language that is extensible can be 
adapted to specify RequestPolicy and ResponsePolicy constructs such as the P3P 
specification language. As shown in the examples of Figure 32 and Figure 34, a list of 
privacy conditions is defined for a single data type. The XACML specification allows 
privacy conditions (defined as <Obligation> attributes) to be defined for all the data types 
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included in the privacy policy. This has been altered to allow users to request different 
terms and conditions per data type. For example, a user can request a short data retention 
period for their location data and a longer one for their email address or postal address.  
 Privacy Policy Negotiation 
Privacy Policy Negotiation (PPN) is the process in which a user negotiates the terms and 
conditions of the privacy policy with a service. It is a solution to the “take it or leave it” 
approach that is currently being implemented by millions of services worldwide. 
Negotiating for privacy means freedom for the user to adjust their privacy as they wish 
rather than fitting the preferences of the service provider.  
A system can present to the user in a visually friendly manner what data will be requested 
of them and what happens to the data after disclosure. An appropriate negotiation user 
interface allows the user to edit the Request Items present in the Request Policy, edit the 
conditions and tailor the privacy policy to fit their preferences with regard to privacy. 
From the viewpoint of the service, a customised privacy policy means that the Quality of 
Service to the user will be proportionate to the restrictions imposed by the user in the 
privacy policy. For example, a user can demand that a map service does not disclose their 
location to 3rd parties. If the map service is integrated with services offering discounts in 
stores nearby, the user will not be informed of these.  
A suitable negotiation protocol should be able to terminate in a finite number of message 
exchanges so as not to deadlock the system into an infinite loop of offers and 
counteroffers. Also, during the negotiation process, it is required that the user remains 
anonymous so that any information disclosed during the negotiation cannot identify the 
user. 
The Privacy Policy Negotiation process is initiated by the user who wants to install or use 
a service or application in one of their devices. During the negotiation, a negotiating entity 
termed Negotiation Client acts on behalf of the user and another termed Negotiation 
Agent acts on behalf of the service provider. These two entities exchange messages and 
are responsible for implementing the Privacy Policy Negotiation algorithm. The 
Negotiation Client retrieves the service’s Request Policy from the Negotiation Agent and 
processes it. Using an appropriate user interface, the Negotiation Client shows the 
contents of the Request Policy to the user, clearly indicating with whom the user is 
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negotiating, the data and respective actions and conditions on that data and the purpose 
for which the data is requested. Figure 33 demonstrates a graphical user interface allowing 
the user to make adjustments to the proposed Request Policy of the service. 
 
 Example of a Privacy Policy Negotiation GUI 
After the user reviews the items and makes the necessary adjustments to satisfy his 
privacy needs, the system generates a document based on the Request Policy of the 
service and the user’s responses and adjustments. This document expressed in a machine 
readable format is termed the Response Policy.  
5.2.1 The Response Policy 
A Response Policy document is constructed during the negotiation to state the user’s 
agreement or disagreement with the Request Policy of a service. The Response Policy 
comprises the Subject element which identifies the service with which the user is 
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negotiating and a list of Response Item elements, one for each Request Item present in 
the service’s Request Policy document. As shown in Figure 34, the Response Item 
encapsulates the Request Item and the decision of the user regarding this Request Item. 
The Request Item is modified based on the user’s input to the PPN user interface (Figure 
33). If the user accepts the terms of the original Request Item and does not make any 
changes, the <Decision> attribute is marked with “PERMIT”. If the data item is marked 
as optional, the user can indicate that they do not wish to disclose it at all. Then, the 
<Decision> attribute is marked with “DENY”. If the user makes changes to the conditions 




  <Attribute AttributeId="Decision" 
DataType="org.societies.api.schema.privacytrust.privacy.model.privacypolicy.Decisi
on"> 
   <AttributeValue>INDETERMINATE</AttributeValue> 
  </Attribute> 
 </Decision> 
 <Target> 
  <Request> 
   <Attribute AttributeId="context" 
 DataType="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#string"> 
    <AttributeValue>locationSymbolic</AttributeValue> 
   </Attribute> 
  </Resource> 
  <Purpose>Your name is needed so you can be identified by your contacts. 
  </Purpose> 
  <Action> 
   <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:action-id" 
DataType="org.societies.api.schema.privacytrust.privacy.model.privacypolicy.Action
Constants"> 
    <AttributeValue>READ</AttributeValue> 
   </Attribute> 
   <Optional>false</Optional> 
  </Action> … 
  <Condition> 
   <Attribute AttributeId="urn:oasis:names:tc:xacml:1.0:action:condition-id" 
DataType="org.societies.api.schema.privacytrust.privacy.model.privacypolicy.Condit
ionConstants"> 
    <AttributeValue DataType="RIGHT_TO_ACCESS_HELD_DATA">yes</AttributeValue> 
   </Attribute> 
  </Condition>  
  <Optional>false</Optional> 
 </Request> 
</Response> 
 Snippet of a Response Policy document in XACML format. 
5.2.2 Negotiating with the service 
After generating the Response Policy based on the user’s input, the Negotiation Client 
sends the document to the Negotiation Agent and initiates a new privacy policy 
negotiation session. The Negotiation Agent receiving the Response Policy will inspect all 
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the Response Items to see if it can satisfy the user’s requests. The Negotiation Agent 
acting on behalf of the service maintains an internal set of rules that define the ranges in 
the values of the conditions that can be satisfied by the service. For example, the service 
provider sets a minimum and a maximum data retention period. The maximum retention 
period is also set in the Request Policy, while the internal rules indicate both the minimum 
and the maximum value for use in the negotiation process.  
 
 Privacy policy negotiation protocol. 
For example, the Request Policy might set a data retention period of one month for GPS 
data, while the internal rules set a range of satisfiable values between twenty four hours 
and one month. These ranges are set by the service provider according to their capabilities 
and the functionality of the service. For example, a service provider may not be able to 
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the rule for negotiating this condition would define that this functionality is not available. 
Using these rules, the Negotiation Agent modifies the Response Policy to match its own 
abilities and returns it to the user.  
Using the privacy policy negotiation user interface, the Negotiation Client presents the 
service’s Response Policy, highlighting the sections where the service was not able to 
meet the user’s demands. In the XACML notation, the changed items are marked using 
the <Decision> attribute. The user can either abort the negotiation at this point if they are 
not satisfied with the response of the service or accept the Response Policy and continue 
to finalise the result of the Negotiation. 
5.2.3 The Negotiation Agreement  
A successful negotiation terminates with the signing of a Negotiation Agreement 
document that states what has been agreed during the negotiation process. If an Identity 
Management system is available to the user which makes use of multiple identities (see 
section 5.3), the user is prompted to select a digital identity to represent themselves to the 
service. The Negotiation Agreement is constructed using the agreed Response Policy 
document, the user’s and the service provider’s identities and the service identity 
(identifying the service uniquely). The Negotiation Agreement is then signed by the user 
digitally and then sent to the service for signing and acknowledgement. Upon receiving 
the Negotiation Agreement, the service checks to make sure it has not been altered since 
the previous round of negotiation and then signs it and returns it to the user. 
The Negotiation agreement then defines the terms and conditions for all subsequent use 
of user information by the service provider which must be adhered to.  
 Digital Identities 
A digital identity is an identifier that can represent a user in the system. A digital identity 
is also associated with a set of data which are part of a user’s profile. A suitable Identity 
Management system for pervasive environments allows the user to use multiple identities 
to represent themselves to services, service providers, and other entities on the network 
in different contexts. Users may wish to present a different view of themselves by 
selectively revealing different items of information under different identities. If the user 
profile can be thought of as a theoretical concept that defines the set of all personal data 
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held in the system about the user, a digital identity can be regarded as an identifier that 
can give access to a subset of that data.  
5.3.1 Identity Selection 
Identity selection is the responsibility of the underlying Identity Management system. It 
is a process that is usually performed after the privacy policy negotiation stage and its 
primary input is the Negotiation Agreement document. As described in chapter 3, an 
Identity is associated with a set of data in the user’s profile. Hence, the identity selection 
process entails looking at the set of data types defined in the Negotiation Agreement and 
matching them to the set of data associated with each of the Identities in an effort to select 
the most appropriate digital Identity. After finding one or more identities that can satisfy 
the requirements presented in the Negotiation Agreement, the user is asked to choose one 
of them or create a new identity if they wish.  
Creating a new identity even though existing identities can be reused allows the user to 
represent themselves to each service as a different user. This means that the details of 
their interaction with one service cannot be linked to details of their interaction with 
another. In case none of the existing identities are suitable, a new digital identity should 
be created and associated with the data defined in the Negotiation Agreement.  
As explained earlier, the user profile contains all the data that the system holds about the 
user. Some data attributes have multiple values. For example, a user can have many e-
mail addresses, postal addresses, jobs, cars, can speak multiple languages and so forth. 
Supporting multiple values allows for a good level of flexibility as it allows the user to 
select which attribute of a specific type they prefer to associate with a specific Identity. 
For example, a user can create two identities, one for work related activities and the other 
for personal activities. The former would be associated with the attribute holding the e-
mail address that they use for work correspondence and the latter with the attribute 
holding the e-mail address used for personal communication. Associating specific 
attributes with an Identity is part of the identity creation process. Selecting the appropriate 
attributes to associate with the new Identity depends on the service that the identity will 
be used for and the context in which the service will be used.  
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 Access Control  
Privacy policy negotiation and identity selection are two processes completed 
sequentially before a user makes use of a service. After these two processes complete 
successfully, the system must take care to continue protecting the privacy of the user by 
restricting access to the user’s data using access control rules. Access control refers to 
allowing or blocking access to a data record when a request is made by a service. While 
the Negotiation Agreement sets out the terms and conditions for disclosing data, it does 
not warrant an ongoing access to the data agreed to be disclosed. Access control rules 
must be maintained in the system to define if access should be granted when a request for 
data is received.  
Access control rules define an ‘allow’ or ‘block’ decision for access to perform a specific 
action to a specific data attribute by a specific requestor. A list of access control rules can 
be accrued in the system by prompting the user to confirm or block access to the data and 
storing that decision as an access control rule. Hence, a component providing access 
control maintains a list of permissions that denote if a subject (i.e. a service) is allowed 
to perform a specific action (read, write, create, delete) on a data item specified with its 
identifier.  
However, in pervasive environments, the value of many data are continuously changing; 
specifically, data that come from sensors and services that monitor the behaviour and 
activity of the user. For those kinds of data, the actual value of data can be an important 
factor in deciding whether the data should be disclosed. There is a clear need for context-
dependent access control rules. For example, the user might be willing to allow their boss 
to monitor their location and activity while they are at work but not when they are not 
working. The system must be able to provide this simple functionality. It is evident that 
traditional access control rules that define static rules allowing or blocking access to a 
data item are not sufficient in a pervasive service environment. However, defining 
context-aware access control rules to manage the disclosure of data is not enough; 
monitoring of the constantly changing data that affects the decision whether to allow or 
block access to a requestor is needed. Specifically, in the case of pervasive environments 
where smart services act in a proactive manner, listening to changes in the user’s context 
and reacting to those changes to provide the best available information and service in the 
current context of the user, the system must be able to proactively make changes to the 
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access control rules making sure that data disclosure happens according to the wishes of 
the user defined in a set of context aware access control rules.  
 Data Obfuscation 
Access control can be enhanced with the use of data obfuscation techniques. The purpose 
of using data obfuscation is to make the data more generic, thus limiting data disclosure 
to a level that is still acceptable for running a service while respecting the user’s privacy. 
In some cases, services receive a lot more detailed information than needed. For example, 
consider a service that is only available to devices present in the UK. For a user to be able 
to use the service, they will have to prove the device is present in the UK by allowing the 
application to retrieve GPS information from the device. Even though the query is very 
generic, the response is a lot more detailed than needed by divulging very precise location 
information to the service. In such cases, data obfuscation can be very helpful. In addition 
to these cases, users may wish to limit the information they divulge even though that 
might diminish the Quality of Service they receive. 
Data obfuscation can be applied to different degrees depending on the type and value of 
data. For example, the postal address “10 Downing St, London, SW1A 2AA, UK” can be 
obfuscated fully to “UK”. However, for some services, full obfuscation might render the 
service useless, for example in the case of a restaurant finder service. Therefore, a good 
obfuscation algorithm should be able to offer different levels of obfuscation. In the case 
of a restaurant finder service it could suggest the obfuscated value of “Westminster, 
London, UK” or “London, UK”.  
5.5.1 Data Obfuscation Limitations 
While data obfuscation is a very useful privacy enhancing technology, there are certain 
limitations and drawbacks to applying data obfuscation to everything.  
 Applicability. Data obfuscation cannot be applied to any type of data because 
some types cannot be obfuscated. For example, it is not possible to obfuscate a 
binary value. 
 Availability. In order to obfuscate data of a given type, an appropriate algorithm 
must exist that is able to process the data type appropriately. For example, the 
system would need a suitable algorithm to obfuscate location coordinates, 
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another algorithm to obfuscate the user’s age, another algorithm to obfuscate 
their date of birth, their religion, their ethnicity and so forth. The number of data 
types is not fixed. As new sensors, services and applications are encountered, 
the number of data types grows and new algorithms will be needed to obfuscate 
them. 
 Resource demanding. Data obfuscation must be performed on a request basis 
because different obfuscation levels may be applied to the data according to the 
requestor and the current value of the data. Running an obfuscation algorithm 
each time a request for the data is received can be computationally expensive, 
especially for mobile or embedded devices where most sensitive context data 
are likely to be collected.  
 Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of a set of privacy enhancing technologies that can be 
combined to provide a comprehensive approach to privacy protection. These are: privacy 
policy negotiation, multiple identities, context-aware access control rules and data 
obfuscation.  
Privacy Policy Negotiation allows the user to configure the terms and conditions of a 
service and tailor them according to their own privacy requirements and demand higher 
privacy than that being offered by the service, provided that the service can satisfy that 
demand.  
The use of multiple identities allows the user to present themselves differently in different 
contexts to different services with appropriate user information. The “dis-integration” of 
the full set of data of the user’s profile with the use of multiple identities impedes third 
parties from collecting vast amounts of user information. 
Access control rules embedded with context-awareness functionality provide a 
differentiating decision making approach to traditional access control systems. Allowing 
access to certain resources according to the current context of the user is appropriate in 
the context of pervasive systems as different information with varying quality will be 
necessary in different situations.  
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On top of context-aware access control rules, data obfuscation strengthens the system in 
delivering information in a form that is both adequate for the purposes to which it is being 
put whilst maximising the privacy of the user.  
Privacy Policy Negotiation provides an alternative solution to the “take it or leave it” 
concept that is currently being offered in traditional systems. However, pervasive systems 
are a lot more demanding in terms of information than traditional systems. The more 
information they have about the context and preferences of the user, the better they can 
perform. In spite of this, the quantity and quality of the information disclosed must be 
proportionate to the purpose for which the information is requested. Appropriate terms 
and conditions must be demanded by the user to guarantee that any disclosed information 
is processed, stored and eventually deleted according to the wishes of the user.  
These privacy enhancing technologies are combined to deliver comprehensive privacy 
protection to the user. Primarily, the level of privacy that can be delivered depends on a) 
the demands that the user makes during the privacy policy negotiation, b) the manner in 
which the user creates and manages their identities, and c) the data disclosure that the user 
allows. Hence, the user decides the level of privacy protection that is to be applied. 
However, not all users have the requisite knowledge about how to achieve the level of 
privacy they desire using any kind of privacy protection technology. Therefore, the 
system must provide appropriate tools to help the user make use of these technologies in 
order to achieve and maintain the desired level of privacy protection. The PersoNISM 
system described in the next chapter describes a comprehensive privacy protection system 
based on such user-friendly functionality. 
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6 PersoNISM - PERSOnalised Negotiation, Identity 
Selection and Management 
This chapter presents the PersoNISM (PERSOnalised Negotiation, Identity Selection and 
Management) system. The PersoNISM system provides a comprehensive approach to 
privacy protection in pervasive environments using context dependent personalisation 
and learning functionalities. The PersoNISM system makes use of the technologies 
presented in the previous two chapters; personalisation using context dependent user 
preferences and user behaviour learning designed to help the user achieve the desired 
level of privacy protection based on privacy policy negotiation, identity selection and 
context-aware access control enhanced by data obfuscation.  
The goals of the PersoNISM system are twofold. The first goal is to equip the user with 
the necessary tools to protect their privacy as they see fit and the second goal is to help 
the user make the best use of these tools using a set of privacy preferences designed 
specifically for personalising these privacy tools according to the user’s wishes.  
The User Privacy Preference Model is the foundation of the PersoNISM system. In 
essence, the User Privacy Preference Model holds all the information that drives the 
functionality of the PersoNISM system. The personalisation techniques described in 
chapter 4 are designed primarily to satisfy the requirements of adapting third party 
services in a specific context without knowing the specific functionality of these services. 
In the case of PersoNISM, personalisation is used for the purposes of a) tailoring privacy 
protection technologies according to the user’s wishes and b) helping the user make 
informed decisions about their privacy. The functionality and the requirements of each 
privacy protection technology employed are known in advance. Therefore, the 
personalisation system can be designed specifically to accommodate the specific 
requirements of Privacy Policy Negotiation, Identity Selection, context-aware access 
control and data obfuscation. Hence, the User Privacy Preference Model contains five 
different forms of user privacy preference rules, designed to personalise these 
technologies where the user is involved. These are: privacy policy negotiation 
preferences, identity selection preferences, attribute selection preferences, access control 
preferences and data obfuscation preferences.  
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 PersoNISM architecture  
The PersoNISM system exists within a pervasive service environment that offers a 
multitude of services such as user context data management, identity management and 
trust management. Figure 36 shows the PersoNISM architecture blocks and their 
interactions with such services in the context of a pervasive platform similar to the 
platforms implemented during the three EU projects DAIDALOS, PERSIST, 
SOCIETIES. Figure 36 shows the set of components that are active in a pervasive 
platform running on behalf of a user. In the case of a service provider platform, only the 
Privacy Policy Management and Privacy Policy Negotiation components are necessary. 
In a pervasive platform where users can act as micro-operators providing services to other 
users (e.g. the Personal Smart Space platform), the PersoNISM system has a dual role to 
provide functionality that serves both service provider and service consumer.  
 
 
 PersoNISM architecture blocks.  
The Privacy Policy Negotiation process is implemented within the Privacy Policy 
Negotiation component that implements the Negotiation Agent and Negotiation Client 
functionality needed by the service provider and service consumer respectively. The 
Privacy Policy Management component running on behalf of the service provider has the 
responsibility of maintaining the set of privacy policies for the services that this service 
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From the point of view of a service provider, the privacy policy negotiation requires a 
privacy policy and a set of options that define the range of satisfiable privacy condition 
values to be used when a user sends a ResponsePolicy document to the Negotiation Agent. 
These options are declared when a service first becomes available and are maintained in 
the Privacy Policy Management component. While the developer of the service defines 
the data items that the service needs to operate, the service provider must make sure that 
the privacy policy attached to the service defines the Privacy Conditions in the policy and 
the range of satisfiable options for each of these data items according to the capabilities 
of the service provider and the implementation of the service.  
From the point of view of the service consumer, the privacy policy negotiation requires 
input from the user either through the graphical user interface or through an automatic 
Response Policy generation algorithm that is based on the user’s privacy preferences 
(described in section 6.2.3). When the privacy policy negotiation process is finalised with 
a successful agreement, the Identity Selection and Creation component needs to deliver 
an identity to be used to represent the user to the service. The process of selecting an 
appropriate identity takes into account the Negotiation Agreement and a set of privacy 
preferences designed to guide the component in selecting an identity that can satisfy the 
requirements of the service but more importantly in selecting the right identity depending 
on the current context of the user and the trustworthiness of the service.  
Access Control and Data Obfuscation handle the disclosure of the data to services. Even 
though the Negotiation Agreement dictates the terms and conditions for data disclosure, 
the user retains the right to deny disclosing information to services at any moment. This 
is particularly important in disclosing contextual information that describe the 
environment of the user, their current location, activity, other people near them and other 
sensitive information. This information is used in deciding when and to whom to disclose 
what information and in what quality.  
 Personalisation in Privacy Policy Negotiation 
During the privacy policy negotiation process, the user can configure several options for 
each data item that a service is requesting in order to tailor the use of the service with the 
quality of privacy that the user wishes. While this process is very flexible in terms of 
empowering users to request the desired level of privacy, the number of options presented 
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to the user can appear cumbersome. Personalisation in the form of user preferences can 
be used to aid the user in performing privacy policy negotiation by suggesting options 
that fit the user’s previous privacy demands. Such user privacy preferences can be created 
either manually by the user or by using an appropriate learning algorithm that uses the 
user’s previous configurations during privacy policy negotiations as input to produce a 
set of user privacy preferences that can be used to guide the user through future privacy 
policy negotiations. Such an algorithm should also be able to merge existing privacy 
policy negotiation preferences with newly formed ones as the user installs new services 
on their devices. 
6.2.1 Privacy Policy Negotiation (PPN) Preferences 
Traditional user preferences are designed in a way that they can be applied to a variety of 
services but in the case of using user preferences for personalising privacy policy 
negotiation, that requirement does not apply and therefore the data model can be designed 
to fit the needs of this task explicitly. Knowing the semantics of the conditions and the 
outcomes gives much greater flexibility in designing an appropriate data model for 
privacy policy negotiation preferences.  
PPN Preference Outcome  
Maintaining the basic IF-THEN-ELSE structure format for the skeleton of the privacy 
preferences allows the presentation of these rules to the user in a user friendly manner. In 
a privacy policy negotiation, a PPN preference is used to personalise privacy condition 
statements, where the user is able to make changes and request the level of privacy they 
wish. Therefore, the outcome of the PPN preference defines the value that should be set 
in a <Condition> element. The PersoNISM privacy policy negotiation specification 
defines seven types of privacy Conditions: 
 Data retention. This condition defines the time period that the service can keep 
the data in their servers. The values of this condition are in the range of 1 hour, 
2 hours, 4 hours, 6 hours, 12 hours, 24 hours, 36 hours, 48 hours, 1 week, 2 
weeks, 1 month and until the account is deactivated. 
 Data sharing. This condition defines the right of the service to share (or sell) 
the data to others. The values of this condition are: no sharing, sharing with 
affiliated services, sharing with 3rd party services, sharing with everyone. 
Chapter 6 PersoNISM - PERSOnalised Negotiation, Identity Selection and Management 
Page 123 
 Secure storage. This condition defines the right of the user to demand that their 
data is stored encrypted and in a secure database by the server. Information on 
how secure the storage and how strong the encryption is can also be provided 
in the RequestPolicy document. This condition has a binary value (yes-no). 
 Inference. This condition defines the right of the service to manipulate the 
user’s data, combine them with other information to infer further information 
about the user. This condition has a binary value (yes-no). 
 Opt-out clause. This condition defines the right of the user to deny disclosing 
data to the service at any time. This condition has a binary value (yes-no). 
 Access to data. This condition defines the right of the user to access the data 
that the service maintains about the user. This condition has a binary value (yes-
no). 
 Edit the data. This condition defines the right of the user to edit the data that 
the service maintains about the user. This condition has a binary value (yes-no). 
The user preference outcomes used in service personalisation allow services to define the 
values of the outcomes themselves to fit the needs of their service. In the case of PPN 
Preference Outcomes, the key-value pairs are already defined. The key can only be one 
of the seven types of privacy condition, and each key has a set of predefined values. 
PPN Preference Condition 
PPN preferences are used during a Privacy Policy Negotiation process. They define the 
value of the condition that should be used for a specific data item. These preferences do 
not need to be context-dependent as the current context of the user does not affect the 
decision about the terms and conditions for disclosing data. However, they need to be 
trust dependent. The trustworthiness of the service and the service provider can affect the 
decision for requesting higher levels of privacy. Like context information, trust 
information can also be used in a conditional statement that defines what value should be 
set if the trust level of a service is above some threshold. Querying the user about their 
perception of the service’s trustworthiness with regard to the service’s privacy tactics is 
one way to receive trust information. A more elaborate approach is to integrate a third 
party trust management system to deliver this information based on the experience of 
other users with the service. The SOCIETIES Trust Management system, which has been 
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used to evaluate the PersoNISM system, provides trust values that range between 0 and 
100 [167][168].  
6.2.2 Acquiring Privacy Policy Negotiation Preferences 
The PersoNISM system acquires PPN preferences in two ways; manually through a 
graphical user interface or by translating the user’s input to the privacy policy negotiation 
process into IF-THEN-ELSE statements and then merging them with existing PPN 
preferences if they exist. For every data item requested in the agreement document, three 
sets of seven PPN preferences are created and/or updated. Each set has a total of seven 
PPN preferences, one for each condition present in each data request. The first set is 
created to reflect preferences for the specific service provider and service so that in the 
case of the user reinstalling this service in the future, the system can provide this 
information to the user to help them perform the negotiation and also remind them of the 
options they chose previously. Even though this set of PPN preferences are set to be used 
only for renegotiating with the same service provider for the same service, trust conditions 
are still embedded in the PPN preferences as it is possible that the trustworthiness of the 
service might change leading to the user re-examining the level of privacy they have 
previously negotiated with the service. The second set of PPN preferences is created to 
reflect preferences for the specific service provider but unrelated to the service with which 
the user negotiated. This is done to create preferences to guide the user in future 
negotiations with other services offered by the same service provider. The third set is 
needed to create or update a set of generic PPN preferences independently from the 
service and service provider the user negotiated with. These preferences are valuable 
information to use when the user negotiates with service providers that they have not 
interacted with before. The process of creating a PPN preference is shown in Figure 37.  
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 Acquiring PPN preferences sequence diagram. 
6.2.3 Applying Privacy Policy Negotiation Preferences 
When the Request Policy is received, the Negotiation Client requests the evaluation of 
the PPN preferences that can be used to configure the RequestPolicy. The Privacy 
Preference Manager then tries to find a PPN preference for each condition in each data 
item. As explained in the previous section, PPN preferences can be related to either a 
specific service provided by a specific service provider or only a specific service provider 
or not related to a service at all (generic preferences). The preference retrieval algorithm 
will first search for a PPN preference that is related to the specific service. If it doesn’t 
exist, it will then search for a PPN preference that is related to the specific service provider 
and if that doesn’t exist, it will retrieve the generic PPN preference. After all the available 
PPN preferences have been retrieved, each preference is evaluated using the preference 
evaluation algorithm described in section 4.2.1. The privacy preference evaluation 
algorithm contains an additional evaluation functionality that allows trust conditions to 
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A PPN preference can contain multiple trust conditions that could all evaluate to true. For 
example, a PPN preference might contain two trust conditions such as in the preference 
shown below: 
IF trust>=60 then data_retention= “48 hours” 
IF trust>= 70 THEN data_retention= “1 week”.  
If the trust management system reports that the current trust level of the service is above 
70, then both statements evaluate to true. In this case, the algorithm will try to find the 
closest match between the trust conditions present in the preference. To perform this, 
during the preference tree traversal, any outcomes whose trust conditions evaluate to true 
are added to a temporary list so that they can be checked at the end of the algorithm. Then, 
if the list contains more than one item, the algorithm compares all the trust conditions to 
find the one closest to the current trust level of the service.  
When the privacy preference evaluation algorithm terminates, the results are combined 
to create ResponseItem objects, one for each RequestItem object found in the service’s 
privacy policy. These are returned to the NegotiationClient which now needs the user’s 
input to continue. A graphical user interface such as the one shown in Figure 35 is used 
to show the terms and conditions of the service and allows the user to make changes. As 
shown in the figure, the GUI includes a button that provides the user with personalised 
suggestions. When the user clicks on the button, the parameters are changed according to 
the list of ResponseItem objects returned from the privacy preference evaluation process.  
Any items that were changed are marked with arrows as shown in Figure 35, to highlight 
to the user what has been changed. Clicking the reset button returns all the parameters 
back to the values that were originally requested by the service.  
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 PersoNISM Privacy Policy Negotiation GUI.  
Automating the privacy policy negotiation 
After performing the evaluation process and before presenting the graphical user interface 
of the privacy policy negotiation to the user, the NegotiationClient checks to see if the 
evaluation outcomes can be used to perform the negotiation automatically on behalf of 
the user. If there is at least one valid evaluation outcome for every privacy condition of 
each data item requested, then there is enough information to perform it automatically. 
The user is asked to confirm that this is what they want. If the user accepts, then the 
Response Policy generation algorithm produces the Response Policy on behalf of the user 
using the PPN preference evaluation outcomes to configure the terms and conditions for 
each data item. The ResponsePolicy is sent to the NegotiationAgent continuing the 
negotiation process. When the NegotiationAgent returns the modified ResponsePolicy, 
the NegotiationClient compares it with the ResponsePolicy it sent on behalf of the user. 
If they match, the negotiation completes successfully. If they don’t match, then the 
privacy policy negotiation form shows to the user the new terms and conditions offered 
by the service. As shown in Figure 39, the parameters are marked appropriately to 
highlight the ones that were rejected by the Negotiation Agent. 
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 Service provider’s ResponsePolicy presented to the user. 
 Personalisation in Identity Selection & Creation 
The purpose of personalising the identity selection is to help the user select the 
appropriate identity to represent themselves to services and in the case of identity 
creation, to help them associate the right data with the new identity thus presenting 
themselves to the service in a manner that satisfies their privacy demands. Identity 
Selection & Creation preferences can maintain information regarding the circumstances 
in which a user selected a specific identity to use or in which a specific data item was 
associated with a specific identity. The circumstances are defined by the identity of the 
service provider, their trust level, the current context of the user and the privacy 
conditions that were agreed during the Privacy Policy Negotiation. 
6.3.1 Identity Selection Preferences 
The Identity Selection (IdS) Preferences define under what circumstances an identity 
should be selected for use. As in the case of the PPN preferences, IdS preferences are 
designed to service the specific requirements of identity selection and therefore the 
preference outcome defines the identity identifier. The IdS preference conditions describe 
the conditions in which the identity (defined in the outcome) should be used. IdS 
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Preference Conditions can be context conditions and trust conditions. Identity Selection 
Preferences are context dependent because the use of an identity can depend on the 
context of the user, such as their location, time and current activity. For example, a user 
might use an identity for work related activities and another for leisure related activities. 
To help the user manage their identities and select the right identity to use in a situation, 
the preference must be able to maintain this information and evaluate it accordingly. The 
trustworthiness of the service also affects the identity selection process because different 
identities are associated with different data. The user can maintain a set of identities to 
use with services with a trust level below a certain threshold. Finally, the privacy 
conditions that are derived by examining the Negotiation Agreement document, can also 
determine which identity to use in a specific situation. Similarly with trust conditions, a 
set of negotiated privacy conditions that denote lower settings than the user would have 
preferred can determine that an identity should not be used and another should. Optimally, 
to protect their privacy users would create two or more identities to use with certain 
services in order to maintain some separation between some sensitive information. For 
example, separating work related information from home related information. As the 
number of installed services grows, so will the number of identities. Managing a large 
number of identities and remembering which identity should be used in a specific context 
can be a very cumbersome exercise for the user. The Identity Selection preferences are 
designed to help the user with this task.  
6.3.2 Attribute Selection Preferences 
The Attribute Selection (AttrSel) preferences define which data item should be associated 
with a new identity in a specific situation when a new identity is created for a specific 
purpose (i.e. to use a service). Attribute Selection Preferences cannot be used for creating 
a new identity manually as there is no information about the purpose for creating the 
identity. The association of a data item with an identity can be influenced by the service’s 
trustworthiness level as well as the privacy conditions agreed during the privacy policy 
negotiation.  User context information such as the current location, activity or time do not 
affect the attribute selection process as the identity associations are final and exist as long 
as the identity exists. So, the only two types of preference conditions that can be used for 
Identity Selection Preferences are privacy conditions and trust conditions. A Privacy 
Condition is a conditional statement that compares the value of a Privacy Condition such 
as data retention, sharing with third parties, etc. (as described in section 6.2.1) with the 
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current value of the same privacy condition type present in the ResponsePolicy.  The 
Attribute Selection Preference Outcome defines which data item should be used under 
the set of conditions. The data item is defined by its specific context identifier assigned 
to it by the Context Management system. For example, the context database can contain 
multiple data attributes of type “email” as users tend to have more than one email address 
that is used for different purposes. Each different attribute has its own identifier to allow 
it to be addressed. Therefore, the AttrSel preference outcome contains only the identifier 
of the data attribute.  
6.3.3 Acquiring Identity Selection preferences 
The PersoNISM system acquires Identity Selection preferences at the end of the privacy 
policy negotiation.  Using the Negotiation Agreement as input, the Privacy Preference 
Management system extracts the identities of the user, the service provider and the service 
identifier. It first constructs the preference outcome using the user’s identity. Then, it 
creates two trust conditions, one for the service provider and one for the service itself. 
Then it retrieves a snapshot of the current context of the user.  
By default, the current snapshot of the current context includes the following information: 
the user’s location, the time of day, the day of the week and the user’s activity. Through 
its exposed API (Application Program Interface), the PersoNISM system allows the 
manipulation of this set if the system is enhanced with sensors that provide additional 
contextual information about the user and this information can affect the selection of 
identities. This functionality allows the system to behave in a dynamic manner, 
appropriate to the nature of pervasive systems.  
Each retrieved data item is translated into a context preference condition. All conditions 
(both trust and context) are then loaded into a preference tree structure as branches 
(example shown in Figure 40) with the preference outcome added as the leaf of the tree. 
This preference now defines one of the circumstances under which this identity may be 
used. Three copies of this preference are used. One is associated with the selected identity, 
the specific service and service provider, one with the selected identity and the service 
provider only and one with only the selected identity (the generic preference). For each 
of these, the Preference Management component searches for existing preferences. If a 
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preference exists, then it is merged with the newly created preference and is stored. Again, 
the same merging algorithm is used as the one described in section 4.3.1.  
 
 Constructed IdS Preference tree. 
6.3.4 Acquiring Attribute Selection preferences 
During the identity selection stage, the user might choose not to use any of their existing 
identities, or if the existing identities cannot satisfy the requirements of the 
ResponsePolicy, a new identity needs to be created. As explained previously, the profile 
of the user can contain any number of data items of the same type (such as multiple email 
addresses or postal addresses). The identity creation process involves picking the 
appropriate data item to associate with the new identity. When the user performs their 
selection and the new identity is finalised, the Preference Management component 
collects all the required information in order to create the corresponding Attribute 
Selection Preferences. Three sets of N number of preferences are created where N is the 
number of data items in the ResponsePolicy. The first set is associated with the specific 
service, specific service provider and data type; the second set is associated with the 
specific service provider and data type and the last set is associated only with the data 
type. The trust level of the service and service provider are retrieved and translated into 
trust conditions. Then, for each data type, the list of privacy conditions defined in the 
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conditions and the PreferenceOutcome is constructed from the identifier of the attribute 
that was selected for providing the actual information to the service. Using the same 
procedure as in the previous section, the preference tree is constructed with the trust and 
privacy conditions placed as branches of the tree and the preference outcome as the leaf. 
Preferences that already exist in the system are retrieved and merged with the newly 
created preference tree using the merging algorithm described in section 4.3.1.  
6.3.5 Applying Identity Selection Preferences 
Identity Selection preferences are evaluated to produce an identity that should be selected 
for use with a specific service in a specific situation. If the user has requested that the 
privacy policy negotiation be performed on their behalf automatically (as described in 
section 6.2.3), Identity Selection preferences are evaluated in order to perform automatic 
Identity Selection. If the user has selected manual configuration, the Identity Selection 
preferences are only evaluated upon request. When the user is prompted to select an 
identity, the graphical user interface provides a button (shown in Figure 42) that allows 
the user to request the aid of the system in selecting the identity. When that happens, the 
preference evaluation algorithm is called to evaluate all the relevant IdS preferences and 
suggest one or more identities to the user. The current trust level of the service and service 
provider and the current context of the user are retrieved to be used in the preference 
evaluation process. For each existing identity that can satisfy the requirements of the 
ResponsePolicy, the corresponding preferences are retrieved. The algorithm begins to 
evaluate the most specific preference first; the one associated with the identity, the service 
provider and the service. If that preference doesn’t produce a result, it then evaluates the 
second most specific preference; that is the one associated with the identity and service 
provider and if that doesn’t produce a result, the most generic preference is evaluated. If 
the preference evaluation algorithm produces one identity to be used, it is selected and 
the service is started with that identity. If there is more than one identity that can be 
suggested, the user is prompted to confirm which identity they wish to use. If the 
evaluation algorithm does not produce a result, the user has to be prompted to create a 
new identity.  
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 Identity Selection 
 
 Personalised Identity Selection.  
Proactive context-aware Identity Selection 
By monitoring the user’s active sessions, the PersoNISM system is constantly aware of 
the identities that are being used at any time. Using the algorithm described in section 
4.2.2, a change in the values of the context and trust conditions that affect the evaluation 
of the Identity Selection preferences of the active identities triggers their re-evaluation. If 
the evaluation algorithm results in a suggestion to use a different identity, the user is 
alerted that their privacy may be compromised and is advised to take appropriate course 
of action such as switching to the identity recommended in the evaluation result.   
6.3.6 Applying Attribute Selection Preferences 
The Identity Creation process involves the association of a list of data items with a new 
identity. The user decides what information to associate with an identity so that this 
information is then disclosed to the service. Attribute selection preferences can be used 
to aid the user in performing this task faster and more efficiently. As shown in Figure 43, 
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the user can request help from the PersoNISM system by clicking the button “Get 
recommended attributes”.  
 
 Identity Creation form. 
The evaluation algorithm will be triggered to evaluate all the preferences that are related 
to the data types that need to be associated with this identity, the service provider and 
service. Again, the order of evaluating the retrieved preferences begins from the most 
specific preference; the one that is associated with the data type, the service provider and 
the service and if that fails to produce a result, it moves to the preference associated with 
the data type and service provider only and so on. If all three preferences are evaluated 
without producing a result, then the system cannot recommend a specific attribute. The 
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results of the evaluation are collected and presented to the user for approval as shown in 
Figure 44. 
  
 Recommended attributes list for new identity. 
 Personalisation in Access Control 
The Privacy Policy Negotiation and Identity Selection stages happen before any data is 
disclosed to a service. At this stage, the system has prepared the environment in which 
the data will be disclosed, defining the rules that the service will adhere to after it receives 
the user data. After this stage finishes, the PersoNISM system facilitates the actual data 
disclosure according to the wishes of the user. The PersoNISM system maintains a set of 
access control rules that declare who has access to perform a specific action on a resource.  
These rules are managed in a dynamic manner. The access control rules change by 
constantly monitoring the current context of the user that affects the decision of granting 
permission to access a data resource. The PersoNISM system utilises a set of access 
control preferences that are evaluated to perform this dynamic management of access 
control rules.  In addition to access control functionality, data obfuscation is performed 
in some cases to alter the quality of the information that is disclosed to services. To 
determine the level of obfuscation that should be applied to each data item, another type 
of privacy preference is used; the data obfuscation preference.  
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6.4.1 Access Control and Data Obfuscation Preferences 
Access control preferences state if a requestor (i.e. a service) is allowed to perform an 
action (read, write, create, delete) on a data item (specified by its context identifier) in a 
specific situation.   The trust level of the service and service provider combined with 
current context information affect the decision whether to allow a service access to a data 
item. Therefore both trust and context preference conditions are used in Access Control 
preferences. The preference outcome of an access control preference defines an “allow” 
or “block” permission. Access control preferences have the following preference 
hierarchy: 
a) The specific AccCtrl preference is associated with the data identifier, the action 
to be performed (read, write, create, delete), the service and service provider 
information. 
b) The generic AccCtrl preference is associated with the data identifier and the action 
to be performed.  
Data obfuscation (DObf) preferences state the level of obfuscation that should be applied 
to a specific data item in a specific situation. The data obfuscation algorithm of a data 
type defines the number of obfuscation levels that can be applied. The DObf preference 
outcome states the obfuscation level that should be applied in numeric form, the bounds 
of which are defined by the algorithm.  
For example, the DObf preference 
IF symbolic_location== “home” AND trust>=51 THEN obfLevel = 4. 
defines data obfuscation level four (4) should be applied to the data attribute of type 
<symbolic_location> when the current value of that data attribute is <home>. 
6.4.2 Acquiring Access Control and Data Obfuscation Preferences 
All preferences are created by collecting information about the user’s interactions with 
the system and then translating that behaviour into a preference tree. Likewise, access 
control and data obfuscation preferences are created by monitoring the user’s decisions 
about data disclosure when they are prompted with a graphical user interface as shown 
later in Figure 45.  
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Static profile information such as the user’s name, postal address changes rarely or not at 
all and when it is disclosed at least once, it has little consequence if it is disclosed again 
to the same service in a different situation. For static context information, only trust 
conditions are used (not context) in constructing the corresponding access control or data 
obfuscation preferences, as the disclosure and obfuscation of those data values does not 
depend on the current context of the user. For these data types, the trustworthiness of the 
service can affect the decision to block access or obfuscate the value of the data.  
 
 Access Control and Data Obfuscation requests. 
As shown in Figure 45, a service requests access to the user’s symbolic location and the 
user is prompted to allow or block the service from accessing the data and to indicate how 
they want to obfuscate their symbolic location before disclosing it to the service. When 
the value of the slider bar changes, the example value provided below it (showing “EH14 
4AS, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK” in Figure 45) changes to reflect the obfuscated value of 
the chosen level. After receiving the user’s input, the Privacy Preference Management 
component translates it into access control and data obfuscation preferences respectively. 
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In the case of the access control notification, depending on the user’s input, the Access 
Control Preference Outcome is created to indicate an “Allow” or “Block” decision (e.g. 
effect = “Allow”). Similarly, the Data Obfuscation Preference Outcome is constructed 
using the selected level of obfuscation (i.e. obfLevel = 3). Trust conditions are created by 
retrieving the trust value of the service and service provider from the Trust Management 
component. The only context condition that is created refers to the current value of the 
data item that was requested. In the example of Figure 45, the data item is of type 
symbolic location and the value that is used to construct the context condition is the non-
obfuscated value of the data item. The context condition is created only if the data item 
is contextual information and not static profile information (i.e. location information as 
opposed to an email or postal address).   
As the user interacts with their environment, their location and other information changes 
and the service listening to these changes tries to retrieve the updated information. This 
triggers the access control and data obfuscation notifications to appear and request the 
user’s input. Every time the user is involved in a decision, the PersoNISM system collects 
the information and updates the access control and DObf preferences trees appropriately. 
Existing preferences associated to the same data are retrieved and are combined with the 
newly created preference trees using the preference merging algorithm.  
6.4.3 Applying Access Control and Data Obfuscation Preferences 
Access Control and Data Obfuscation preferences are applied when a service requests 
access to a data item. Using the preference hierarchy described in section 6.4.1, the 
appropriate preferences are retrieved and evaluated against the current trust level of the 
service requesting the data, and if applicable, the current context of the user (if a context 
condition exists in the preference tree). When the preference evaluation algorithm 
produces a preference outcome, its confidence level defines how this outcome will be 
implemented. If the confidence level is high (by default 7 but these thresholds can be 
changed by the user), then an access control notification is presented to the user with a 
countdown timer of fifteen seconds (this can also be modified by the user). The 
notification informs the user that their preferences recommend this permission and offer 
the user the option to change it. If the countdown timer reaches zero without being 
interrupted by the user, the outcome will be implemented. If the user intervenes and 
changes the outcome, this information is fed back to the preference merging algorithm to 
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adjust the confidence level of the preference outcome appropriately using the confidence 
level calculation algorithm described in section 4.3.2. The countdown timer is a parameter 
which can be modified if the user needs more time to react to these notifications. If the 
confidence level is between 5 and 7, the notification requests the explicit input of the user 
while informing them what the preference evaluation algorithm suggested. Again, the 
user’s input is delivered to the preference merging algorithm to update the existing 
preferences and their confidence level. Finally, if the confidence level is below 50, the 
notification appears without a suggestion of action as the system needs the user to make 
the decision without being offered a wrong suggestion. The same approach is 
implemented in the case of Data Obfuscation preferences.  
Condition Monitored Access Control 
In a pervasive service environment where context information changes frequently, access 
control must be performed in a proactive manner. The trust and context conditions that 
affect the access control preferences must be monitored constantly and, when a change 
occurs, a re-evaluation of those preferences should be triggered. In an event driven 
platform, services can listen for changes to the contextual information of the user in order 
to continuously update the information they are using. In the PersoNISM system, the 
Privacy Preference Management component performs the re-evaluation of the 
preferences that are affected by these preferences before any updated data is delivered to 
the services. This is the same process as the one used for personalising services in a 
proactive manner (described in section 4.2.2).  
 Preference Learning for PersoNISM 
The PersoNISM system uses the Preference Merging algorithm as described in section 
4.3.1 with slight differences. The major difference between learning user preferences for 
personalisation, and learning privacy preferences for PersoNISM is that PersoNISM does 
not make use of the C45 learning algorithm. Instead, information that is captured during 
the user’s interaction with a) the PPN GUI, b) the identity selection or creation GUIs and 
c) the access control and data obfuscation GUIs is translated directly into the 
corresponding privacy preference format and merged with the existing preference of the 
same type using the Preference Merging algorithm directly as described in sections 6.2.2, 
6.3.3, 6.3.4, and 6.4.2.  
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The algorithm as described in section 4.3.1 differs in the following situations:  
Situation 2 uses option d) which states that both actions are kept in the system. Option d) 
was preferred in the case of the PersoNISM system as it does not maintain a user 
behaviour history that it mines to produce privacy preferences. Instead, the input from the 
user is fed directly into the merging algorithm that merges the input with the existing 
preference. Partly, this solution allows that a form of behaviour history is actually stored 
as a preference tree. It also gives the user more options when they edit the preference 
manually and they can see the different decisions they have made in the past and the 
corresponding confidence level shows them how the system treats each of the actions.  
Situations 4.1 and 4.3 use option a) as defined under situation 4.1. The same reasoning is 
used as in situation 2.  
 Summary 
The PersoNISM system is an approach to privacy protection that utilises a set of 
personalisation and behaviour learning techniques. It is designed to help users obtain 
better privacy and handling of their data. The privacy policy negotiation process offers 
users an alternative to the “take it or leave it” approach where users agree to a set of terms 
and conditions that are dictated by the service provider. Demanding the right privacy that 
fits the needs of the individual user is the first goal of the PersoNISM system. The second 
goal is to use sophisticated user behaviour learning and personalisation tools in order to 
help the user maintain the privacy they desire in a user friendly manner. By providing 
such a system, we can emphasize the importance of privacy protection to the user. 
However, the privacy protection that the PersoNISM system provides is directly affected 
by the user’s decisions. 
The PersoNISM system maintains a set of Privacy Policy Negotiation preferences that 
are constantly updated by collecting information from the user’s input. PPN preferences 
can be used to recommend to the user terms and conditions similar to the ones they have 
selected in previous negotiations. PPN preferences can also be used to automate the 
process of privacy policy negotiation if the user wishes to do so.  
Identity Selection and Creation preferences are maintained to guide the user through 
choosing the right identity to use in a specific situation to represent themselves to services, 
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and configure these identities by allowing the user to keep certain information separate 
from other information.  
Access Control preferences dictate if a service has permission to access a resource in 
some context and data obfuscation preferences define the quality of the information that 
will be accessed.  
The PersoNISM system provides different levels of automation depending on the degree 
of trust that the user has in the system. Users may choose how often they prefer to be 
prompted. However, in order to reassure users they are always in control of their data, the 
system notifies them when a data is about to be disclosed.   
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7 PersoNISM Evaluation 
The evaluation of the PersoNISM system was conducted in two phases. In both cases, 
users were involved in the evaluation. In the first case, a questionnaire was published 
online, advertised on social media to attract as many respondents as possible. Users were 
asked to answer questions about their online data disclosure habits. Through a series of 
questions and scenarios, users were asked how much they know about what happens to 
their data after they are disclosed, what tools they use to protect their privacy and what 
they think about the consequences of data disclosure. The aim of the questionnaire was 
to assess the level of awareness of privacy of the average user and to assess the necessity 
for a system such as PersoNISM to be available.  
It was predicted from early on that it would be difficult to attract a large number of people 
to participate in a “hands on” approach to evaluating the PersoNISM system, therefore, 
the online questionnaire was partially done to collect answers from a wider audience.  
The second phase of the evaluation involved a smaller user group as the experiment was 
conducted face to face in one hour sessions for each user. Each user followed a set of 
instructions on how to use the PersoNISM system in order to experience its main 
functionalities and answered a set of questions in each step of the evaluation process.  
The evaluation of the PersoNISM system aimed at, first, establishing that there is a real 
need for changes in the way that privacy is handled currently by pinpointing the current 
privacy practices of digital services and further, evaluating the concept and usefulness of 
the PersoNISM system by exposing users to its functionalities and subtle personalisation 
techniques.  
 Online Questionnaire on Privacy 
Subject Group 
This section presents the results of the questionnaire conducted in March 2014. The 
questionnaire was advertised on LinkedIn and Facebook and attracted 185 respondents of 
various ages as shown in Figure 46 most of whom have received a university degree.  
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 Questionnaire respondents’ ages and education. 
The respondents’ were assessed in terms of how privacy aware they perceive themselves. 
As shown in Figure 44, 44.3% of respondents declare that they try to protect their privacy 
as much as they can while 34.6% only do so when the software provides explicit tools to 
do so. Notably, 20.5% declare that they are not worried about their privacy while a very 
small percentage (0.5%) declare that they do not care about their personal data. 
Finding 1: 78.9% (44.3% + 34.6%) state that they want to protect their personal data. 
Hence there is a clear need to design a tool to help them protect personal information.  
 
 Privacy awareness perception of respondents. 
Respondents’ Social media use 
Social networking sites (SNSs) promote the disclosure of personal information. Figure 
48, Figure 49 and Figure 50 show the subject group’s use of SNSs, the frequency with 
which they post information on them and what type of information they typically disclose 






















How privacy aware do you think you are? 
I strive to protect my personal data as
much as I can
I protect my personal data when the
software allows me
Sometimes I try to protect my personal
data  but I'm not worried about it
I don't care about my personal data
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respondents use SNSs and disclose personal information on them. Since pervasive 
systems are not common-place at the moment, most users would be unable to comprehend 
the enormity of data disclosure in such an environment. SNSs provide a platform on 
which users are used to disclosing data.  
As shown in Figure 45, at most only 2.7% of respondents do no use social networking 
sites of any kind, which shows that the subject group is largely familiar with disclosure 
of personal information.  
 
 Respondents’ use of social media.  
 







































How often do you post on social networks on average?
Multiple times a day
Once a day
2-3 times a week
Once a week
2-3 times a month
Once a month
Less than once a month
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Finding 2: As shown in Figure 50, users disclose a lot of personal information on SNSs 
and they constantly update that information.  
 
 Range of personal information disclosed on SNS.  
Respondents’ Awareness of Privacy in Social media 
There has been a lot of attention on the issue of privacy in Social Networking Sites due 
to the vast amounts of personal information being disclosed voluntarily by users, many 
of whom are not aware of potential risks in disclosing so much information. Figure 51 
shows the level of awareness of users in what SNSs do with the information they 
accumulate. It is noteworthy that 9.1% (3.2% + 5.9%) of subjects state that they do not 
care about what happens to their data. The majority of subjects (49.2%) state that they 
have limited knowledge of what SNSs do with their data and that worries them but they 
feel they have no way to protect their information except to not use SNSs.  
Finding 3: 82.8% (19.5% + 49.2% + 14.1)) of respondents state their only option is to not 






























Photos of you and your friends
Current job
Date of Birth
Place you live currently
Previous jobs
Photos of you and your family
Places you have visited
Marital Status
Attending events such as concerts, museum…
Places you have lived in the past
Place of Birth
Movies you have watched
Music you listen to
Books you have read
Languages you speak
Life events such as graduations, weddings,…
Your hobbies
Family connections




Which of the following information have you disclosed on
social networking sites?
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 Privacy Awareness in Social Media.  
Privacy practices are described in privacy policies and terms and conditions (T&C) 
documents and presented to users before they use a service. It is important to find out 
how many users actually read these documents and how well they read them and 
understand them and discover the reasons for not reading them. As shown in Figure 52, 
21.1% of respondents state that they always read the privacy policy and T&C documents 
but only 15.1% state they understand them. 33% state they don’t understand them 
regardless of whether they read them or not. 23.8% of respondents believe that service 
providers don’t abide by their privacy policies. There is a need for service providers to 
provide proper mechanisms to show that data disclosure and processing is performed 
according to the privacy policies they publish. 12.4% of respondents don’t read privacy 
policies and T&C documents because they are too long. A worryingly high percentage of 
64.3% of respondents state that they never read privacy policies and T&C documents. 
There should be a mechanism to present the information in a concise form that users can 
understand easily and quickly to be able to provide informed consent about disclosing 
their personal data. 







Do you know what the social networking sites are doing with
the information you have disclosed?
No, I have no idea what can happen to my data and I
don't care.
No, I have no idea what can happen to my data and that
worries me but I don't feel I have any option except to
not use social networking sites.
I have some knowledge of what they are allowed to do
with my data and I don't care.
I have some knowledge of what they are allowed to do
with my data and that worries me but I don't feel I have
any option except to not use social networking sites.
Yes, I know exactly what they are allowed to do with my
data and I don't have a problem with what they are
allowed to do with the data.
Yes, I know exactly what they are allowed to do with my
data and that worries me but I don't feel I have any
option except to not use social networking sites.
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 Reading and Understanding Privacy Policies.  
The majority of SNSs provide privacy settings where users can define which SNS 
members can see what they have disclosed in the SNS. It should be noted that the privacy 
settings only give users the ability to hide information from other users but do not give 
them any way to stop SNSs from sharing information with other companies for 
advertising purposes.  
As shown in Figure 53, 90.7% of the subject group have configured their privacy using 
privacy settings tools provided by SNSs but 29.7% of those state that they are not satisfied 
with it. The most common reasons for the users’ dissatisfaction are: 
a) 18.9% of respondents commented that the privacy settings do not provide 
comprehensive privacy protection. The functionality is limited and there are data 
they would like to hide but they cannot.   
b) 12.4% of respondents commented that the settings are not user friendly and that 
some settings they applied did not work as expected.  
c) 7.8% of respondents commented that the settings affect the visibility of the data 
inside the social networking site but not about what the SNS does with that data.  
61% of respondents state that they are satisfied with the privacy tools provided by the 








I always read them
I never read them
I sometimes read them
I don't understand them
I understand them
I believe they don't abide by their privacy policies
I don't read them because they are too long
Do you read the privacy policy and terms and conditions when 
joining social networking sites, registering for services such as 
Amazon, Gmail, Dropbox etc, or installing apps on your mobile 
phone or software on your computer?
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 Privacy tools in SNSs. 
68.1% of respondents state that they have aborted the installation or signing up for a 
service because they disagreed with the service’s privacy policy. Allowing users to 
configure the privacy policy to match their preferred privacy settings as much as the 
functionality of the service allows, could attract more users to that service.   
 
 Acceptance of privacy policy.  
Respondents were asked if they would use a privacy policy negotiation tool such as the 







I have used it and I am satisfied with it.
I have used it and I am not satisfied with it.
(explain further)
I have not used it because I didn't know this
feature was available to me.
I have not used it because the SNSs I use don't
provide such feature.
I have not used it because the default settings
cover my privacy needs.
It is too much of a hassle for me. I would like to
use these features but I don't have the time to
configure all these settings.
Some social networking sites such as Facebook, offer users the 
option to configure privacy settings. For example, it is possible to 
hide some information from other people or Facebook apps. Have 
you ever used this feature?
68.1%
31.9%
Have you ever declined installing an application or registering
for a service because you disagreed with a privacy policy
and/or terms and conditions of a company?
Yes.
No.
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tool. 5.9% of respondents did not understand what the tool was asking of them. It is 
necessary to provide enough information and guidance to use such a feature properly.  
A small percentage (7%) stated they would not use such a tool listing the following 
reasons:  
 Not seeing the difference between current privacy terms and what the tool 
provides.  
 Not trusting the service providers to abide by the rules hence they don’t see any 
value in using it. 
 The tool looks too complex.  
 Some of the settings are not clear (specifically the actions). 
 
 Privacy Policy Negotiation Tool User Interface 
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Finding 5: The vast majority of users (87%) stated they would use a privacy policy 
negotiation tool. 
 
 User Customisation of privacy policies. 
25.4% of respondents were not aware that contextual information as described in the 
following paragraph can exist in a digital form and be used by web services. The 
following definition of user context was given to users:  
Context information is information that describes the environment and yourself. This 
includes current location (GPS coordinates), symbolic locations (home, work, gym, pub 
etc), activity (sleeping, walking, working, exercising, watching television etc), age, room 
temperature, light conditions, current weather. Most of this information is currently 
available through sensors and personal mobile devices. 
 
 Awareness of information that can be represented in digital form.  
As shown in Figure 58, 8.6% of users do not care if mobile phone or SNS apps have 
access to this information while 75.1% of them state that they do. However, as shown in 
Figure 59, only 3.2% would not want to restrict access to this information. The last 16.2% 
of respondents stated that it depends on what the apps would use the information for. 
Specifically, the following were the most common statements: 




If you had the option to negotiate your privacy rights, would 
you use a tool such as the one showing in the picture?
Yes.
I don't understand what this picture is showing.
No (please explain the reasons below)
74.6%
25.4%
Where you aware that this kind of information can exist in a
digital form and used by Web services?
Yes.
No.
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 The disclosed information has to be clearly relevant (or its relevance explained) 
to the application that requests it.  
 The information is not to be used for advertising.  
 The information must only be disclosed when the user wants it and not always.  
 
 Context information usage. 
The following reasons were given by those who answered no to restricting access to 
contextual information (Figure 59): 
 Contextual information make navigation through webpages and apps easier. 
 Not seeing the harm in disclosing contextual information. 
 Having nothing to hide and feeling that such information disclosure works to 
the user’s advantage. 
 Making the apps more functional (and hence more useful). 
 Not considering contextual information as personal information.  
Finding 6: Almost all respondents (96.8%) state they would want to restrict access to 
contextual information made available through their smart phones.  
 




Would you care if your apps on your mobile phone or your




It depends on what they would use this
information for (please explain further)
96.8%
3.2%
Would you want to restrict access to this information?
Yes.
No. (Please explain why)
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As shown in Figure 60, the desirable frequency for prompting users with questions about 
disclosing data varies a lot between users. 39.5% - the highest percentage – state that they 
want to be prompted every time. However, 32.4% state they want to be asked depending 
on their context and 26.5% of respondents state they only want to be asked once for each 
type of information. Finally, a very small percentage (1.6%) stated they don’t want to be 
asked at all. It can safely be deduced that the system should provide appropriate 
mechanisms to customise the frequency of prompting users for privacy permissions to the 
user’s preference. 
Finding 7: Users want to be prompted to permit or deny access to contextual information 
but they should be able to customise when they are prompted. 
 
 Access control for contextual information.  
The following text was used to briefly describe to users what privacy preferences are:  
Privacy Preferences (or settings) could be used to block access to this information 
(context information) under certain circumstances. For example, you may block specific 
services, apps or people to access your location information (both GPS and symbolic) 
when you are at specific locations or performing some activity. 
As shown in Figure 61, users were asked whether they would create such privacy 
preferences to block access to their context information. Only 5.9% of respondents stated 
they would not use them due to time restrictions. 44.9% stated they would find it tedious 





Would you want the system to ask you to permit or deny access
to this information every time an App or a social networking
site requested this information from your personal devices?
Yes, every time.
I would like to be asked once for each type of information.
I would like to be asked in moderation but I want to be able to
permit or deny access to location information depending on my
current location and date/time.
No, I don't want to be asked at all.
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learns from the users’ previous privacy decisions to facilitate the creation of privacy 
preferences. Figure 62 shows how useful respondents find a privacy preference learning 
mechanism. Only 7.6% don’t find it at all useful, while the rest of the respondents find it 
useful in varying degrees.  
 
 Creating privacy preferences. 
Finding 8: Almost all users (94.1%) would define privacy preferences but half of them 
would prefer not to do it manually. Almost the same number (92.4%) feel that preference 
learning would be useful.  
 
 Assistance using Privacy Preference Learning 
Using Extreme Dark Scenarios 
Four very short dark scenarios were presented to the respondents to demonstrate extreme 
cases of disclosing information with consequences of varying degree. After reading these 
scenarios, the respondents were asked to comment freely on them and answer questions 
three questions (Figure 63, Figure 64 and Figure 65 respectively) 




14. Would you define such preferences to block access to your
context information?
Yes.
Yes but I would find it tedious to manually configure such
preferences.





15. Would you find it useful if the system could learn your
preferences automatically based on your previous access
control requests so you wouldn't have to manually create them
yourself?
Not useful at all. Somewhat useful.
Quite useful. Very useful.
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While you are booking a flight, you are given the option to use a tool that can offer to 
seat you next to any friends in your social networks who happen to be on the same flight. 
You use the tool but you don’t find any friends on the flight. On the day of the flight, you 
realise that one of your “social network friends” who you don’t really want to talk to is 
sitting right next to you because they spotted you using the seat finder tool.  
Scenario 2: Location based services in combination with poor inference. 
Your friend is having an abortion so you go with her for support to the clinic. One of the 
apps on your phone which monitors your location records this information on your 
profile. A few years later, you are applying for a job but the person reviewing your 
application rejects it because of the apparent pro-abortion stance revealed by your 
profile. Needless to say, a different reason is given to you. 
Scenario 3: Location based services in combination with poor profiling. 
Arriving on an international flight, you are pulled out of the line by immigration officials, 
detained and interrogated for 24 hours because your physical characteristics match 
someone on their terrorist watch list and places you have recently visited, recorded by an 
application on your phone, match locations in which the terrorist has been spotted.   
Scenario 4: Health sensor-based service.  
On the advice of your doctor, you make use of a wrist band that monitors your heart rate 
along with a mobile app that transmits this data to a computer at your local hospital 
where it is stored along with the data of many other similar patients. Meanwhile the local 
police are investigating a series of serious crimes but getting nowhere. One of the victims 
works at the hospital and, suspecting one of the patients as being the perpetrator, makes 
all the data available to the police. Coincidentally, your data happens to indicate an 
increase in your heart rate at the time of every crime. With nothing else to go on, the 
police make you their prime suspect and start searching for evidence that can be used 
against you in court. 
Respondents were asked to comment on these scenarios. The most common comments 
collected from respondents were: 
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 These scenarios, albeit exaggerated, could happen but under very specific 
circumstances. 
 Most respondents described the scenarios as scary and worrying. Some also 
mentioned George Orwell’s ‘1984’ novel [169] famous for its depiction of an 
authoritative state where all citizens are constantly monitored and controlled by 
the state.  
 It had not occurred to many respondents that personal information can be used 
in this way to their disadvantage.  
 Some respondents stated that the scenarios made them rethink their current 
privacy settings.  
 Some respondents commented that these scenarios present the worst 
consequences of disclosing information. However, technology should be 
developed to aid users to perform tasks whilst protecting their privacy 
appropriately.  
 Finally, some respondents raised the concern that existing privacy laws may not 
be adequate to protect the privacy of individuals and hence appropriate tools 
must be provided to help users protect their privacy themselves.  
 
 Consequences of disclosing personal data. 
 
 Awareness of privacy changed.  
47.6%52.4%
Did you realise that disclosing information could have such
consequences?
No, I didn't.




Have these scenarios raised your awareness about the privacy
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 Users consider changing data disclosure practices. 
 Evaluation of PersoNISM system 
The PersoNISM system was evaluated in a live trial using students and staff from Heriot-
Watt University in Edinburgh. The experiment took place in December 2014 in the 
Pervasive, Ubiquitous and Mobile Applications Lab. 21 people from the School of 
Mathematical and Computer Sciences (both staff and students) participated in the 
experiment. Each user was assigned a one hour slot to evaluate the PersoNISM system. 
The experiment was split into a series of tasks with a list of questions at the end of each 
task. 
7.2.1 Pre-Evaluation Step 
Before evaluating the PersoNISM system, each user was asked to read three privacy 
policies in the same way as if they were sitting at home and started to use the respective 
services and answer a list of questions about what they read. The selected privacy policies 
were Google’s (3659 words) [170], the BBC website’s privacy policy (3282 words) [171] 
and Heriot-Watt University’s privacy policy (5219 words) [172]. The privacy policies 
were selected for the following reasons: 
a) The length of the privacy policy. 
b) The familiarity of the users with the companies or organisations. All three can be 
considered widespread and well known to the experiment participants. 
c) The differences in the content and the presentation of the content in each privacy 
policy. Google and BBC present a well-structured privacy policy document in 
HTML format containing links that help explain some terminology which might 
be unknown to the average user. Heriot-Watt University provides a legal 
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The current industry practice for informing users about what happens to their data is to 
present a lengthy privacy policy document to the user and request their informed consent 
by way of ticking a checkbox in a page. The reading speed for an average reader is 200 
to 400 words per minute for comprehension [173]. However, the reading speed is lower 
when the reader is not familiar with the subject and the text is not in the user’s native 
language. McDonald and Cranor conducted a survey which shows that the average time 
to read a privacy policy is 10 minutes using an average document length of 2500 words. 
That only shows that the user has read the document in 10 minutes but does not show 
how well they understood the content. If an individual were to read the privacy policy at 
every website they visited even once per year, they would spend, on average, an estimated 
244 hours per year reading privacy policies (calculated by visiting an average number of 
1462 websites per year) [5]. 
In the first step of the PersoNISM evaluation, the following timings were observed for 
reading each privacy policy: 
  Google BBC HWU 
average 04:52 04:19 05:53 
min 00:02 00:02 00:33 
max 15:32 10:27 16:45 
median 03:49 03:29 04:42 
Table 1. Statistics of time spent reading privacy policies. 
4 out of 21 users spent a minute or less reading each privacy policy as they only skimmed 
through the text.  
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 Google Privacy Policy read times.  
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 Heriot-Watt University Privacy Policy Read Times. 
As users were asked to read the privacy policies in the same way they would read them 
at home, the majority of them did not try to assimilate and comprehend the text. This 
finding is obvious in the answers they gave when they were asked to report some of the 
information they had read on the privacy policies.  
Pre-Evaluation Questions 
After reading the privacy policies, users were asked to answer a list of questions about 
what they had read.  
4. Do you use the BBC and Google websites and HWU services regularly? 
Google: 100% (21 out of 21 users use Google regularly) 
BBC: 71.4 (15 out of 21 users use BBC regularly) 
HWU: 100% (21 out of 21 users use HWU services regularly) 
The numbers indicate that the users are regular users of the three websites.  
5. Have you ever read their respective privacy policies before? 
Google: 23.8% (4 of 21 users) have skimmed through Google’s privacy policy and 19% 
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BBC: 14.3% (3 of 21 users) have read BBC’s privacy policy. 
HWU: 14.3% (3 of 21 users) have read HWU’s privacy policy. 
The statistics indicate that a small minority have read privacy policies of these websites 
that they regularly visit.  
6. Before you read their privacy policies did you know what information BBC, 
Google and HWU collect through your interactions with their services?  
Google: 33.3% (7 out of 21) said they didn’t know what information Google was 
collecting about them. 52.4% (11 out of 21) answered they assumed or had a rough idea 
and 14.3% (3 out of 21) answered that they knew.  
BBC: 38.1% (8 out of 21) said they didn’t know what information the BBC was collecting 
about them. 52.4% (11 out of 21) answered they assumed or had a rough idea and 9.5% 
(2 out of 21) answered that they knew.  
HWU: 38.1% (8 out of 21) said they didn’t know what information HWU was collecting 
about them. 47.6% (10 out of 21) answered they assumed or had a rough idea and 14.3% 
(3 out of 21) answered that they knew. 
7. Before you read their privacy policies did you know what they do with the 
information they collect from you? 
Google: 38.1% (8 out of 21) said they didn’t know what Google did with their 
information. 47.6% (10 out of 21) answered they assumed or had a rough idea and 14.3% 
(3 out of 21) answered that they knew. 
BBC: 47.6% (10 out of 21) said they didn’t know what BBC did with their information. 
33.3% (7 out of 21) answered they assumed or had a rough idea and 19% (4 out of 21) 
answered that they knew. 
HWU: 47.6% (10 out of 21) said they didn’t know what HWU did with their information. 
42.9% (9 out of 21) answered they assumed or had a rough idea and 9.5% (2 out of 21) 
answered that they knew. 
8. After reading their privacy policies do you know exactly what information BBC, 
Google and HWU collect through your interactions with their services? (list the 
information they collect) 
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38.1% (8 out of 21) couldn’t list the information Google, BBC and HWU collect even 
after reading their privacy policies. 61.9% (13 out of 21) listed some information 
(personal details - name, age, DOB, GPS information, browsing history, clicks, 
registration information, credit card information, linked accounts, email addresses).  
9. After reading their privacy policies do you know what they do with the information 
they collect from you? (write how they use your information) 
19% (4 out of 21) couldn’t answer what Google, BBC and HWU do with the collected 
information even after reading their privacy policies. 47.6% (10 out of 21) listed some 
information (targeting ads, website improvements, service customisation, selling 
information to third parties, recommendations).  
10. After reading the privacy policies, can you tell how you can make changes 
(remove, edit) to the information that was collected from you from their systems? 
Google: 76.2% (16 out of 21) could not tell how they can remove or edit their information 
on Google. 23.8% (5 out of 21) claimed to know how.  
BBC: 76.2% (16 out of 21) could not tell how they can remove or edit their information 
on the BBC website. 23.8% (5 out of 21) claimed to know how. 
HWU: 81% (17 out of 21) could not tell how they can remove or edit their information 
held by HWU. 19% (4 out of 21) claimed to know how. 
11. How long will the information that was collected be kept in their systems?  
Google: 28.6% (6 out of 21) answered that their information will be kept in their systems 
for as long as necessary or for as long they use Google services. 23.8% (5 out of 21) 
answered that their information will be kept forever. 47.6% (10 out of 21) answered they 
do not know.  
Note: Google’s privacy policy does not state clearly how long the information will be 
kept by Google or companies that use Google user data. Information from search queries 
are anonymised after 9 months. Anonymisation is performed by removing the last octet 
from the IP address (contrary to EU data supervisors that call for IP anonymisation after 
6 months). However this is not stated anywhere in Google’s privacy policy. According to 
the Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés [174] – France’s regulatory 
Chapter 7 PersoNISM Evaluation 
Page 162 
body for the enforcement of the EU Data Protection Directive, Google has refused to 
provide a data retention period [175].  
BBC: 19% (4 out of 21) answered that their information will be kept in their systems for 
as long as necessary or for as long they use BBC services. 28.6% (6 out of 21) answered 
that their information will be kept forever. 52.4% (11 out of 21) answered they do not 
know. 
Note: The following excerpt is from the BBC Privacy Policy section on “How long will 
the BBC keep my personal information?” 
“We will hold your personal information on our systems for as long as is necessary for 
the relevant activity, or as long as is set out in any relevant contract you hold with the 
BBC or the BBC's corporate retention schedule (a database that defines which documents 
should be kept and for how long). If you cancel your registration as a BBC website 
member and your account is deleted a red flag goes on the database and, while the BBC 
cannot use the personal information, it stays on the system for a period of one year for 
administration purposes before being deleted automatically.” [171] 
HWU: 19% (4 out of 21) answered that their information will be kept in their systems for 
as long as necessary or for as long they use HWU services. 23.8% (5 out of 21) answered 
that their information will be kept forever. 57.1% (12 out of 21) answered they do not 
know. 
Note: Section 3.7 of the Heriot-Watt University Data Protection Policy [172] states that 
personal data will be retained only for as long as required according to the University 
records retention policies. In some cases, some information may be held for historical or 
statistical reasons but personal data will be redacted.  
12. Do you know whether information you have disclosed to these companies has been 
shared with other companies? (yes/no)  
61.9% (13 out of 21) answered they did not know whether their information has been 
shared with other companies.  
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13. Do you know how to stop these companies from sharing your information with 
other companies (yes/no)? 
85.7% (18 out of 21) answered they did not know how to stop companies from sharing 
their information with other companies.  
14. Do you know if your information has been processed further and combined with 
other information to infer more information about yourself (yes/no)?  
66.7% (14 out of 21) answered they did not know if their information has been used to 
infer further information about them.  
15. Do you know how to tell the company to stop doing that (yes/no)? 
95.2% (20 out of 21) answered they did not know how to tell companies to stop combining 
their information to infer more information about them.  
Pre-Evaluation answers discussion.  
Only a small minority of users stated that they know what information the services are 
collecting about them and what they do with the information they collect.  However, it is 
more noteworthy that even after reading the privacy policies, the majority of the users 
could not accurately describe what information the services were collecting about them 
and what they did with the information they collected.  
Specifically in the case of Google, which does not state in its privacy policy how long 
they keep personal information, 28.6% of users stated that their information would be 
kept by Google for as long as necessary and 23.8% of users answered that their 
information would be kept forever. It can be concluded that users can often perceive the 
information erroneously or assume statements with no actual basis. 
Hence, there is a clear need to present the terms and conditions for disclosing data and 
interacting with services in a manner that allows users to easily comprehend what 
information is collected, how long it is kept, how it is used, processed and shared with 
others. 
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7.2.2 Experiment specification 
One of the problems with evaluating the PersoNISM system with real users is the amount 
of time available to conduct the experiment. The benefits of the PersoNISM system can 
only be demonstrated properly after the user has used the system a few times so that 
enough information has been accumulated to create preferences that can be used to 
automate the processes involved. However, due to the fact that users have not experienced 
a privacy policy negotiation process, the aim of the 1st step of the PersoNISM evaluation 
is to compare the practices of reading a privacy policy and accepting it with participating 
in a privacy policy negotiation with a service provider. Hence, the 1st step of the 
experiment is performed without any privacy preferences present in the system. The 
privacy policy negotiation that is performed during the 1st step is performed manually 
where the user must configure all the settings to continue. In later steps, as the user starts 
to provide information and take decisions during the privacy policy negotiations, identity 
creations and selections, and the system has started to accumulate enough information to 
apply them, the user is subjected to personalisation in all of the steps. The experiment 
was designed this way to show to the user a gradual personalisation being applied while 
they use all the privacy functionality.  
Four mock applications were implemented to evaluate the PersoNISM system with real 
users. The applications are a fictional application called “Google Venue Finder”, a 
fictional application “HWU Campus Guide App” and mock versions of a BBC News app 
and a BBC Weather app.  Each application has its own privacy policy. Even though all 
privacy policies request the same data – name, age, date of birth and location, the 
conditions for disclosing the data and the corresponding condition ranges differ for each 
service. 
PersoNISM Evaluation Step 1 of 3 
Users are given a handout to follow so that all users complete a pre-defined set of steps 
with minimal intervention from the investigator. The handout document can be seen in 
appendix B.  
In step 1, users are requested to fill in some of their personal information as shown in 
Figure 69. Personal information is requested in an effort to instil a sense of ownership of 
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the data that is going to be used in the experiment despite the fact that users are aware 
they are in a protected environment.  
 
 Users enter their personal details. 
After inputting their personal information, the PersoNISM evaluation tool GUI starts 
showing the four apps that are available for installation (Figure 70).  
 
 PersoNISM evaluation tool – available services. 
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Next, the user is asked to rate the four service providers in terms of how much they trust 
it using a trust settings GUI that allows them to enter a trust level value using a slider 
(shown in Figure 71). Users are told that the actual trust level values are not important 
but rather how they rate one service provider relative to another. The fact that one service 
provider is rated higher or lower than another is what will play an important role later in 
the privacy preference learning and privacy preference evaluation.  
 
 Adjusting trust level values.  
The next step involves installing the first service. According to the trust level values that 
the user has entered, the user is told to install the service with the lowest trust level. The 
user is unaware of the reason for the selection of the service. The service with the lowest 
trust level is selected first so that the preferences that will be learnt first can be reused in 
later steps to demonstrate how the privacy preferences can aid the user in configuring 
their privacy settings.  
The Privacy Policy Negotiation form as shown in Figure 72 presents the terms and 
conditions for using Google Maps. The current page as shown in Figure 72 presents the 
conditions for disclosing the data type “birthday”. After the user has configured the 
conditions to match their privacy needs, they are told to continue by clicking the “Next” 
button. As mentioned before, each privacy policy used in the experiment defines four data 
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types to be accessed: name, birthday, email and location. Hence, the next page will show 
the conditions for one of the remaining data types. After the user has configured the 
settings for all four data types, they are asked to confirm their selections.  
 
 Privacy Policy Negotiation with Google. 
Next, the privacy policy negotiation process begins and the user is presented with the 
response from the “mock” Google service provider. The terms that Google could not 
accept are highlighted with a warning sign as shown in Figure 73. 
Chapter 7 PersoNISM Evaluation 
Page 168 
 
 Google’s Privacy Policy Negotiation Response. 
The user is asked to review the refined terms and conditions and to click Continue if they 
agree or cancel if they do not accept them. If they click cancel, the privacy policy 
negotiation process aborts and the service cannot be installed. If the user accepts the new 
terms, the next step requires them to select an identity to use with Google Maps. Since 
this is the first installation for the user, there are no such identities yet. The window to 
create a new identity is shown in Figure 74. The handout explains how to use the GUI to 
create the identity with the data that the user wants to disclose to Google. The GUI allows 
the user to enter new data to associate with their identity if they don’t wish to associate 
the data that already exists in the system.  
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 Identity Creation GUI. 
The identity must be associated with all the data requested in the privacy policy. After 
creating the new identity, the privacy policy negotiation process finalises and the service 
is installed. At this point, the user is asked the following questions: 
Q1. On a scale of 1 to 10, indicate the level of understanding of the terms and conditions 
in each form presented to you: (1 is you don’t understand at all, 10 being you understood 
fully) 
Text:   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
PersoNISM:  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Chapter 7 PersoNISM Evaluation 
Page 170 
 
 Understanding the terms and conditions answers. 
As shown in Table 2, the PersoNISM system presented the terms and conditions in a 
much more understandable manner than a privacy policy document. The average level of 
understanding a privacy policy document on a scale of 1 to 10 is 4.67 with a median of 4, 
while understanding terms and conditions on the Privacy Policy Negotiation GUI is 8.14 
with a median of 8. A graphical representation of the results is also shown in Figure 75.  
 Average Min Max Median 
Text 4.67 1 10 4 
PersoNISM 8.14 5 10 8 
Table 2. Comparing the level of understanding the terms and conditions. 
In the next two questions, users are asked to evaluate a) the value of specifying the terms 
and conditions with such a fine granularity on a per data and per service basis and b) how 
they would feel about configuring the terms and conditions with such fine granularity. 
The questions were phrased as follows: 
Q2. On a scale of 1 to 10, how valuable is it to specify the terms and conditions on a per 
data and per service basis? (where 1 is not valuable at all and 10 being extremely valuable) 
Q3. On a scale of 1 to 10, how happy would you be to configure the terms and conditions 
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 Valuable vs. Convenient presentation of T&Cs. 
 Average Min Max Median 
Q2 8.57 5 10 9 
Q3 7.19 2 10 8 
Table 3. Q2 – Q3 answers. 
As shown in Figure 76, users consider it valuable to be able to modify the terms and 
conditions for every data type, each condition and service. However, they would not be 
too happy to have to configure all these items manually. This was expected as the number 
of data types would not normally be as small as four but rather a much longer list. 
PersoNISM Evaluation Step 2 of 3 
In the 2nd step of the PersoNISM evaluation, the user experiences the use of personalised 
suggestions in all the steps of the installation process as well as an automatic negotiation 
based on their previous decisions. Finally the user is asked to evaluate their experience.  
Following the instructions on the handout, the user attempts to install another application. 
At the negotiation GUI that pops up, they can now use the “Personalised Suggestions” 
button (as shown in Figure 72). The system has accumulated some privacy preferences 
based on the previous PPN with Google and can now suggest parameters to the user. The 
suggested parameters are highlighted with a  sign. Continuing on in a similar fashion 
to the previous step, when the user reaches the Identity Selection process, they are asked 
























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Scale 1 to 10
Valuable vs. Convenient
Q2 Q3
Chapter 7 PersoNISM Evaluation 
Page 172 
can make use of the “Get recommended identity” button which can suggest the most 
appropriate identity to use with the service they are installing. The user can opt to create 
a new identity as well.  
 
 Selecting an Identity Dialog. 
In this case, the user is encouraged to create a new identity in order to experience the 
personalisation in the identity creation process by clicking on “Get Recommended 
Attributes” in the Identity Creation GUI (Figure 74). The suggested attributes are listed 
as shown in Figure 78. Users have the option of selecting the attributes they prefer using 
the tick boxes. 
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 Suggested attributes for new identity.  
This task served to familiarise the user with the semi-automatic nature of personalisation 
of the privacy functionality offered by the PersoNISM system. The fully automated mode 
of the PersoNISM system is demonstrated to the user when they are asked to install a 
third application, BBC Weather, where all the privacy functionality is performed without 
manual intervention after the user has consented (see Figure 79).  
 
 Automatic Negotiation Dialog.  




Chapter 7 PersoNISM Evaluation 
Page 174 
Q1. On a scale of 1 to 10, did you feel that the personalised suggestions were useful? 
(1 being not useful at all and 10 being very useful) 
 
 Are personalised suggestions useful? 
Q2. On a scale of 1 to 10, how much would you trust the system to perform this process 
on your behalf without your involvement in later negotiations? (1 indicating no trust in 
the system at all and 10 indicating complete trust in the system) 
 
 Trusting the system to automate processes on behalf of user. 
The purpose of question 2 was used to measure if users would welcome the level of 
automation made available to them. It is important that the users have the option to choose 
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Q3. On a scale of 1 to 10, how likely would you be to configure the terms and conditions 
for every data type and every service with the help of personalised suggestions? (1 being 
very unlikely and 10 being highly likely) 
 
 Configuring T&Cs with personalised suggestions. 
 average min max median 
Q1 9.14 7 10 9 
Q2 7.55 2 10 8 
Q3 8.57 3 10 9 
Table 4. Personalised Suggestions Statistics of Step 2 Questions. 
PersoNISM Evaluation Step 3 of 3 
In this final step, the users are subjected to personalised access control and data 
obfuscation. The data obfuscation was not a feature that users had experienced before.  
Users were asked to start one of the installed applications. Upon starting up, the 
application requested a login username and then attempted to retrieve the user’s data from 
the system. The system asks the user to allow or block access to the data using notification 
boxes (such as the one shown in Figure 83.  
 
 Access control notification for “birthday. 
After each request, and if the user allows the disclosure, it also asks for a data obfuscation 
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 Data Obfuscation notification for “birthday”. 
The system should have accumulated privacy preferences with high confidence level. To 
demonstrate this to the user, they are asked to trigger a second request for data by the 
service by clicking on the “Update profile” button (as shown in Figure 85). As the 
confidence level of the privacy preferences is high, the user sees a timed notification 
instead of a standard notification.  
 
 Mock Venue Finder App after having retrieved data.  
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At the end of step 3, the user is asked to answer the following questions: 
Q1. Taking into account all the steps you did, on a scale of 1 to 10 indicate if using this 
tool would make you take your privacy more seriously. (1 indicating that it would make 
you take it less seriously, 5 indicating no change and 10 indicating it would make you 
take your privacy very seriously) 
 
 Would using PersoNISM make users take privacy more seriously? 
Q2. On a scale of 1 to 10, indicate how useful you would find having such control of your 
personal data. (1 being not useful at all and 10 being very useful) 
 
 How useful it is to have such control of personal data. 
Q3. On a scale of 1 to 10, indicate how necessary you think it is to have tools like this to 
control your privacy. (1 not necessary at all, 10 being essential to your privacy) 
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 How necessary it is to have a tool like PersoNISM.  
Q4. Do you think service providers (such as Google, Facebook, websites) should be 
forced by law to give YOU control of your data? (yes/no) 
100% of users answered yes, they believe service providers should be forced by law to 
give them control of their data.  
Q5. Do you believe that personal devices such as mobile phones and tablets should have 
built in privacy control mechanisms such as the one you experimented with? (yes/no) 
100% of users answered that they want personal devices to have built-in privacy control 
mechanisms such as PersoNISM. One user commented that more training should be given 
to use the tool more efficiently and another user commented that it would be hard to get 
service providers to take such a tool seriously.  
Q6. As our world becomes more and more pervasive do you believe that privacy 
protection is becoming a bigger problem? (1 indicating you don’t believe it’s becoming 
a bigger problem, 10 indicates you think it’s a very big issue). 
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 Is privacy becoming a bigger problem? 
Q7. If tools such as the ones you have just experimented with were provided at a small 
cost, would you be prepared to pay for them to protect your privacy? (1 indicates you 
would never pay, 10 being you would definitely pay) 
 
 Paying for privacy tools such as PersoNISM.  
Q8. Finally, can you express in a few words what would be your biggest worry regarding 
your privacy in a pervasive environment? 
The most common concern expressed by the users is the misuse of personal information 
and the possibility of someone using the data to cause them harm such as stealing their 
identity. Some users expressed their fear that the world is moving into a constantly 
monitored state where nobody can remain anonymous (the “Big Brother” effect). For 
some, lack of control of personal data means loss of personal freedom and the freedom to 
think individually without bias.  
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7.2.3 Evaluation Results Analysis 
The evaluation results show that the Privacy Policy Negotiation form presents the 
contents of a privacy policy in a much more user-friendly manner than a textual privacy 
policy document. It is preferable to present the terms and conditions succinctly, in a 
manner that invites the user to pay attention to the privacy policy as its purpose is to get 
the user’s informed consent. When users just accept the terms and conditions without 
reading them, then the consent cannot be considered informed. As the evaluation shows, 
the PersoNISM system can improve the user’s comprehension of terms and conditions.  
Even though the PPN form provides a medium to present all the terms and conditions in 
great detail, the results show that the users would not be very happy having to configure 
all the terms and conditions for each data type every time they install a new service despite 
the fact that they find it very valuable.  We can deduce that the value of the privacy policy 
negotiation is to give users the power to negotiate the terms and conditions of the data 
that matters to them. Step 1 of the evaluation process was designed specifically to 
highlight this issue in order to demonstrate the benefits of the personalisation in steps 2 
and 3. Any process that involves spending a lot of time configuring settings can frustrate 
users and eventually discourage users from using the system.  
Even though the evaluation only used four data types, in reality services could request a 
very long list of data types. The fact that half of the users reported that they would not be 
very happy to configure the terms and conditions for each data type and service in this 
example with only four data types, suggests that a long list of data types would be 
extremely tedious for them to configure. However, not all data types are important to all 
users. Hence, one solution to this problem would be to learn which data types are 
important for each user and draw their attention to those. This feature would also require 
a few negotiations to take place to be appropriately useful. 
The personalised suggestions in the privacy policy negotiation process were rated quite 
highly; demonstrating the benefits of personalisation in a process that can become quite 
tedious to perform manually. The use of personalised suggestions is very obvious to the 
user as the application of the accumulated privacy preferences is highlighted 
appropriately to draw the attention of the user to them. Contrary to that, the automated 
privacy policy negotiation using privacy preferences performs the entire process without 
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the user’s involvement. The evaluation results show that this kind of automation is not 
highly regarded as users don’t trust the system enough to perform the negotiation on their 
behalf. However, some users appreciated the option to automate this process. Therefore, 
the flexibility feature to allow users to use it if they wish but not to force it on them is 
sound.  
The responses to Question 3 of Steps 1 and 2 show that the personalised suggestions 
provide an important improvement in the privacy policy negotiation process. Users rate 
the use of the PersoNISM system with the use of personalised suggestions much higher 
than without them.   
  
 Rating PersoNISM with and without personalised suggestions. 
For the users that never read privacy policies and do not care about data disclosure, the 
PersoNISM system does not change anything for them, as they can simply accept the 
terms and conditions offered to them by the service and continue to install the service as 
they would normally do.   
Based on the answers from Step 3, the PersoNISM system appears to be a very valuable 
and necessary tool for protecting one’s privacy. Given the abundance of information that 
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what information is disclosed to whom and when and under which specific terms. 
According to the users’ responses, a mechanism such as the PersoNISM tool should be 
available on all personal devices, especially smart phones, which can be a source for a lot 
of personal information including contextual information about the user such as location, 
activity, heart rate, speed.  
The necessity of a tool such as PersoNISM is also shown in the answers to question 7 that 
shows the willingness of users to pay a small amount in order to have such a tool at their 
disposal with which to protect their privacy.  
One of the issues that were not raised during the evaluation of the PersoNISM system but 
which is often raised is scalability. The question is whether the system could cope with a 
large number of users. The PersoNISM system is designed so that each user will have 
their own instance of the system running on their behalf. Each instance will only have 
access to its user’s data and will be providing its functionality only to that user. This is 
contrary to other arhictectures that are deployed in a centralised fashion that serve all the 
users of a pervasive platform.  
 Summary 
The evaluation of the PersoNISM system demonstrated that many users are not reading 
the privacy policies of the services they use and many who do read them do not properly 
understand them but merely agree blindly to the terms and conditions imposed by the 
services. Users highlighted the “take it or leave it” issue; users have no option but to agree 
to the terms and conditions if they want to use the services.  
The evaluation of the PersoNISM system showed that users welcome a mechanism that 
allows them to configure the way their data are handled by service providers. As expected, 
the manual configuration of all the privacy functionalities of the PersoNISM system tired 
users even though only four types of data were requested by the example services. This 
highlights the need for personalisation in the privacy policy negotiation process. After 
experiencing the personalised suggestions, users gave very positive feedback on their 
usefulness.  
The full automation of the PersoNISM system was not received in the same positive light 
as the personalised suggestions. It is evident that users do not wish to relinquish total 
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control of the privacy protection to a system they do not fully trust to perform these tasks 
on their behalf as they want. There is no “one size fits all” solution to the privacy problem. 
That is why the personalisation functionality is an important feature to include in order to 
help the user protect their privacy on their own terms.  
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8 Conclusion 
The issue of privacy in the digital world is complicated. It involves combining many 
different approaches that must work in harmony to have the desired effect. This thesis 
attempts to address the issue of using personalisation to automate a set of privacy 
protection techniques including privacy policy negotiation, identity management, identity 
selection and access control in a pervasive environment with the purpose of aiding users 
to make better decisions regarding the use and disclosure of their data. These privacy 
enhancing technologies cannot be performed in isolation. The result of a privacy policy 
negotiation drives the identity creation and selection processes. Without personalisation, 
the user has to perform all of these steps by themselves every time they install new 
services and privacy protection is inadequate for context information that changes 
constantly and where users want flexibility in disclosing data in a context-aware fashion. 
This thesis also demonstrates that there is only a superficial conflict between 
personalisation and privacy and that this conflict can be resolved by using personalisation 
to enhance privacy and using privacy enhancing technologies to enhance personalisation.  
 Future work 
The evaluation results of the PersoNISM system showed that users welcomed the system 
and gave very good feedback. However, the following issues need to be further 
researched.  
8.1.1 Need for more information 
New types of information become available almost daily and are made available through 
new types of sensors that are embedded into mobile devices and systems in our 
environment. Services are created to take advantage of this information and provide 
certain functionalities to the end-user. Controlling access to that information as it keeps 
growing can become very frustrating to users. The process of privacy policy negotiation 
can become very tedious to perform when no applicable privacy preferences are present 
to guide the user. One solution would be to provide a number of templates of privacy 
preferences that can be downloaded from trusted third parties or assist communities and 
friends in sharing their privacy preferences to aid one another. Another solution would be 
to organise data items into groups according to their semantics in order to perform the 
privacy policy negotiation and the access control in a more efficient manner.  
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8.1.2 Including semantics to control identifiability 
The PersoNISM system does not use any semantic information to handle the data it 
protects. By attaching semantic information to data, more sophisticated algorithms can be 
used to relate data to each other in the same manner as inference algorithms do. This 
information could be used to detect the level of identifiability of a user and alert them if 
their privacy is threatened. When a combination of data is about to be disclosed to a 
service that identifies a user as an individual, they can be alerted to take appropriate steps. 
This functionality could also enhance the identity creation process to ensure that identities 
are not linked back to the single user.  
8.1.3 Monitoring service providers’ activities 
The PersoNISM system does not provide monitoring functionality that checks to ensure 
that service providers adhere to the agreed terms and conditions. Further research is 
required in this field to protect data after they have been disclosed. There should be 
transparency in the way that service providers acquire information, process and share it. 
This could be accomplished using a system of receipts, similar to a “chain of evidence” 
to show users how data was acquired. Such a mechanism would have a great impact on 
the willingness of users to disclose data to services. 
8.1.4 Graphical User Interfaces 
A usability study on the aesthetics of the graphical user interfaces used in the PersoNISM 
system could be conducted to improve their appearance. The GUIs shown in chapters 6 
and 7 were designed to perform the evaluation of the PersoNISM system and demonstrate 
the functionalities such as the application of the privacy preferences and the privacy 
policy negotiation process.  The aesthetics of a graphical user interface play an important 
role in attracting users and retaining them. 
8.1.5 Storing user data 
The PersoNISM system is designed to store the privacy preferences of the user on devices 
owned by the user. However, there are some issues such as data availability at all times 
for the mobile user and whether the user owns or has access to a device that is always 
available and can satisfy the needs of the PersoNISM software. A solution would be to 
engage the services of trusted third party security providers such as i-brokers in 
combination with a certification authority.  
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8.1.6 Federated Privacy Policy Negotiation 
In an environment in which multiple services are combined to offer a composed service, 
the user would have to negotiate with all of the services separately which would be 
confusing to the user and would very likely drive users to avoid using such services 
because of the additional hassle. To avoid this, the component responsible for selecting 
which services to include in the service composition (such as a Service Discovery 
component) could use the privacy policies and the predefined set of options of each 
service as another criterion for service selection. It can collect the privacy policies and 
the predefined set of options from the available services and compare all privacy 
statements. For each privacy statement, it can find the option that can be satisfied by all 
services. Using this information it can produce a) a single privacy policy that can be used 
as a starting point to the negotiation with the user and b) a modified set of options that 
can be satisfied by the services that will be needed during the privacy policy negotiation 
with the user. The Negotiation Agent of one of the services could be elected to act as a 
delegate between the Negotiation Agents of the services included in the service 
composition and the Negotiation Client running on behalf of the user. This means that the 
delegated Negotiation Agent would be authorised to perform a negotiation process 
without input from the Negotiation Agents of the other services. During the negotiation 
process, the elected Negotiation Agent has at its disposal the modified set of options that 
it can use to negotiate with the Negotiation Client. In a successful negotiation, the 
delegated Negotiation Agent would need to inform the services in the composition of the 
result of the negotiation sending them the agreed Response Policy which they will have 
to adhere to when they receive the user’s data.  
 Key Contributions 
The most important requirements for designing a privacy protection system are giving the 
user control over the manner in which their data are disclosed to others and over what 
happens to the data after disclosure. An effective system must take its orders from the 
user and act accordingly. While it is very important for the user to have control over every 
decision about how their privacy is handled, it is not practical to prompt the user 
constantly for every decision. Hence, a successful system must also provide mechanisms 
to maintain a set of rules that reflect the user's decisions which can be re-used in similar 
circumstances. Setting preferences in the system is one of the ways that a user can instruct 
the system to act in a certain way. Context-aware user preferences give the user a higher 
Chapter 8 Conclusion 
Page 187 
level of flexibility about how their data should be handled and disclosed under different 
circumstances. User preferences for privacy must be able to handle all the different types 
of personalisation that can be applied to the privacy enhancing technologies employed by 
the system. For every decision that the system asks the user to make, it has to have an 
appropriate user preference that can represent that decision as a rule for future use.  
While giving the user the ultimate control, the system needs to provide a mechanism to 
learn from the user's decisions regarding their privacy protection and automatically create 
user preferences based upon those decisions. Therefore, there is a clear requirement for 
privacy preference learning.  
The key contributions of this thesis can be summarised as follows:  
 The key issues in the protection of privacy in a pervasive environment were 
identified through research into current industry practices, state-of-the-art in 
pervasive and ubiquitous systems, context-aware personalisation and privacy 
enhancing technologies and finally surveying of users.  
o The “take it or leave it” issue. The predominant notice-choice model 
disadvantages not only users who either reluctantly agree to fixed terms 
and conditions or are prevented from using a service. This also 
disadvantages service providers when users a) don’t agree with the 
presented terms and conditions and elect not to use a service or b) are 
willing to disclose more information than requested.  
o Growing amount of information. As devices, sensors and services grow, 
so does the amount and quality of data that is accumulated in the system 
about the user, making it possible to monitor the user’s activities in greater 
detail.  
o Users’ inability to maintain knowledge about previous data disclosures to 
maintain the same level of data disclosure. 
o Users’ reluctance to use privacy preserving technologies they do not 
understand or are too busy to concern themselves with.  
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o The deciding factors in disclosing information are the user’s context, the 
type of information, the recipient of the information what happens to the 
information after it is released.  
 Design of the PERSOnalised Negotiation, Identity Selection and Management 
(PersoNISM) system including the:  
o Design of a privacy policy negotiation protocol allowing both parties to 
the negotiation to demand or compromise on the disclosure processing 
and sharing of specific data.  
o Design of a mechanism to control the creation and selection of digital 
identities based on the intended use of the identity in a specific context.  
o Design of a context-dependent access control system aided by data 
obfuscation capabilities.  
o Design of a privacy preference model specifically tailored to aiding users 
in performing all the privacy enhancing technologies used in the 
PersoNISM lifecycle using IF-THEN-ELSE rules.  
o Design of a rapid behaviour learning approach based on an IF-THEN-
ELSE preference rule merging algorithm for acquiring privacy 
preferences, taking advantage of instant user feedback. 
 Implementation of the personalised privacy policy negotiation functionality, the 
identity selection and context-dependent access control mechanisms in the 
PERSIST Personal Smart Space platform. Implementation of the PersoNISM 
system as a privacy protecting framework for the SOCIETIES Cooperative 
Smart Space platform and subsequent use in live user trials. Both prototypes 
were demonstrated to EU project reviewers and received “excellent” status.  
 Major survey of privacy, data disclosure practices and online user behaviour to 
assess the level of awareness of privacy of the average user and to assess the 
value of a system such as PersoNISM. 
 An evaluation of the PersoNISM system by 21 users using real data as input. 
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8.2.1 Negotiating Privacy  
Protecting Privacy is not just about controlling the disclosure of data but it is also about 
controlling what happens to the data after they have been disclosed. This is one of the 
hardest challenges when designing a privacy protection system. In a nutshell, a privacy 
policy is the tool used by service providers to state what type of data they need access to 
and what type of processing they will apply to the data after acquiring it. Currently, users 
that want to use a service must comply with the service privacy policy and terms and 
conditions. The obvious problem is that users have no option but to agree to all of the 
statements in the privacy policy if they want to use it. By allowing users to negotiate the 
terms and conditions in the privacy policy of the service, they are given better control 
over their privacy. Privacy policy negotiation can be an arduous task to perform manually. 
The system should employ appropriate mechanisms to automate this process as much as 
possible but at the same time it should acquire informed consent from the user about the 
decisions that need to be made during the privacy policy negotiation. First, the system 
should be able to analyse the terms of the privacy policy and present them to the user in 
a user friendly manner. User preferences can be very useful in automating privacy policy 
negotiation. A graphical user interface should be provided for the user to create 
preferences so that the system is able to perform the negotiation on their behalf. 
Moreover, the system should also employ preference learning techniques to learn 
preferences for automating the privacy policy negotiation process based on previous 
decisions of the user thus relieving the user of the burden of manually creating these 
preferences or constantly entering the same decision into the privacy policy negotiation 
forms.   
There are different requirements for designing privacy policy negotiation preferences to 
other types of privacy preferences such as identity selection preferences or access control 
preferences. The privacy policy negotiation preference model does not need to be context 
dependent. The purpose of the privacy policy negotiation is for the user to be able to 
negotiate the manner in which the data are going to be processed, stored, shared and 
eventually deleted by the service that retrieves them. Therefore, privacy policy 
negotiation preferences must be flexible in order to allow the user to define different 
courses of action depending on the statements in the privacy policy. 
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Privacy policy negotiation has received some criticism over the years and fears have been 
expressed that it might lead to services offering incentives for users to give up their 
privacy. For example, a service could offer better quality of service to users that divulge 
more personal information. While this is the argument against privacy policy negotiation, 
the argument for enabling privacy policy negotiation is the fact that protecting privacy 
will become something that services will compete over to provide better quality of service 
than others.  
8.2.2 Personalising the use of Digital Identities 
The primary purpose of an Identity Management system operating in a pervasive 
environment is to provide users with multiple identities to represent themselves to 
services and entities in a network. An identity can be used to retrieve information from a 
context or a content management database. Identities can be associated with specific data 
records so that when a service uses the identifier of a user's identity to retrieve 
information, it can only see the data records associated with that identity, hence they will 
get access to only a partial view of the user's profile. Any system should ensure that the 
decision to associate a data attribute with an identity can only be made by the user that 
owns the identity. In some cases other input to this process will be necessary. For 
example, when the creation of an identity is triggered because none of the existing 
identities of the user are applicable for use with a service, the negotiation agreement with 
the service has to be used as input to selecting what types of data need to be associated 
with that identity to be applicable for use with that service. As the number of identities 
and the information stored in the context and content management databases grows, the 
user can become overwhelmed with the complexities of maintaining the identities and 
their data associations. By monitoring the use of the identities and their associations, user 
preferences can be created to indicate how sensitive a data attribute is and define 
parameters to be considered when associating this data attribute with an identity. Two 
different types of preferences are needed; one used to guide the identity creation process 
and the other used to select an identity to interact with a specific service.  
As the user starts to use more and more services, the system can analyse the user's 
decisions about the use of each of their identities and learn preferences that define where 
each identity should be used or not used. Moreover, during the identity creation process, 
the user configures the new identity and associates the data they want to share using that 
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identity. The system should be able to monitor this process and create preferences that 
define under what circumstances a data attribute could be linked to an identity.  
8.2.3 Controlling Data Disclosure 
Any system with an access control mechanism employs some sort of rule model and rule 
engine to control data disclosure. Even though a user has agreed to allow access to some 
of his data during the privacy policy negotiation process, they should be allowed to deny 
access to any data attribute they want at any time they want. This requirement is important 
for data attributes that describe the context of the user and therefore the values of these 
data attributes change as the user goes about their daily routine. It is not very important 
for data attributes that do not change such as the user’s name as once this information is 
disclosed, it does not matter how many times it is disclosed.  
8.2.4 Proactive Privacy Protection 
Context-dependent preferences define actions that should be implemented in different 
situations. A personalisation system that employs context-dependent preferences must be 
proactive in applying the appropriate outcome in each situation. Changes in the context 
of the user must be monitored, the affected preferences must be evaluated, and the 
corresponding outcomes must be applied. In pervasive systems, context and preference 
management systems use event management mechanisms to be notified of changes in the 
context and preferences of the user and adapt their behaviour accordingly. The same can 
be applied to privacy protection components. The goal of proactive personalisation of 
privacy is to proactively change the access permissions or change the identity with which 
a user uses a service at any particular moment according to the current situation of the 
user and the evaluated outcome of their privacy preferences. Consequently, one more 
requirement is that the privacy framework as well as the underlying system has to support 
changes to the access control permissions as well as reconfiguring a service with a 
different identity if it becomes necessary. 
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Appendix A – Online Questionnaire 
Age 
15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 
Education: High School, Higher Education,  
Tick if you own the following devices: 
Laptop, Mobile phone with GPS, Tablet, SatNav 
1. How privacy aware do you think you are?  
Range 1 to 10 where 1 is no privacy aware at all and 10 being very privacy aware.  
 
2. Which of the following social networking sites do you use? (tick as appropriate) 















p. Other: Please specify  
 
3. How often do you post on social networks on average? 
a. Multiple times a day 
b. Once a day 
c. 2-3 times a week 
d. Once a week 
e. 2-3 times a month 
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f. Once a month 
g. Less than once a month 
 
4. Which of the following information have you disclosed on social networking 
sites? 
a. Full name 
b. Date of Birth 
c. Place of Birth 
d. Place you live currently 
e. Places you’ve lived in the past 
f. Places you have visited 
g. Education 
h. Sexual orientation 
i. Marital Status 
j. Information on romantic relationships you’ve been involved in 
k. Religious views 
l. Political views 
m. Current job  
n. Previous jobs 
o. Languages you speak 
p. Family connections 
q. Photos of you 
r. Photos of you and your family 
s. Photos of you and your friends 
t. Your hobbies 
u. Books you have read 
v. Movies you have watched 
w. Music you listen 
x. Life events such as graduations, your wedding, buying a car or a house 
y. Attending events such as concerts, museum exhibits, movies etc. 
 
5. Do you know what the social networking sites are doing with the information you 
have disclosed?   
a. No, I have no idea what can happen to my data and I don’t care.  
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b. No, I have no idea what can happen to my data and that worries me but I 
don’t feel I have any option except to not use social networking sites.  
c. I have some knowledge of what they are allowed to do with my data and I 
don’t care. 
d. I have some knowledge of what they are allowed to do with my data and 
that worries me but I don’t feel I have any option except to not use social 
networking sites. 
e. Yes, I know exactly what they are allowed to do with my data and I don’t 
have a problem with what they are allowed to do with the data. 
f. Yes, I know exactly what they are allowed to do with my data and that 
worries me but I don’t feel I have any option except to not use social 
networking sites. 
 
6. Do you read the privacy policy and terms and conditions when joining social 
networking sites, registering for services such as Amazon, Gmail, Dropbox etc, 
or installing apps on your mobile phone or software on your computer? 
a. I always read them and I understand them. 
b. I want to read them but I don’t understand them so I don’t bother.  
c. I never read them because I don’t care about my privacy.  
d. I think it’s a waste of time because I’m sure they don’t abide by their 
privacy policies. 
e. If your answer is not covered above, please answer in your own words.  
 
7. Some social networking sites such as Facebook, offer users the option to configure 
privacy settings. For example, it’s possible to hide some information from other 
people or Facebook apps. Have you ever used this feature? 
a. Yes.  
i. Are you satisfied with this feature? 
1. Yes, it allows me to protect my privacy as I want to.  
2. No, I’m not satisfied (Please specify) 
b. No.  
i. Is that because: 
1. I didn’t know this feature was available to me. 
Appendix A – Online Questionnaire 
Page 195 
2. The social networking sites I am a member of, do not 
support this feature.  
3. I don’t need to. The default settings cover my privacy 
needs. 
4. It’s too much a hassle for me. I would like to use these 
features but I don’t have the time to configure all these 
settings.  
5. Other (please explain) 
 
8. Have you ever declined installing an application or registering for a service 






When installing an application or signing up for a service you are required to read the 
privacy policy and terms and conditions of the service and tick a box to indicate that you 
agree. Instead of a document, a privacy policy can be graphically shown using a tool such 
as the one showing in the picture below. A privacy policy negotiation is the process that 
allows you to negotiate with the service what data are going to be accessed by the service 
and the terms and conditions under which the data are going to be disclosed and further 
processed. Examples of conditions include sharing the data with other companies, how 
long the data will be kept by the service, your right to opt out of the service any time you 
wish, your right to delete any data the service holds about you etc.   




9. If you had the option to negotiate your privacy rights, would you use a tool such 
as the one showing in the picture? 
a. Yes 
b. I don’t understand what this picture is showing.  
c. No (please explain the reasons below) 
 
Context information is information that describes the environment and yourself. This 
includes current location (GPS coordinates), symbolic locations (home, work, gym, 
pub etc), activity (sleeping, walking, working, exercising, watching television etc), 
age, room temperature, light conditions, current weather. Most of this information is 
currently available through sensors and personal mobile devices.  
10. Where you aware that this kind of information can exist in a digital form and used 
by Web services? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
11. Would you care if your apps on your mobile phone or your social networking sites 
had access to this information about you? 
a. Yes 
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b. No 
c. It depends on what they would use this information for (please explain 
further) 
12. Would you want to restrict access to this information? 
a. Yes 
b. No. (Please explain why) 
 
13. Would you want the system to ask you to permit or deny access to this information 
every time an App or a social networking site requested this information from 
your personal devices? 
a. Yes, every time. 
b. No, that would become too much of a hassle. I already receive too many 
notifications.  
Privacy Preferences (or settings) could be used to block access to this information under 
certain circumstances. For example, you may block specific services or apps to access 
your location information (both GPS and symbolic) when you are at specific locations or 
performing some activity.  
14. Would you define such preferences to block access to your context information? 
a. Yes 
b. Yes but I would find it tedious to manually configure such preferences.  
c. No, I don’t have the time to do that.  
 
15. Would you find it useful if the system could learn your preferences automatically 
based on your previous access control requests so you wouldn’t have to manually 
create them yourself? 
a. No, I wouldn’t find it useful at all.  
b. I would find it useful but I would like to be able to see what preferences 
the system learnt on my behalf. 
c. I would find it very useful because I wouldn’t have to bother responding 
to privacy notifications all the time.  
d. Other (please explain).  
Read the following scenarios and answer the questions that follow.  
Social network disclosures 
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While you are booking a flight, you are given the option to use a tool that can offer to seat 
you next to any friends in your social networks who happen to be on the same flight. You 
use the tool but you don’t find any friends on the flight. On the day of the flight, you 
realise that one of your “social network friends” who you don’t really want to talk to is 
sitting right next to you because they spotted you using the seat finder tool.  
Location based services in combination with poor inference 
Your friend is having an abortion so you go with her for support to the clinic. One of the 
apps on your phone which monitors your location records this information on your 
profile. A few years later, you are applying for a job but the person reviewing your 
application rejects it because of the apparent pro-abortion stance revealed by your profile. 
Needless to say, a different reason is given to you. 
Location based services in combination with poor profiling 
Arriving on an international flight, you are pulled out of the line by immigration officials, 
detained and interrogated for 24 hours because your physical characteristics match 
someone on their terrorist watch list and places you have recently visited, recorded by an 
application on your phone, match locations in which the terrorist has been spotted.   
Health sensor-based service  
On the advice of your doctor, you make use of a wrist band that monitors your heart rate 
along with a mobile app that transmits this data to a computer at your local hospital where 
it is stored along with the data of many other similar patients. Meanwhile the local police 
are investigating a series of serious crimes but getting nowhere. One of the victims works 
at the hospital and, suspecting one of the patients as being the perpetrator, makes all the 
data available to the police. Coincidentally, your data happens to indicate an increase in 
your heart rate at the time of every crime. With nothing else to go on, the police make 
you their prime suspect and start searching for evidence that can be used against you in 
court. 
16. What do you think of the above scenarios? 
 




18. Have these scenarios raised your awareness about the privacy of your personal 
data?  
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a. Not at all. 
b. A little. 
c. A lot. 
 
19. Would you consider changing the way that your data are handled or disclosed 
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Appendix B – Evaluation handout document 
PersoNISM Trial Evaluation 
 
This experiment evaluates the PersoNISM (Personalised Negotiation, Identity Selection 
and Management) tool in the context of pervasive systems. A pervasive system is a 
computing environment embedded with sensors and digital devices such as smart phones, 
tablets and laptops. These devices provide information (often sensitive information) about 
the user and their environment such as the user’s current location, activity, people in the 
vicinity, current room temperature, light intensity etc. This and other information is 
collected, processed and meshed together to form the user’s profile. Applications running 
on the user’s devices can access this information to provide their services to their users.   
Pervasive systems are slowly starting to appear in our daily lives as sensors such as GPS 
and accelerometers are becoming standard features in smart phones and cars providing 
location based services to users. As more sensors are embedded in our environment, the 
more information about ourselves will be captured in a digital form which raises the issue 
of privacy.  
Currently, applications provide the terms and conditions in a privacy policy to users and 
ask them to accept them. The PersoNISM tool allows the user to negotiate these terms 
and conditions to fit their privacy requirements and configure their digital identity to 
represent themselves to applications and services.  
If you have any questions, please don’t hesitate to ask them before continuing with the 
experiment.  
Note that any information about you collected during this experiment will be used for 
analysis and will be deleted afterwards.  
Step 1. You will be timed for this step. 
Use an Internet browser and find and read Google’s privacy policy. 
Use an Internet browser and find and read BBC’s privacy policy.  
Use an Internet browser and find and read Heriot Watt University’s privacy policy.  
Answer the following questions: 
 
1. Do you use the BBC and Google websites and HWU services regularly? 
2. Have you ever read their respective privacy policies before? 
3. If the answer to the above question is no, explain why 
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4. Before you read their privacy policies 
a. did you know what information BBC, Google and HWU collect through 
your interactions with their services?  
b. did you know what they do with the information they collect from you? 
5. After reading their privacy policies 
c. do you know exactly what information BBC, Google and HWU collect 
through your interactions with their services? (list the information they 
collect) 
d. do you know what they do with the information they collect from you? 
(write how they use your information) 
6. After reading the privacy policies, can you tell how you can make changes 








8. Do you know whether information you have disclosed to these companies has 
been shared with other companies? (yes/no)  
9. Do you know how to stop these companies from sharing your information with 
other companies (yes/no)? 
10. Do you know if your information has been processed further and combined with 
other information to infer more information about yourself (yes/no)?  
11. Do you know how to tell the company to stop doing that (yes/no)? 
Go to step 2. 
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Step 2. 
a) Enter your details in the form and click “Save Details”. 
b) In the Window titled “PersoNISM Evaluation Tool”, go to the “My Data” menu 
and click on “Trust Settings”. In the window that opens, adjust the current trust 
values to indicate your personal trust level for each of the three companies with 
regard to how much you trust them to safeguard your data and respect your 
privacy. When you are done, click “Save” and close the window. 
c) There should be 4 services showing in the “Available Apps” section. Click on 
“Google Venue Finder” and then click “install”.  
The next window shows you Google’s privacy policy in a digital format 
allowing you to make changes to the terms and conditions (T&Cs) to fit your 
privacy requirements. Make your changes to each of the data items requested by 
Google by clicking the “Next” and “Back” buttons available at the bottom of the 
page. You can reset your changes in each of the data items by clicking the 
“Reset changes” button. This will only reset the changes you made to the data 
item you are currently viewing. When you are finished, click “Continue”.  
Your negotiation with Google begins. Google responds with an updated privacy 
policy indicating if they can satisfy your requests. Requests that cannot be 
satisfied fully are marked with a warning. If you are happy with Google’s 
response, click “Continue”, otherwise click “Cancel”. 
Assuming you have clicked “Continue”, the next window that pops up allows 
you to create an identity to interact with Google. Your new identity must be 
linked with the data that is requested by Google. In this case, the data are limited 
to “name”, “email”, “birthday” and “locationSymbolic” (Symbolic locations 
indicate locations with semantic meaning such as a postal address as opposed to 
location using GPS coordinates). Clicking on the items on the left hand side will 
update the current values on the right side that are currently available in your 
profile. Select a value you want to link with your new identity and click “Add 
selected attribute” or add a new attribute of the selected data type and type a new 
value. The new value will appear in the left hand. At the bottom of this page, 
you will see the list of data you have linked with your new identity. Don’t forget 
to type a name (username) for your new identity at the top. When you are 
finished, click “OK >>”. Google Venue Finder should now appear in the 
“Installed Apps” section.  
Appendix B – Evaluation handout document 
Page 203 
 
Answer the following questions: 
1. On a scale of 1 to 10, indicate the level of understanding of the terms and 
conditions in each form presented to you: (1 is you don’t understand at all, 10 
being you understood fully) 
Text:   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
PersoNISM:  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2. On a scale of 1 to 10, how valuable is it to specify the terms and conditions on a 
per data and per service basis? (where 1 is not valuable at all and 10 being 
extremely valuable) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
3. On a scale of 1 to 10, how happy would you be to configure the terms and 
conditions for every data type and every service? (1 being not happy at all and 10 
being very happy) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Go to Step 3. 
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Step 3. 
a) In the Applications window, click on the BBC News app and click “install”. In 
the Privacy Policy Negotiation form, you can now make use of the “Get 
Personalised Suggestions” functionality. When you click it, the terms and 
conditions are configured based on your previous negotiation. You can reset the 
changes by clicking “Restore changes”. Configure the terms and conditions 
suggested for every data type requested as you wish and click “Continue”.  
b) In the next form, review the BBC’s changes and if you are happy with the 
changes, click “Continue”. Otherwise, click “cancel”. By clicking cancel, you 
abort the negotiation and installation of the service.  
c) Assuming you clicked “Continue”, the next window asks you to select an 
identity to interact with BBC. You can create a new identity if you wish or use 
the same identity you used to interact with Google. If you use the same identity, 
the data that you linked with this identity and you made available to Google, will 
also become available to BBC. If you want different data (for example, a 
different email address) to be disclosed to the BBC, create a new identity.  
d) If you decided to create a new identity, you can make use of the “Get 
recommended attributes” functionality which will show you what attributes can 
be linked with that identity according to your previous activity and the trust you 
assigned to the services in the previous step. When you are happy with your new 
identity, click “OK >>”. 
e) In the main window, go to the menu “Identities” and click on “Identities 
Viewer”. You can see the identities you created and the corresponding values of 
each data type linked to each identity. After you are done, close the Identities 
viewer window 
f) In the main window, click on “BBC Weather” and click install. The system 
should now have enough information to negotiate on your behalf and select the 
appropriate identity. Click yes.  
Answer the following questions. 
1. On a scale of 1 to 10, did you feel that the personalised suggestions were useful? 
(1 being not useful at all and 10 being very useful) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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2. On a scale of 1 to 10, how much would you trust the system to perform this process 
on your behalf without your involvement in later negotiations? (1 indicating no 
trust in the system at all and 10 indicating complete trust in the system) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
3. On a scale of 1 to 10, how likely would you be to configure the terms and 
conditions for every data type and every service with the help of personalised 
suggestions? (1 being very unlikely and 10 being highly likely) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Go to step 4. 
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Step 4. 
a) Click on any of the installed applications. On the application window, click 
on “Login in” and login with the identity available. 
b) As soon as you login, the application retrieves your data from the system. On 
the right hand side of the main window of the evaluation tool, you will find a 
notification section. Access control notifications will appear there to ask you 
if you want to disclose your data and data obfuscation notifications to ask 
you how you want to obfuscate your data. Use the slider to see examples of 
different data obfuscation levels and select the one you want to use. The 
service will try to retrieve all data types (name, email, birthday and 
locationSymbolic) from your profile. Configure the obfuscation levels for 
each one. Go back to the application window to see the retrieved data. 
c) Go back to the application window and click on “Update profile”. 
Notifications in the main window will appear in a personalised format with a 
countdown timer. If the countdown timer reaches 0, the system will apply 
the recommended access permission and data obfuscation level to that item.  
d) In the main window, go to menu “My Data” and click on “profile 
information”. In the search box enter “locationSymbolic”. Change the value 
from EM1.69 to EM1.24 to simulate a location change (you walking from 
the puma lab to the student office). The application will try to retrieve your 
new location and a non-timed notification will appear in the notifications 
area. Click as you wish.  
Answer the following questions: 
1. Taking into account all the steps you did, on a scale of 1 to 10 indicate if using 
this tool would make you take your privacy more seriously. (1 indicating that it 
would make you take it less seriously, 5 indicating no change and 10 indicating it 
would make you take your privacy very seriously) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
2. On a scale of 1 to 10, indicate how useful you would find having such control of 
your personal data. (1 being not useful at all and 10 being very useful) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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3. On a scale of 1 to 10, indicate how necessary you think it is to have tools like this 
to control your privacy. (1 not necessary at all, 10 being essential to your privacy) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
4. Do you think service providers (such as google, facebook, websites) should be 
forced by law to give YOU control of your data? (yes/no) 
5. Do you believe that personal devices such as mobile phones and tablets should 
have built in privacy control mechanisms such as the one you experimented with? 
(yes/no) 
6. As our world becomes more and more pervasive do you believe that privacy 
protection is becoming a bigger problem? (1 indicating you don’t believe it’s 
becoming a bigger problem, 10 indicates you think it’s a very big issue). 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
7. If tools such as the ones you have just experimented with were provided at a small 
cost, would you be prepared to pay for them to protect your privacy? (1 indicates 
you would never pay, 10 being you would definitely pay) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
8. Finally, can you express in a few words what would be your biggest worry 
regarding your privacy in a pervasive environment? 
  
End of experiment. 
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Appendix C – PersoNISM code repository 
The source code for the PersoNISM system can be retrieved from the following Github 
repository:  
https://github.com/EPapadopoulou/SOCIETIES-Platform/tree/Student_Trial_Eliza  
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